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1 Transcendental Reflection 
 
The suggestion that there are certain limitations to the kinds of things one 
can know is a familiar one; one not particularly philosophical or controversial. 
That there are different ways in which the notion of limitation can be used 
with reference to forms of knowledge is a fact that invites philosophical 
controversy in many quarters, extending not merely through the question’s 
home terrain of epistemology, but also, amongst other areas of inquiry, that 
great “queen of the sciences”, metaphysics. Beyond the commonsense 
curiosity regarding the possibility of particular empirical facts being or not 
being the case, questions of limitation tend to arise philosophically with respect 
to such things as knowledge of the external world, knowledge of other minds,  
and perhaps more disturbingly, the validity of rational inquiry and even 
knowledge itself. It is clear that philosophy’s turning of such things held dear 
into objects of scrutiny can be a sometimes-uncomfortable enterprise. 
By engrossing oneself in these general questions the more specific idea 
arises that there might be either describable or perhaps even circumscribable 
conditions accountable for some of these purported limitations (in the latter 
case, to set out on the task of defining the limits of limits). This is a further 
specification1 that can be taken in a number of ways, both philosophical and 
non-philosophical. We might think of the latter grouping as involving, in the 
most respectable cases, a scientific account of limitation; in the terms relevant 
for us here, perhaps of physical laws describing conditions of perception for a 
perceiving subject, for example.2 That there is a tension between this way and 
the former case pertaining to a philosophical understanding of the question of 
limitation is significant, and the depth of this significance will become 
thematic in the course of thinking pursued herein. Before broaching this line 
however, a very general picture of the scope of the family of questions to be 
addressed here should be situated appropriately.  
                                                
1 To refer to the general specification immediately above; not to, at this point, associate 
description and circumscription with non-philosophical and philosophical senses of 
limitation respectively.  
2 To hazard a preliminary equivocation of "scientific" with "descriptive". 
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Our way of approaching the question of limitation here will be via the 
variety of philosophy and philosophical method entitled “transcendental”. This 
variety of philosophical thinking brings with it persistent controversy not 
only in terms of what questions it might settle, yet also in terms of its very 
nature; it being a matter of debate what the term “transcendental” does, 
should, or even could mean. Preliminarily, and as ought to be evident in an 
essay’s concerning itself with a defence of such a thing, it is a stamp of the 
arguments to be developed and defended here that the term “transcendental” 
not only has sense, and is a variety of philosophical thinking worthy of 
investigation, yet is also a sound, methodical approach to philosophical 
problems of some merit.  
The common term for the topic of this essay is then “transcendental 
arguments”, yet an important terminological point will be made here via the 
programmatic suggestion that one ought to reconceive the central task of such 
philosophical method and evidence such reconception by instead using the 
title “transcendental proof”.1 The question of precisely what is involved in 
reconsidering the main prerogative of certain kinds of transcendental 
argumentation—those spoken of here as “transcendental proof”—will be 
given extended treatment in hope of delivering a positive and novel answer 
which satisfies not only the demands of philosophical rigour, yet also the 
demand of attention to historical developments which ought to have alerted 
us to alternate ways in which to regard transcendental philosophy.2 
The reconception alluded to above, with regard to transcendental proof, 
essentially involves a change of perspective as to not only the impetus for 
something such as a transcendental method, yet also the end-goal of 
                                                
1 Recognition of the importance of this terminological point is present in the work of such 
philosophers as Manfred Baum, Kenneth Westphal, and Mark Sacks to note a few.  
2 The typical association of what have been called “transcendental arguments” with their 
origin in Kant will be given suggestive treatment—although unfortunately not entirely 
satisfactory treatment, in terms of extension—by ranging this association to include what we 
might call “transcendental insights” found in Hegel and Husserl (Hegel will be suggestively 
referred to in Section 3.4.2 and Chapter 4, while we will see some affinities between Husserl’s 
phenomenology and the account we give in Section 3.2 of situated thought). Additionally, our 
historical sensitivity will involve also mentioning precisely what it is that has led to un-
Kantian varieties of transcendental arguments to dominate the literature. 
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employing such a philosophical tool. Summarily, we can say that in 
contemporary philosophy the term “transcendental argument” has been used 
to refer to certain kinds of arguments that seek to establish the conditions of the 
possibility of something, X. In the main, and as is the topical drift here, 
particular cases of such arguments substitute for X such things as “the unity 
and objectivity of experience”, “the existence of language”, “the employment 
of the concept X”, “the capacity to refer to oneself”, and so on; that is, such 
arguments intend to establish something regarding our experience, our usage 
of language, or the existence of thought. Perhaps there is no more interesting 
philosophical task than delivering plausible answers to these kinds of 
questions. But equally, at times, it would appear that few more demanding 
philosophical tasks can be set—perhaps mostly with reference to the first of 
the epithets enclosed in inverted commas (the unity and objectivity of 
experience)—since very little in way of conclusion or agreement seems to 
have come, or to be on the horizon. 
However, the intended aim for employing transcendental proof is to show 
how more than the inference from one or more premises, in propositional 
form, stating some fact/s about experience, to a conclusion in propositional 
form making some claim about the nature of experience—how more than this 
is needed to secure a grasp on the scope of transcendental knowledge. The 
shape of transcendental proof involves locating arguments that make such 
claims about experience within the experiential framework about which they 
make such claims; transcendental proof aims to evidence the nature of 
empirical thought by encouraging reflection as to what is involved in having 
such thought.1 In this way, transcendental proof ought to be seen as directed 
at answering the “how possible” questions which, to put the thought in 
Kantian dress, amounts to enquiring as to the shape and limits of possible 
experience. For, as Kant said, “in transcendental knowledge...our guide is the 
                                                
1 We can here note the similarity between the idea of “what it is to have a thought”, or “what 
is involved in having a thought about an experiential framework”, and the idea of “what it 
takes to have a concept”. Unfortunately, we cannot address the questions this fascinating 
issue raises. For now, we can note that the idea of what is involved in having empirical thought 
will be given attention in Section 3.2 entitled “Situated Thought”.  
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possibility of experience.”1 
Transcendental proof ought then to be seen as a philosophical method 
related to those familiar transcendental arguments which have occupied so 
many philosophers in the recent past, the crucial difference being that such 
proof occupies itself not merely with the logical relations between the 
premises of an argument directed at establishing some conclusion about 
experience, yet is the crucial core of certain transcendental arguments and 
thereby evidences their truth for the kind of epistemic subject for which they 
have relevance. The opacity of this phrasing of the problem will only dissipate 
(if only partially) with an extended and focussed treatment; something which 
will be the topic of a later chapter. What we can note here, however, is that 
committing to a positive account of transcendental proof will involve reviving 
some theses from the doctrine of transcendental idealism, the lack of 
enthusiasm toward that doctrine notwithstanding. For although much recent 
philosophy concerns itself with Kantian questions, not all of such work has 
hopes for more than extraction of singular insights conceived of as separable 
from Kant’s larger and purportedly treacherous metaphysical claims. That 
being said, this essay is not primarily concerned with Kant exegesis either, 
since its focus is on reconstruction, although a more positive tone than is 
usual will be found here with respect to Kant’s general philosophical project 
regarding the scope and limits of human knowledge, even if this positive tone 
is primarily expressed in the determined effort to show how Kant’s project 
can be extended, even if not completed (this aspect of the essay pertains also 
to historical sensitivity vis-à-vis those philosophers after Kant who made their 
own attempt on similar epistemological problems).  
Following on from this thought, we can observe how in recent times there 
have been numerous attempts at showing how Kant’s doctrine of 
transcendental idealism can be viewed in ways diverging from the orthodoxy 
                                                
1 Immanuel Kant (1998) Critique of Pure Reason, trans. by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, 
Cambridge University Press: A783/B811. Unless otherwise noted, all further references to 
Kant will be to this volume. Additionally, references of this kind will simply include the 
standard A and B edition page numbers. 
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of the recent past. Arguably the most salient and focussed of these attempts 
lies in the pages of Henry Allison’s classic interpretive text Kant’s 
Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense.1 The interpretation of 
transcendental idealism offered there is known generally as the “two-aspect” 
view. It is a view that places emphasis on the general thought expressed by 
Kant’s admonitions in the chapter of the Critique of Pure Reason (hereafter 
Critique) entitled “On the ground of the distinction of all objects in general 
into phenomena and noumena” which involve insistence on a purely negative 
conception of “noumena”;2 i.e., one that makes no positive claim about the 
existence of things in themselves yet instead employs the negative conception 
of noumena as a way of drawing a limit to knowledge.3 I will not indulge in 
an evaluation of this interpretation of Kant’s doctrine of transcendental 
idealism here, although I will at times make references to certain interpretive 
claims made by Allison insofar as I believe such claims bring out a distinctive 
and important aspect of the kind of transcendental proof which it is the task 
of this essay to elucidate. Involving such a revised interpretation of 
transcendental idealism in an account of transcendental proof will therefore 
serve as a complementary task whereby such an interpretation raises hopes 
for a positive account of such transcendental proof as it might be possible to 
construct.  
To clarify the position of the reading of transcendental idealism referred to 
above with respect to the typical reading apparently accepted by the majority 
of the philosophers concerned with transcendental arguments in the recent 
past, we can make note of how the traditional, or typical, reading has been 
referred to as the “two-world” view (sometimes also called the “two-object” 
view). Although not referred to as such by him, this interpretation of 
transcendental idealism is that generally accepted by the philosopher who 
represents the modern source of interest in transcendental arguments; that 
                                                
1 Henry Allison (2004) Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: Revised and Enlarged Edition, Yale 
University Press. 
2 It is noteworthy that these admonitions are most explicit in the B edition of the Critique. 
3 The linkage to Tractarian remarks is of course here tempting, although will not be a focus. 
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philosopher being P.F. Strawson. This fact is significant if we reflect on how 
much a shaping influence Strawson has had on the literature of 
transcendental arguments, and how his general conception of such 
arguments, as highly influential, has smuggled in its carriage a particular—
now contested—reading of the doctrine to which some claim transcendental 
arguments (and especially transcendental proofs) are tied.  
Admittedly, the question of whether transcendental arguments are 
separable from transcendental idealism is a question for elsewhere, however, 
it will emerge that the particular conception of transcendental proof argued 
for here is tied to some core theses of transcendental idealism.1 As said, I will 
not be committing to Kant exegesis here, so I will simply drop Kant’s name 
from further references to that philosophical doctrine concerning us, since it 
ought to be possible to consider a particular reading of the central arguments 
of such a doctrine without engaging in dispute over what the one who 
advanced them meant precisely by them. 2    
To risk a brief digression, we can observe two unique argumentative 
strategies applied in the case of re-interpretation of a philosophical doctrine. 
Firstly, there are those who may recognise a solid core of sound and valid 
claims contained in a doctrine, or entailed by it, yet may find an aspect of 
their expression (perhaps through purported ineptitude of the original 
thinker) unacceptable such as to void the overall doctrine as itself sound and 
valid. Secondly, there are those who may recognise the same solid core of 
arguments which they, in seeing them as sound and valid, opt to trumpet as 
the intended truth of the doctrine, however obscured that core of truth may be 
                                                
1 We will offer a proposal for these “core theses” in Section 3.5.  
2 Additionally, I will desist from associating Kant’s name with the doctrine at every turn since 
I believe this makes thorough re-interpretation more difficult whereby it seems incumbent 
upon one to claim “Kant meant to say...” or “Kant should have said, more consistently...”By 
alluding to transcendental idealism plain and simple we are able to make claims about such a 
doctrine without being open to attack from those who engage in textual exegesis to launch 
the appeal that “Kant did not say X, nor did he mean to say X”. A basic claim to be made, 
however, is that the doctrine of transcendental idealism can be taken to mean something 
other than it has been taken to mean by many. More generally, we might think of this trend as 
the symptom of a problem with attitudes toward the term “idealism” insofar as such attitudes 
are largely fearful. 
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by possible infelicities in related expressions of the force of the doctrine. If we 
think of these two strategies as possible options for one bearing positive 
hopes for such a core of arguments in the doctrine of transcendental idealism, 
we might think of the former strategy as aiming to extract these arguments 
out of their original context and apply them in a new model—although 
however happy it might be for such excellent core arguments to find a new 
home away from their purportedly abrasive neighbours, one wonders as to 
whether the original expression of the arguments themselves can be 
maintained, their force intact, if they are subjected to such extraction and 
relocation. We might also wonder if the second strategy, by attempting to 
reconceive the neighbourhood of the central core of argument is not in fact 
misconstruing it, however commendable it might be to “take the good with 
the bad”, so to speak. Both these argumentative strategies thus bear virtuous 
and poisonous fruit alike, and it may come down to temperament which one 
sees as the most encouraging. 
To use the above paragraph as an instructive stepping stone, we can refer 
to the former strategy (let us call it “Strategy A”1) as that employed by the 
philosopher whose work on transcendental proof will be the focus of the 
main, middle chapter of this essay: Mark Sacks. Apart from what else will be 
said regarding Sacks’s work, mainly in praise, it can be noted here that the 
extent to which transcendental idealism can simply be discarded in the way 
Sacks seems to intend it to be2 is up for debate. However, again, we will 
involve ourselves in such a debate briefly and only to the extent to which such 
an evaluation impacts on giving the best possible account of transcendental 
proof. Thus, from the outset it appears that it is a commitment, yet not one to 
                                                
1 This strategy will be commented upon with relation the latter strategy, which we will call 
“Strategy B”, in a later discussion (in Section 3.5) of what I take to be the relevant core 
arguments of transcendental idealism. 
2 This attitude is taken toward transcendental idealism in Mark Sacks (2000) Objectivity and 
Insight, Oxford University Press. I will single out his later paper, Sacks (2005) The Nature of 
Transcendental Argumentation, International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 13, pp. 439-460, 
as an exception since it is not manifestly clear in that work exactly what attitude Sacks is 
taking toward transcendental idealism—particularly in regard to the aspect relevant for us 
here: its relationship to transcendental proof.  
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articulate beyond the terms explicated just now, of the account of 
transcendental proof to be argued for here that such an account implicates a 
transcendentally ideal model of knowledge. However, exactly what the core 
of such a model of knowledge comes to is unclear, so a suggestive proposal 
differing from the typically accepted version will be given in these pages. 
To link up with the classic origin of transcendental argumentation and 
proof as found in Kant it can be noted that Kant’s original intended reflections 
were concerned with self-consciousness and the unity and objectivity of 
experience, both being topics of some of the most fascinating yet troublesome 
of philosophical problems. Kant’s reflections were most exhaustively engaged 
in within the section of the Critique entitled “Transcendental Deduction of the 
Pure Concepts of the Understanding”, although other sections such as the 
Refutation of Idealism deal with related matters. It has been a hallmark of 20th 
century readings of these classic arguments that they are read through the 
looking glass of the philosophy of language, which is a happy fact for the 
most part where such a lens allows for a reshaping that vastly increases the 
perspicuity of (what seem to be) the originally intended ideas and results in 
reconstructions which glisten with clarity and power where their ancestors 
suffered from myopia or blurred vision. As noted above, the dark side of this 
fact resides in precisely the neglect of the arguable dependence of such 
philosophical edifice on, at least a substantial part of, if not all of, the doctrine 
in which they originated. 
From the outset then, we can embrace the program of reconstructing 
Kant’s philosophical project in his Transcendental Deduction, epitomised by 
Strawson’s attempt in The Bounds of Sense,1 while keeping on guard with an 
awareness of the peculiar hazards encountered by Strawson’s strategy 
employed there, such as will emerge shortly. Strawson’s reading of Kant2 will, 
                                                
1 P.F. Strawson (1966) The Bounds of Sense: An essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, Methuen 
& Co. Ltd. Page references are to the Routledge edition of 2006.  
2 It should be noted that in Strawson (1997) Kant’s New Foundations of Metaphysics, in “Entity 
and Identity and Other Essays”, Oxford University Press, an interpretation of Kant’s 
transcendental idealism similar to the two-aspect view is considered. Strawson accords a little 
sympathy before announcing his discomfort with the way such a reading does not do justice 
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unfortunately, not be something we are able to address here in full, although 
it is worth noting that in some of his later work1 it appears he was 
uncomfortable with several of his original claims and made attempts to 
rethink relevant issues where they arose.   
To reconnect with our opening reflections, by considering the 
philosophical notion of limitation mentioned above, we can see quite readily 
how this notion relates to the term “transcendental”; although precisely what 
this relationship amounts to will prove to be an abiding problem for us in the 
analyses entered into here. Thus, a sensible entry onto the landscape comes in 
the form of a consideration of Kant’s framing of the notion transcendental: 
 
“I entitle transcendental all knowledge which is occupied not so much with objects as 
with the mode of our knowledge of objects insofar as this mode of knowledge is to be 
possible a priori.”2  
 
Thus, from the very beginning Kant establishes a link between a priori 
knowledge and transcendental knowledge. We need to pay heed to this 
comment as it should be taken as a directive for investigation into the hopes 
                                                                                                                                       
to what seems to be the full force of Kant’s intentions. Strawson says: “If, in accordance with a 
purely negative concept of the noumenon, the thought of things in themselves is to be 
understood simply and solely as the thought of the very things of which human knowledge is 
possible, but the thought of them in total abstraction from what have been shown (or argued) 
to be the conditions of the very possibility of any such knowledge, then it must surely be 
concluded that the thought is empty; for the doctrine that we can have no knowledge of 
things as they are in themselves then reduces to a tautology: the tautology that knowledge of 
the things of which we can have knowledge is impossible except under the conditions under 
which it is possible; or: we can know of things only what we can know of them. In that case, 
the ‘idealism’ in Kant’s ‘transcendental idealism’ would appear as little more than a token 
name; or as, at most, the acknowledgement that there may be more to the nature of the very 
things we can have knowledge of than we can possibly know of them.” (Op. cit.: p. 241) 
Given this sentiment, Strawson would seem to be in agreement with critics of the two-aspect 
view, such as Guyer, who view it as an “anodyne” reading of transcendental idealism. 
1 Including: Strawson (1989) Sensibility, Understanding, and the Doctrine of Synthesis: Comments 
on Henrich and Guyer, in “Kant’s Transcendental Deductions: The Three Critiques and the Opus 
Postumum”, ed. by Eckart Förster, Stanford University Press; (1997) Kant’s New Foundations of 
Metaphysics, in “Entity and Identity and Other Essays”, Oxford University Press; and (1997) 
The Problem of Realism and the A Priori, in “Entity and Identity and Other Essays”, Oxford 
University Press. 
2 Kant (1933) Critique of Pure Reason, trans. by Norman Kemp Smith, 2nd ed., Macmillan: 
A11/B25. The Kemp Smith translation is employed here due to the efficacy with which it 
brings out the intended point.   
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for transcendental argumentation and transcendental proof, regardless of 
whether these two characterisations of knowledge are to be viewed, in the last 
analysis, as separable or not. Of related importance, then, is a sound 
understanding of what a priori knowledge means in its essence for Kant. He 
says that 
 
“we can know a priori of things only what we ourselves have put into them.”1 
 
So it is clear that Kant’s conception of a priori knowledge is a variety of what 
has been called “maker’s knowledge”2 insofar as such knowledge essentially 
involves reference to one’s own contribution to one’s knowledge. Ignoring the 
subtleties of Kant’s position for a moment, let us content ourselves that at 
least for him there is an indispensable connection here. Despite this, much 20th 
century work on transcendental arguments has construed them such that it is 
thought “any inference from a successful conceptual practice (use of concepts 
a priori) to its presuppositions is a transcendental argument.”3 Therefore, and 
as alluded to already, it is a main contention here that the dominant readings 
of the scope and limits of transcendental arguments err. Precisely how these 
readings err will be explored in the next chapter, although at this point we can 
make the preliminary remark that such contemporary readings spring from 
the rejection of the philosophical context out of which transcendental 
strategies originated; specifically, Kant’s transcendental idealism. The 
adoption of a purportedly empiricist or naturalistic outlook, through the 
influence of Hume, has resulted in contemporary views of all things 
transcendental being skewed, insofar as the condition of acceptance of them 
has been reconception—and not radical reconception either. Instead, the 
modern versions of transcendental arguments are modest and highly 
domesticated, and devoid of the apparent metaphysical excesses the 
                                                
1 Op. cit.: B xviii. 
2 This phrasing is used in Jaako Hintikka (1972) Transcendental Arguments: Genuine and 
Spurious, Nous, 6, pp. 274-280. 
3 Op. cit.: p. 277. Hintikka asserts that this conception of transcendental arguments has done 
much to damage the possibility of accounting for them adequately.  
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possession of which by their ancestors has been the main subject of criticism.  
Given this last point, we should have an understanding as to how conflict 
might arise regarding the interpretation of a fundamental aspect of 
transcendental arguments, since arguably not every account of the way 
inferences are made from successful conceptual practices to their 
presuppositions is going to involve an appeal to the notion of this as 
transcendental knowledge—as “maker’s knowledge”—and additionally, since 
arguably the task of unearthing the basic structure, or fundamental 
framework, of our most basic conceptual practices upon which all other 
understanding is based does not entail any claims about the structure of 
experience more generally, the latter being a central concern of Kant’s 
transcendental investigations. 
We are now at a point at which a crude picture of the structure of this 
essay can be drawn. The following three chapters each deal with fairly 
specific tasks, although aim collectively at arriving at some kind of positive 
conclusion vis-à-vis transcendental proof and transcendental philosophy 
generally. Chapter 2 concerns itself with general problems encountered, and 
solutions offered, with regard to transcendental argumentation in the 
literature and concludes with a more specific diagnosis of the way forward. 
Chapter 3 makes an attempt at reconstructing and buttressing some of the 
arguments provided in the work of Mark Sacks vis-à-vis transcendental proof 
and, for its own part, concludes with some further diagnoses as to what more 
needs to be done to adequately construct such transcendental proof. Finally, 
Chapter 4 makes some suggestions and advances some arguments for a 
revised conception of the structure and role of transcendental proof, its 
relationship to transcendental philosophy generally, and its links to what 
Strawson has called “descriptive metaphysics”.1  
 
                                                
1 Exploration of the nuances of this thought is, of course, the self-assigned task of Strawson 
(1959) Individuals: An essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, Methuen & Co. Ltd. Page references are 
to the Routledge edition of 2006.  
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2 Evaluating Transcendental Argumentation 
2.1 The Scope of the Problem 
 
When reflecting on themes that radiate from the idea that there are 
limitations for thought, we tend to conjure up such questions as follows: 
“What might it mean, or be, to have thoughts about a world insofar as they 
are intelligible as such?” That is, we might ask, “What requirements do we 
have, what conditions is it possible to enumerate, that must ground any 
coherent account of the way self-conscious thought about an objective world 
might be possible?”1 Arguments directed at resolving difficulties inherent in 
questions of this form are those to which we have already alluded; those 
generally known as “transcendental” forms of argument. As we also noted, 
such arguments have a curious history and are notorious for carrying 
controversial commitments; the reason for the characterisation of those 
commitments as such it will at this point be efficacious to illuminate. An early 
diagnosis of this controversy and an awareness of the consequences of it will 
become important since, as we noted, the reading of transcendental proof 
given here is committed to a (perhaps inadequately demonstrated) version of 
transcendental idealism, which itself is a salient target for controversy.  
To rehearse a well-known historical fact about the birth of what is 
generally called analytic philosophy we can observe that few more important 
shaping influences exist for such philosophy than Frege’s revolution in logic 
constituted in his series of seminal works written toward the end of the 19th 
century and at the beginning of the 20th.2 This Fregean innovation in logical 
                                                
1 These epithets are italicised to draw attention to the precise specification that Kant’s notion 
of apperception and the possibility of having a subjective take on an objective world are 
tightly interrelated.  
2 Including, perhaps most importantly, Gottlob Frege (1972) Conceptual Notation and Related 
Articles, trans. and ed. by Terrell Ward Bynum, Oxford University Press; (1980) The 
Foundations of Arithmetic, trans. by J.L. Austin, Blackwell Publishers; (1980) Function and 
Concept, in “Translations from the Writings of Gottlob Frege”, ed. by Peter Geach and Max 
Black, Blackwell Publishers and Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.; (1980) On Concept and 
Object in “Translations from the Writings of Gottlob Frege”, ed. by Peter Geach and Max 
Transcendental-Phenomenological Proof and Descriptive Metaphysics 
Byron Clugston 
16 
theory which involved, amongst other things, the development of some 
fundaments of propositional logic, effectively made redundant in the eyes of 
the majority of philosophers the Aristotelian term logic dominant up until 
that time. An additional result of this innovation in logic was that the reason 
for Kant’s employment of the concept/intuition distinction dissolved. For the 
Aristotelian logic held to be, in Kant’s eyes, the final and complete word on 
such a domain of theory was unable to account for the logic of relations; 
something Kant enabled his theory of knowledge to account for, in its own 
way, through the faculty of pure intuition; space and time. Amongst other 
complex reasons for rejecting a transcendentally ideal model of knowledge, 
analytic philosophers, as generally holding to a conception of analysis as 
performed strictly under the rubric of the propositional logic initiated by 
Frege, can (seemingly) easily ignore the redundant Kantian distinction 
between the two forms of contribution to knowledge: concepts and intuitions.  
This change in orientation has meant that few accounts of transcendental 
arguments exist that persist to associate them with Kant’s original 
concept/intuition distinction, since it would be inadvisable to attempt a 
reconstruction of a philosophical method such as transcendental 
argumentation whilst allowing that method to be tied to a philosophical 
doctrine now regarded as erroneous. However, not only may there be insights 
available through a reconsideration of the Kantian distinction, there may exist 
the possibility of the joint reconstruction of that distinction; one that would 
harmonise with a reconstruction of transcendental proof.1 We will have to 
leave that potentially fascinating task to another place however, whilst saying 
that a quite general picture of what is at stake in this reconsideration will be 
offered in later sections when we undertake reflection as to the link between 
                                                                                                                                       
Black, Blackwell Publishers and Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.; and (1980) What is a 
Function? in “Translations from the Writings of Gottlob Frege”, ed. by Peter Geach and Max 
Black, Blackwell Publishers and Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 
1 John McDowell (1996) Mind and World, Harvard University Press, contains a classic case of 
the modernised version of Kant’s concept/intuition split, primarily in terms of attempting to 
conceptualise the Kantian notion of “intuition”. This issue bears quite directly on much that 
will be said here, although for reasons of focus will not be granted substantial attention. 
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transcendental proof and what Strawson has called “descriptive 
metaphysics”.     
An additional development in analytic philosophy which is highly 
relevant for considering the current status of transcendental argumentation 
and proof is the innovative approach to thinking of synthetic a priori 
judgment as advanced in the work of the logical positivists, most notably by 
Rudolf Carnap.1 Summarily, Carnap’s view of the scope of scientific 
knowledge parallels Kant’s in some important respects, although diverging in 
others. The parallel consists in Carnap’s agreement with Kant that, roughly, 
there are pure (or, non-empirical) and empirical parts to scientific knowledge, 
and that the former consist of synthetic a priori judgments whereas the latter 
involve synthetic a posteriori judgments. Additionally, both philosophers 
agree that the pure part of scientific knowledge, the synthetic a priori part, is 
constitutive of the objects of experience; it makes possible the formulations of 
particular empirical laws.2 The divergence consists in what further ways the 
notion of synthetic a priori judgment is interpreted.  
As is well known, Kant thinks of synthetic a priori judgment as being 
available via the validity of the a priori application of the Categories (the 
intellectual contribution to knowledge) to pure intuition (the sensible 
contribution to knowledge); scientific and thus also common empirical 
reasoning proceeds synthetically—that is, not merely through conceptual 
analysis3—yet in the a priori mode, in virtue of the a priori applicability of the 
said Categories. Carnap, however, holds a view of the purported synthetic a 
priori judgments made in particular scientific enterprises as being relative to, 
and dependent upon, the wider assumptions of the paradigm in which that 
science participates; i.e., in the case of the formulation of laws of motion, as in 
Newton’s Laws, the prior assumption of a spatio-temporal framework is 
                                                
1 Excellent background treatment of this issue is given in Michael Friedman (1999) Geometry, 
Convention, and the Relativized A Priori: Reichenbach, Schlick and Carnap, in “Reconsidering 
Logical Positivism”, Cambridge University Press.  
2 Op. cit.: p. 60. 
3 This would constitute unbridled metaphysical system building and represent precisely the 
kind of procedure Kant attacks in his Transcendental Dialectic in the Critique. 
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required.1 However, since the wider paradigm of scientific reasoning may 
alter, Carnap’s conception of the a priori admits of relativisation to the 
framework or requisite background theoretical assumptions; in the case of the 
spatio-temporal framework employed in physics, the theory of general 
relativity undercuts the Newtonian conception of an absolute space-time 
continuum.  
To sharpen the point of difference from Kant further, we can note that 
Carnap’s formulation of his theory involves the usage of the terms L-rules 
and P-rules, where the former are logical rules, or analytic sentences, and the 
latter are physical rules, or synthetic sentences. While the latter P-rules refer 
to specific formulations of physical laws, Carnap allows for the former 
epithet, L-rules, to refer not only to rules of logic yet also to principles of 
physical geometry; an approach to thinking about Euclidean geometry, which 
Kant had taken to be the paradigm of a demonstrably a priori science, that 
meant it would be then regarded as not only merely empirical, yet also false 
in the context of the theory of general relativity.2  
For our purposes here, “the whole point” of making note of 
“the...conception of relativized and dynamical a priori principles” is to 
recognise the “profound conceptual revolutions that have repeatedly shaken 
our knowledge of nature to its very foundations.”3 However, as we progress, 
we will see that more than our knowledge of nature is to be determined by 
our conception of the a priori; it will be a major concern for us to investigate 
precisely what role transcendental proof (as claimed to contain synthetic a 
priori judgment) plays in self-knowledge and the right account of self-
                                                
1 “Indeed the logical positivists here agree with Kant in rather maintaining a sharp distinction 
between the underlying spatio-temporal framework of physical theory, on the one hand, and 
the empirical laws then formulated within this framework, on the other. Their view of 
geometry and scientific knowledge if therefore neither strictly Kantian nor strictly 
empiricist.” (Ibid.) Also, it is not required that the spatio-temporal framework be regarded as 
metaphysically real in the sense in which Newton apparently did; the spatio-temporality of 
the framework in question could just as well be merely empirically real and transcendentally 
ideal in Kant’s sense.  
2 Op. cit.: p. 69. 
3 Friedman (2001) Transcendental Philosophy and A Priori Knowledge: A Neo-Kantian Perspective, 
in “New Essays on the A Priori”, ed. by Paul Boghossian and Christopher Peacocke, Oxford 
University Press: p. 383. 
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consciousness.  
Overall, the revisability of the models of scientific reasoning (Newtonian 
and Euclidean), taken by Kant to be solidified in their truth, meant that a 
whole new conception of a priori knowledge was to filter through 20th century 
philosophy under the influence of logical positivism.1 And although the 
majority of contemporary philosophers would find much to disagree with in 
what they take to be the hallmarks of logical positivism, it cannot be denied 
that the notion of a relativised a priori is one conception inherited from that 
tradition which seems to have made a lasting impression. Thus, we find, even 
in the work of those who attempt a positive reconstruction of transcendental 
arguments, an employment of the notion of the relativised a priori—an 
approach that results in what are generally known as “modest” 
transcendental arguments. An argument will be developed towards the end 
of Chapter 3 which will attempt to show why the adoption of an attitude 
toward scientific reasoning mirroring Carnap’s need not amount to a total 
rejection of a strong conception of the synthetic a priori—and thus, of strong 
(we might call it “immodest”) transcendental proof. This argument will 
involve the assertion that claiming that conceptual frameworks may alter does 
not mean there is no limit on their alteration. We will have to wait to see the 
reasons for this assertion.   
These foregoing remarks should make us aware of some of the key points 
of consideration involved in attempting a sensitive reconstruction of 
transcendental proof, since there is much ambiguity in not only the usage of 
particular terminology employed with reference to transcendental arguments, 
yet also many philosophical assumptions implicit in particular general 
attitudes toward them. The central issue which has been thematic thus far is 
the widely spread, generally negative attitude towards transcendental 
idealism and this general attitude has been seen to contain numerous specific 
philosophical opinions vis-à-vis such primary notions as synthetic a priori 
                                                
1 The direct influence of Carnap on Wilfred Sellars will be relevant for us in some peripheral 
considerations vis-à-vis the articulation of synthetic a priori judgment. See, for example, 
Wilfred Sellars (1953) Is There a Synthetic A Priori?, Philosophy of Science, 20, pp. 121-138. 
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judgment and the concept/intuition dichotomy.  
An additional issue, which we can make note of now, yet one we will not 
broach until Section 2.2.5, is the complexity of the relationship between the 
notion of the “analytic method” and the “synthetic method” in Kant, and the 
form of regressive (as opposed to progressive) argumentation. Generally, this 
relationship is complicated by the alternate conceptions of judgment found in 
Kant’s Critical Philosophy as opposed to modern work on transcendental 
arguments in the analytic tradition, where the concept/intuition distinction 
employed in the former is in conflict with the purely conceptual construal of 
such arguments in the latter. This conflict raises issues also for the further 
distinctions of explicative/ampliative, and a priori/a posteriori, which we 
will explore below. To be sure, however, our employment of such distinctions 
here will be somewhat simplified by our adoption of a reconstructive 
approach which allows us to make claims with regard to these distinctions 
only with reference to the peculiarities of a particular core of arguments 
which it is claimed here one can find in transcendental idealism; that is, 
without concerning ourselves further with the complexities of the historical 
Kant. Sensitivity to the nuanced issues mentioned is necessary to allow for 
this reconstruction, however. 
We will thus focus our further arguments in support of a transcendentally 
ideal model of knowledge only as articulated through those core claims which 
relate directly to the project of supplying a plausible account of 
transcendental proof. Thus, we will find support here of a unique conception 
of such central theses claimed to be contained in transcendental idealism, 
which involve such Kantian ideas as the role of synthetic a priori knowledge 
in self-consciousness and the role of (something like)1 the concept/intuition 
distinction in spatio-temporal, world-directed (empirical) knowledge.  
To return to our diagnosis of themes in the literature, we can advance 
some further claims about general tendencies there found which stem from 
                                                
1 I say “something like” because the appeal is not sufficiently specified. It ought to be clear 
however that the main impetus for the appeal stems from role that something like Kant’s 
notion of “pure intuition” plays in the account of situated thought in Section 3.2.  
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the considerations already made. Firstly, the largely negative attitude toward 
synthetic a priori judgment has meant that such judgment has been largely 
absent from 20th century reconstructions of transcendental arguments, and 
this has meant that such arguments have been construed in quite a different 
way to Kant’s original transcendental expositions1 and proofs. Additionally, 
the rejection the Kantian concept/intuition distinction and the focus of 20th 
century philosophy of language on the notion of conceptual schemes has 
meant that the intended force and power of transcendental proof has been 
lost, since the purely conceptual construal of transcendental arguments has 
taken place within a wider model of knowledge which is itself deliberately 
quite open to the question of scepticism. In fact, as is generally claimed, the 
dominant philosophical antecedent, or philosophical hero, for modern 
analytic philosophy has probably been David Hume.2 And while it might be 
said that Hume himself was a naturalist, not a sceptic,3 the questions raised in 
his philosophising certainly make the sceptical challenge seem pressing; in 
fact they are taken to be a major challenge of his philosophical orientation, 
thus linking the modern philosophical stance of naturalism with a peculiar 
group of sceptical worries from the outset.  
Given these mitigating factors, we can see why modern transcendental 
arguments have concerned themselves largely with scepticism. For not only 
do many proponents of transcendental arguments nowadays seem to readily 
commit to a form of naturalism, they also display a suspicion of both the 
notion of the synthetic a priori and the conception of logic found in Kant 
                                                
1 We will not labour over this additional terminological complication, although it is worth 
depositing the word here since Kant’s transcendental exposition of the concept of space in the 
Transcendental Aesthetic is taken as a paradigm case of transcendental method in Karl 
Ameriks (1978) Kant’s Transcendental Deduction as a Regressive Argument, Kant-Studien, 69, pp. 
273-287.  This paper will be of central importance for assessing the appropriate role of 
regressive argument in transcendental proof.  
2 It is worth noting an additional characterisation of the evolution of analytic philosophy 
which encourages the view that such philosophy is a strange bird indeed. In the introduction 
to Sellars (1997) Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, with introduction by Richard Rorty and 
study guide by Robert Brandom, Harvard University Press, Rorty characterises Brandom’s 
work as “an attempt to usher analytic philosophy from its Kantian to its Hegelian stage” (pp. 
8-9). 
3 Sacks (2000) Objectivity and Insight, Oxford University Press: p. 42.  
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which necessitated the conception/intuition distinction employed by him in 
his transcendentally ideal model of knowledge. Because of these tensions 
most contemporary transcendental arguers have sought to build an alternate 
structure, or proceed by different means, with such argumentation. And since 
little in way of success has been enjoyed by these commonly employed, 
purely conceptual transcendental arguments in a defence against the sceptical 
challenge, it is easy to see why contemporary transcendental arguers have 
lowered their expectations about the scope and limits of their enterprise.1 
The failure of the purely conceptual construal of transcendental arguments 
to answer the sceptical challenge is therefore one reason for a re-assessment of 
the possibilities pregnant in a reconstruction of transcendental proof. A 
second reason is that no sustained attempt has yet been undertaken to 
reconstruct such transcendental proof, as there might be, in the context of a 
thoroughly re-interpreted version of transcendental idealism as exemplified 
by Henry Allison’s two-aspect view, which we mentioned above. Mark 
Sacks’s paper The Nature of Transcendental Arguments can be singled out in this 
regard as it constitutes the first focussed attempt on the connection I have just 
mentioned, although, unfortunately, no fully worked-out theory of 
transcendental proof is given there. Additionally, the precise connection 
between transcendental proof and transcendental idealism is not explained in 
adequate detail. An attempt at thinking through the consequences of the 
account of transcendental proof given in that paper will be a major concern of 
this essay and will be the main topic of Chapter 3. 
For now, we can note that the generally Strawsonian, conceptual versions 
of transcendental arguments embody certain misconceptions about what 
might ultimately be at stake in transcendental knowledge. For although 
                                                
1 Thus we find such luminaries as Strawson back-peddling, in later works, from the hopes 
expressed in his original, famous reconstructions of Kant and the analyses constituting his 
attempt at constructing a descriptive metaphysics, in The Bounds of Sense and Individuals 
respectively. Additionally, we find the host of recent accounts of transcendental arguments as 
all adopting a “modest” stance; nearly the entirety of such a recent and important collection 
as Robert Stern (ed.) (1999) Transcendental Arguments: Problems and Prospects, Oxford 
University Press, is in the “modest” mode. 
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Strawson’s reconstructions of Kant represent vast improvements in terms of 
clarity, rigour, and consistency, they also represent attempts made within a 
wider epistemological model, itself open to scepticism in a unique way, which 
can be called into question. Thus, it is no surprise when we find Barry 
Stroud’s original objection to transcendental arguments1 targeting a 
vulnerable aspect of them which is absent in accounts of transcendental proof, 
such as that proposed here. Yet much subsequent philosophical work has 
gone into attempting to resolve what has seemed to be this insurmountable 
challenge against the possibility of transcendental argumentation which I will, 
following Sacks, refer to as “Stroud’s Challenge”,2 and quite generally, replies 
have come in two forms. Either those who might have endeavoured to argue 
transcendentally have now simply given up hope (a lack of reply); or, their 
reply has been muffled by modesty (a weakened reply).  
Stroud has noted that arguments aimed at refuting the sceptic by insisting 
on the unity and objectivity of our experience, by way of articulation of 
conceptually necessary conditions of our conception of the world, turn on the 
necessity of the mere belief in such conditions of experience as holding, not 
their actually holding. We might think of this as a Humean line of argument 
stemming from the sceptical notion that the analysis of the foundations of our 
knowledge is not possible in the sense we assume, since it relies on the more 
fundamental problem of explaining the reliability of our beliefs—about the 
structure of our experience generally, for example—which, given Hume’s 
thoughts about the reliability of our perceptual contact with the world and the 
linkage between this perceptual contact and knowledge, is not a problem 
easily solved. Thus, so says Stroud, transcendental arguments cannot rid us of 
sceptical worries.3  
                                                
1 Barry Stroud (1968) Transcendental Arguments, The Journal of Philosophy, 65, pp. 241-256.  
2 Sacks (1989) The World We Found, Duckworth: p. 32. 
3 Stroud, Transcendental Arguments. In fact, it is interesting to note that this complaint against 
Strawson can be countered by suggesting that one should go further than he, in taking 
transcendental arguments to be not merely about the conception of our own experience that 
we must hold, but as Kant originally argued, regarding the conditions of the possibility of the 
representation of empirical objects. This stronger thesis, which Kant held and Strawson did not, 
is immune to Stroud’s attack, although it is of course vulnerable to objections of a familiar 
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Although acceptance of the tenability of Stroud’s Challenge has been 
widespread, this is no indication of an impasse. There may be reasonable 
indication that there is a significant, if not insurmountable, objection to 
Strawson’s original project in Individuals and in the Bounds of Sense, although 
this by no means disqualifies the possibility of alternate attempts at providing 
a good account of what transcendental proof might be. Henceforth, it will be 
central to my concerns here to show just what theories about the structure of 
our thought about the world need to seem plausible, by way of elucidating a 
conception of a kind of transcendental argumentation—or proof1—of perhaps 
a more faithfully Kantian variety than usual; albeit, a variety of proof that 
does not seek to be wholly a refutation of scepticism, but rather comes from a 
philosophical perspective in which the force of the sceptical challenge is 
diminished. It is important however to see that the strategy of attempting to 
diminish the felt force of the sceptical threat need not simply come to 
reconceiving objectivity in order to make ourselves feel comfortable with a 
weaker transcendental story.  
As I have alluded already, this project will involve reconsidering the 
accuracy of some widely held beliefs about what the significance of some 
central arguments of transcendental idealism might be, although the 
evaluation of such a doctrine in all its multifarious aspects is a highly 
                                                                                                                                       
kind which attack the doctrine of transcendental idealism. It will be part of my project here to 
give voice in support of an alternative conception of Kant’s wider doctrine not immediately 
vulnerable to such objections. See Sacks, The Nature of Transcendental Arguments; Allison 
(1969) Transcendental Idealism and Descriptive Metaphysics, Kant-Studien, 60, pp. 216-233; (1971) 
Kant’s Transcendental Humanism, The Monist, 55, pp. 182-207; (2004) Kant’s Transcendental 
Idealism: Revised and Enlarged Edition, Yale University Press.  
1 The point of this distinction is not a mere definitional matter. There is a genuine 
philosophically interesting and important issue at stake here. To put matters briefly and 
crudely, a part of the reason for this modification of terminology comes from the notion that a 
successful variety of transcendental proof—as opposed to argumentation—cannot proceed 
merely by way of logically valid, deductive argument via articulation of relevant conceptual 
relations, but must include an appeal to the situatedness of the thinker having the thought or 
experience. Transcendental proofs are thus not merely forms of argumentation since they 
require more than appeal to logically valid forms of inference. The proposal here is that 
through retaining synthetic a priori moves in a philosophical account of objective knowledge, 
a kind of transcendental proof is produced which illustrates something of the revolutionary 
character that Kant intended. This matter will be given thorough treatment in Chapter 3 of 
this essay. 
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ambitious project and is beyond my intentions here. Instead, the program of 
giving a good account of transcendental idealism will appear complementary 
to the debate of what the hopes for transcendental proof might be. The 
linkage I make in this way will show up as an important one that 
recommends, in harmony with recent two-aspect1 interpretations of 
transcendental idealism, a fuller appreciation of Kant’s Copernican Turn. This 
appreciation will also involve a resistance to the generally received 
impression of transcendental idealism as a “bad idealism”.2  
Additionally, it should be clear that since Strawson’s rehabilitation of some 
central arguments that he claims to find in Kant involves an acceptance of the 
widely received traditional interpretation of Kant’s wider doctrine 
(mentioned above as the two-world or two-object view), if one is to give an 
adequate critical appraisal of the validity, force, and general project of these 
rehabilitated candidates, one must re-think the cogency of this traditional 
interpretation. This is a relevant peripheral concern of the project here; one 
which builds toward an appreciation of what “transcendental” might mean—
in terms of argument, proof, idealism, and so on. 
To follow on from these considerations, we can observe a relevant claim 
made by Allison in this regard, namely, as to how we might take Kant’s 
transcendental project. He suggests that 
  
“a rigorous critique of psychologism, i.e. of any attempt to explain, or explain away 
the validity of either our cognitive or moral principles by means of an analysis of 
their basis in human nature or their genesis in human experience, is one of the most 
characteristics traits of the Kantian philosophy. Yet this transcendental, logical 
investigation of the nature and limits of knowledge...leads Kant back to the human 
                                                
1 Of course, I do not thereby hold myself committed to every thesis entailed by the views of 
those who espouse this interpretation; however, I use this phrase as a short-hand for the 
general familiar position which has been put forth in recent times, most notably by Henry 
Allison. I agree with the general thrust of what Allison says regarding Kant, although I may 
not agree with all the details of his exposition. Some of these details, insofar as they are 
relevant, may show up in the course of this essay; others may not. 
2 In fact, attempts at challenging the received impression of idealism as a philosophical 
bogeyman will be encouraged by the project here. 
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subject, in whose cognitive faculties he finds the a priori principles of human 
knowledge”1 
 
This, Allison claims, 
 
“gives rise to a paradoxical conception of man as on the one hand, together with the 
rest of creation, a part of nature, subject to its laws, and on the other hand, in his 
capacity as knower and actor, a rational being who not only transcends nature in the 
sense that he is not completely determined by its laws, but who is actually the author 
of these laws.”2 
 
This issue of the competing dual conceptions of human beings is, of 
course, one of the fundamental dilemmas of modern philosophy and it might 
be said that no-one has made a more strenuous attempt to solve it than Kant,3 
not only in his analysis of human knowledge offered in the first Critique, but 
in the Critical Philosophy as a whole. Importantly, once it is clear that the 
problem is one of seeing how there might be necessary features of 
experience—and not merely human experience—which could resist reduction 
to matters of psychology, we should think of this general way of framing the 
issue; the central one for transcendental philosophy. Namely, we should ask: 
“What is at stake in the project of attempting to provide an account of 
universal features of experience, and how is this different from accounting for 
the conceptually necessary conditions of a particular conception of 
experience?” A verdict on this would also be a final answer to the overall 
cogency of the Strawsonian “austere” interpretation of transcendental 
philosophy.   
It might serve to briefly clarify one particular issue which crops up as an 
important one in this context: that of certain conceptions of certain concepts in 
the philosophical vocabulary held dear. We run up against difficulties if we 
think that it is enough to simply rethink the state of affairs by giving new 
                                                
1 Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Humanism: p. 182. 
2 Ibid. 
3 To paraphrase Strawson, The Bounds of Sense: p. 15 (although with a different topical target).  
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definitions for old terms like “transcendental” and even those much-
misunderstood and variously interpreted terms “subjectivity” and 
“objectivity”. However, it will be an ancillary claim of mine here that a 
rethinking of such concepts may be necessary, although the mere redefinition 
of the concepts will not suffice to justify the proposed interpretation; much 
argumentation is required to put on display the merits of particular 
philosophical options, and the reworking of the nuances of an important 
concept will only come about through a considerable philosophical apparatus 
and not merely by way of re-definition.1 
As we noted, the Strawsonian reconstruction of transcendental arguments 
smuggled into the literature a purely conceptual construal of such arguments 
which, jointly, advocated the two-world view of transcendental idealism (a 
main impetus for the former). That there has been limited complaint about 
this is interesting and possibly indicative of either, (1) philosophical 
persuasion regarding the doctrine of transcendental idealism itself; or, what is 
more likely: (2) decline in the hopes for a good account of transcendental 
arguments. There is, however, one shining case of complaint against 
Strawson’s strategy in the literature which has been put forth by Henry 
Allison where he says: 
 
“What Strawson has done is to change Kant’s concern with the necessary conditions 
of the possibility of experience, and with the objective validity and a priori 
knowledge of the principles based upon these conditions to a concern with the 
structure of our conception of experience.”2 
 
And as I noted above, this objection has been taken up more recently by Mark 
                                                
1 Indeed, it is the central task of Sacks’s Objectivity and Insight (esp. Chapters 8 and 9) to 
propose a new account of objectivity. In the last analysis, however, I find his account there to 
be unconvincing inasmuch as Sacks retains too little of the approach of transcendental 
idealism to hold up against sceptical worries. It seems to me that his general claim (made in 
Chapter 9 of that work) that we can merely “ascend” to a higher critical standpoint from 
which the sceptical worry fails to touch us is too weak. Additionally, it is unclear how Sacks’s 
arguments provided there differ, at least in principle, from the intended force of 
transcendental idealism itself, as construed under the two-aspect view. 
2 Allison, Transcendental Idealism and Descriptive Metaphysics: p. 227. 
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Sacks in The Nature of Transcendental Arguments, who attempts to make the 
connection between the notion of transcendental proof and the doctrine of 
transcendental idealism more direct, although somewhat ambiguously.1 
I am positive about the hopes of this particular attempt and as such, I aim 
to bring out some of the consequences of thinking about the problem in 
Sacks’s terms. A satisfying exploration of the proposal is not possible yet, 
though some brief remarks may help. Sacks has suggested that we can gain a 
deeper appreciation of what transcendental proof has to offer philosophically 
if we make a connection to transcendental idealism through Allison’s notion 
of “epistemic conditions”. The notion of “epistemic conditions” will be made 
more explicit by way of articulation of the philosophical device of “situated 
thought”, for “situated thought” can itself be regarded as embodying a 
philosophical conception of what is involved for a thinker to knowledgeably 
come into contact with the world in various ways. It thus serves as a way of 
making more explicit exactly what an “epistemic condition” might be and 
thus, provides an opening for articulation of some central insights of 
transcendental idealism. And crucially, the notions of “epistemic conditions” 
and “situated thought” involve a consideration of what transcendental claims 
stand to offer in terms of the Kantian idea of possible experience; a 
consideration that emphasises the connection between transcendental proof 
and synthetic a priori judgment.  
The proposal for a reconstructed version of transcendental proof offered 
here then stands opposed to, on the one hand, those accounts of 
transcendental arguments that seek to separate them from transcendental 
idealism and instead, typically, construe them as mere “analytic”2 arguments 
                                                
1 As has been be noted, Sacks has his own unique interpretation of what transcendental 
idealism should come to; or, rather, what the central insight of that doctrine—thought of as 
separable—is. Sacks displays subtle differences in his regard for transcendental idealism 
across different works, so it is important to note that his reconstruction of transcendental 
proof in The Nature of Transcendental Arguments will be our main point of focus. 
2 In The Bounds of Sense Strawson employs the term “analytical” to denote the purely 
conceptual argument he takes to be expressive of the insight in transcendental idealism (the 
Transcendental Deduction in particular) which involves explaining the necessary conditions 
of the possibility of a unified, objective experience. It would seem that transcendental 
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which seek to uncover the presuppositions of a particular conceptual practice, 
and on the other, those accounts which see them as attempting to provide 
something that it is thought by most they simply cannot provide—a story 
about how our experience is structured that is quite simply opposed to any 
“scientific” story about  how our experience is structured, albeit one that not 
merely seeks to enumerate the conditions of the possibility of the representation of 
empirical objects, but the conditions of the possibility of empirical objects. This latter 
reading thus sees Kant’s project as attempting to account for the structure of 
experience in some kind of ontological sense and might be thought of as 
reading Kant as going too far; the former reading might be thought of as 
reading Kant as not going far enough and thus failing to achieve any 
substantial goal. If we read Sacks as providing a middle way between these 
two cliffs, we might see a more plausible, albeit a more faithfully Kantian 
variety of stratagem emerge.  
For now, we need to appreciate the logical, philosophical and historical 
complexity of the terrain of transcendental argumentation and begin by 
taking stock of the host of main issues which are in need of attention once one 
has taken the course of developing this program. However, as the program I 
recommend pursuing involves mainly the first two in the trifecta (the logical 
and the philosophical aspects) my focus will be on those paradigm cases of 
the options which come into play when considering this compound of issues.  
As a brief note, it pays to keep in mind that my references to 
transcendental argumentation pertain to those arguments that aim at making 
some comment upon the nature of experience; none of my efforts will 
directed toward other species of transcendental arguments, i.e., those making 
claims about the role of freedom in moral theory for example (although the 
possibility of these arguments will also be relevant to our analysis at several 
points, most especially when considering McDowell’s conception of the space 
                                                                                                                                       
arguments in the literature are called “analytic” for similar reasons—insofar as such 
arguments are generally in the Strawsonian spirit. We ought to not suppose that such 
arguments are then to be viewed as “regressive” since that would conflict with the reading 
we give of Strawson’s strategy interpreting the Deduction in Section 2.2.5.  
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of reasons as sui generis). It will, however, be seen that strong (or “immodest”) 
transcendental proof, the kind I am interested in here, aims to assert the 
existence of certain conditions of experience and will also prescribe certain 
conditions for the application of certain concepts in experience, and indeed, 
the very existence of linguistic phenomena.1 
 
2.2 The Nature of Transcendental Argumentation 
 
The task lying before us is one of philosophical geography. And since the 
terrain of transcendental argumentation is one dotted with many mountains 
of opinion, I will chart merely an outline by way of noting the salient features 
of the most verdant peaks; through charting these points, the appropriate 
orienteering ought to be made clear.   
Before we engage in an analysis of the terrain it will be helpful to make a 
further note of the terminology that suggests itself in many of the articulations 
of transcendental argumentation in the literature. The first relevant 
terminological concern pertains to the labelling of certain kinds of 
transcendental argument as “analytic”.2 The difficulty here resides in the 
temptation to think that those purportedly more Kantian varieties of 
transcendental proof, such as is to be constructed here, are thus to be labelled 
“synthetic”, however, this will not do. The reason for the inapplicability of the 
term “synthetic” to the kind of transcendental proof reconstructed here stems 
from the fact that the intended distinction between analytic and synthetic 
judgment is drawn against the background of the concerns of modern analytic 
philosophy, and in which philosophy this distinction effectively refers, 
roughly, to “statements true in virtue of the meanings of the terms involved” 
and “statements true in virtue of the meanings of the terms involved as well 
                                                
1 The classic cases of transcendental proof explored in 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 will serve to bring out 
this point. The point will be elaborated upon further in Chapter 4. 
2 A particularly explicit example is Jonathan Bennett (1979) Analytic Transcendental Arguments, 
in “Transcendental Arguments and Science”, ed. by Peter Bieri, Rolf-P. Horstmann and 
Lorenz Kruger, D. Riedel Publishing Company. 
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as the relevant empirical content”, respectively. By contrast, the appropriate 
characterisation of the transcendental proof offered here will necessarily 
involve sensitivity to the Kantian conception of the structure of knowledge; 
that is, a conception of knowledge that is construed in terms of two different 
forms of representation: concepts and intuitions; not merely concepts, as the 
focus on talk about conceptual schemes with reference to transcendental 
arguments in the literature evidences itself to be concerned with.  
An interesting point to note is that, despite the rejection in analytic 
philosophy of the distinction between conceptual and intuitive form in 
cognition, something like Kant’s notion of “empirical intuition” was 
preserved in Russell’s notion of a “sense-datum”. However, later in the 20th 
century, Wilfred Sellars’s attack on the “Myth of the Given” meant many 
analytic philosophers would come to see the notion of a “sense-datum” as 
itself problematic. The fact to recognise here is that Kant had an additional 
epistemic device operative in his notion of “pure intuition” which is not to be 
assimilated to the notion of a “sense-datum”. The notion of “pure intuition” is 
expressed in Kant’s assertion for the a priori status of space and time, which 
themselves are intended to function as necessary conditions of the possibility 
of empirical judgment. Unfortunately, the quite general wholesale rejection of 
Kantian epistemology has meant that the latter notion of “pure intuition” has 
found no place in most contemporary work. Part of the project here will 
attempt to work on rehabilitating the notion of “pure intuition”, at least 
covertly, through the focus on situated thought in Chapter 3. 
The appropriate claim to be made with regard to such transcendental 
proof as referred to is that such proof involves synthetic a priori judgment; 
and it is this claim that can make the characterisation of transcendental proof 
as itself “synthetic” seem correct, when it is in fact not. To elucidate the depth 
of this point a little further we can look to Kant’s pre-Critical writings which 
predate the innovation of the concept/intuition distinction, for such writings 
contain a conception of both the analytic method and the synthetic method 
which is, on the one hand, in conflict with Kant’s later philosophical 
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commitments and, on the other, in closer harmony with the modern 
conception of analytic and synthetic. 
In his Announcement of the programme of his lectures for the winter semester 
1765-1766 (1765)1 Kant states that the method peculiar to metaphysics has 
been misunderstood. He says: 
 
“Its method is not synthetic, as is that of mathematics, but analytic. As a result, that 
which is simple and the most universal in mathematics is also what is easiest, 
whereas in the queen of the sciences it is what is most difficult. In mathematics, what 
is simple and universal must in the nature of things come first, while in metaphysics 
it must come at the end. In mathematics one begins the doctrine with the definitions; 
in metaphysics one ends the doctrine with them; and so on in other respects.”2 
 
Kant can thus been seen here as still adhering to the Leibnizian-Wolffian 
conception of metaphysics which he was later to reject (as is well known, 
through his concerted effort to combine what he took to be truths inherent in 
both the former and also Newtonian mechanics). The Leibnizian conception 
involves the idea that in metaphysics one arrives at definitions (the kind Kant 
alludes to above) by way of an analytic procedure which leads one ultimately 
to the complete concept of something or other. This conception of the analytic 
method thus coincides, in one way, with what has been called regressive 
argument, since the appropriate analytic method involves ascension from the 
particular to the general—from a particular exemplification of a concept to the 
most general concept possible. This method of conceptual analysis is deemed 
illegitimate by Kant in the Critique where he speaks disparagingly of the 
“transcendental illusion” to which previous would-be metaphysicians had 
fallen prey and where he conjointly insists that no metaphysical truths can be 
arrived at simply by the unpacking of concepts; the metaphysics of experience 
Kant proposes in the Transcendental Analytic must instead proceed from a set 
                                                
1 Kant (2002) Announcement of the programme of his lectures for the winter semester 1765-1766, in 
“Theoretical Philosophy 1755-1770”, trans. and ed. by David Walford in collaboration with 
Ralf Meerbote, Cambridge University Press. 
2 Op. cit.: p. 294.  
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of claims regarding the structure of our knowledge and which claims 
themselves serve to establish the conditions of knowing. So, Kant’s later 
conception of metaphysics is limited to the sphere of possible experience, 
which is itself shaped by a set of epistemic conditions. 
The conflict with which we must deal here arises out of the temptation to 
conflate the terms “analysis” and “regression”, or, the procedures of analytic 
method and regressive argument. The key idea to embrace is that in Kant’s 
later epistemological edifice of transcendental idealism, which itself turns on 
the axis of the concept/intuition distinction, the previously paired notions of 
“analysis” and “regression” must now be kept apart. The central reason for 
this is that the operative distinction between concepts and intuitions allows 
for regressive arguments to be formulated which do not consist merely of 
conceptual explication of the kind demonstrated in Leibnizian attempts at 
metaphysical proof. The shape of regressive argument allowed by 
transcendental idealism is of a different kind. For example, Kant’s 
transcendental exposition of space in the Transcendental Aesthetic relies on a 
form of regressive argument,1 yet it certainly does not consist simply in the 
unpacking of concepts, but rather involves a proof of the necessary conditions 
of the possibility of perceiving the world as spatial. We must leave this 
preamble now and continue with its topic in a later section. 
As can be seen from the considerations above, the attempt to divide forms 
of transcendental argument (or proof) into two broad groups by equating, 
without sufficiently detailed attention, on the one hand, the terms “analytic” 
and “regressive”, and, on the other, the terms “synthetic” and “progressive”, is 
misguided. Beyond the comments made with respect to the terms “analytic” 
and “synthetic” above, we will find in Section 2.2.5 a fairly thorough 
consideration of the role of regressive argument in the construction of 
transcendental proof. Additionally, the discussion there will attempt also to 
make more perspicuous the role of synthetic a priori judgment conjointly 
involved. This latter strategy will allow for the connection to ampliative 
                                                
1 This is claimed in Ameriks, Kant’s Transcendental Deduction as a Regressive Argument. 
Transcendental-Phenomenological Proof and Descriptive Metaphysics 
Byron Clugston 
34 
knowledge to be made, since the construal of synthetic a priori judgment will 
involve reference to how such judgment involves an actual increase in 
knowledge, not mere conceptual explication.1 In fact, it is worth noting in this 
context that Kant himself explicitly connects synthetic judgment with 
ampliative knowledge. In the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics (hereafter 
Prolegomena) he says that 
 
“whatever origin judgements may have, or whatever they may be like as to their 
logical form, there is in them a distinction according to content, by virtue of which 
they are either merely explicative and add nothing to the content of the cognition, or 
ampliative and enlarge the given cognition; the former can be called analytic 
judgements, the latter synthetic judgements.”2 
 
These preliminary reflections get us to a point where we can begin to see 
the usefulness of re-interpreting the current state-of-play of transcendental 
argumentation. The aim is to consider an account of the limiting features of 
possible experience, not merely the “limiting features of any experience that we 
could make intelligible to ourselves”,3 since the construal of the task of 
transcendental argumentation in the latter terms has been seen to lead to talk 
about the legitimacy of moves within particular conceptual schemes.4 And the 
conception of transcendental philosophy entailed by attempts to construct 
transcendental arguments in these latter terms is arguably so far from Kant’s 
original project as to be unrecognisable. 
                                                
1 The distinction between “explicative” and “ampliative” knowledge does not, as far as I can 
see, have any prejudicial connection to either a modern analytical or Kantian transcendentally 
ideal conception of knowledge (ignoring the opacity of the former notion). At least, if it does, 
such prejudice as there might be does not appear to touch the intended distinction being 
drawn here. 
2 Kant (2004) Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, trans. by Peter G. Lucas and Günter 
Zöller, ed. by Günter Zöller, Oxford University Press: p. 72. 
3 As is the focus of Strawson’s account in The Bounds of Sense.  
4 I follow on from the argument to this effect by Baum (1979) Transcendental Proofs in the 
Critique of Pure Reason, in “Transcendental Arguments and Science”, ed. by Peter Bieri, Rolf-P. 
Horstmann and Lorenz Kruger, D. Riedel Publishing Company. It is important to note also 
that, due to the general rejection within analytic philosophy of the concept/intuition 
distinction, the notion of “conceptual schemes” includes both of what Kant conceived of as 
the conceptual and sensible contributions to knowledge, which Kant kept apart in his famous 
epistemological distinction. 
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 I propose the idea that it is possible not merely to describe but circumscribe1 
the conditions of a minimal framework of possible experience and, as I have 
alluded thus far, the claim that transcendental proof involves synthetic a 
priori judgment, and the notion that such proof is indeed possible, must stand 
or fall together.   
To begin, we must consider some possible proposals regarding the nature 
of transcendental arguments. Here are a few: 
 
(1) Transcendental arguments aim to refute the sceptic by establishing 
necessary conditions of the possibility of the unity and objectivity of 
our experience. 
(2) Transcendental arguments (merely) articulate (necessary) 
conceptual relations. 
(3) Transcendental arguments establish the uniqueness of a particular 
categorial scheme. 
(4) Transcendental arguments establish the necessity of a certain 
minimal conception of experience. 
(5) Transcendental arguments establish the necessity of a mere belief in 
a certain minimal conception of experience. 
(6) Transcendental arguments rely on a (dubious) verificationist 
principle. 
(7) Transcendental arguments are regressive arguments.  
(8) Transcendental arguments establish necessary conditions of the 
possibility of particular kinds of knowledge; they articulate 
epistemic conditions.  
 
We can immediately see some interconnections here; it being clear that some 
of these propositions suggest or even entail some of the others. It should then 
                                                
1 This distinction, which was made in Chapter 1, will continue to have an importance for us 
since it will be a related concern to recognise the opposition between transcendental and 
naturalistic investigation. This conception, which floats in the background of this essay, is 
alluded to in suggestive references to McDowell’s conception of the Sellarsian “space of 
reasons” as sui generis.  
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also be clear that some of these propositions preclude one another. A 
breakdown by way of remarks follows. 
 
2.2.1 Remarks on Thesis 1 
 
The first statement in our list, “Transcendental arguments aim to refute the 
sceptic by establishing necessary conditions of the possibility of the unity and 
objectivity of our experience”, constitutes a general way of viewing 
transcendental arguments, possibly the dominant way in current work; it 
would seem to be compatible with most statements in the list and could be 
thought of as being more important for the focus of investigation than for the 
exact pattern of arguments themselves—thus making it clear that this way of 
classifying transcendental arguments does not exhaustively characterise their 
nature yet merely suggests the target of such arguments: scepticism.  
It is fairly clear that most 20th century work on transcendental arguments 
has been concerned with the purported threat of global scepticism, although 
what extent this was Kant’s exact concern with his own transcendental 
arguments is questionable.1 So, pace Stroud’s Challenge2 and the majority of 
the current literature,3 it is not clear that Kant’s Transcendental Deduction is 
                                                
1 This is an important issue in the literature. For a paradigm case of the doubt that securing a 
good refutation of, or defence from, scepticism was Kant’s main concern in his transcendental 
philosophy, see Günther Patzig (1979) Comment on Bennett, in “Transcendental Arguments 
and Science”, ed. by Peter Bieri, Rolf-P. Horstmann and Lorenz Kruger, D. Riedel Publishing 
Company. This is a dividing question on the issue of what transcendental argumentation sets 
out to achieve (or, what it can or should set out to achieve).  
2 Taken to be advanced originally in Stroud, Transcendental Arguments. 
3 Including most of the papers included in an important, recent volume of papers on the 
subject: Stern (ed.) Transcendental Arguments: Problems and Prospects. Additionally, the most 
recent and important of those works taking the view that transcendental arguments are 
primarily directed at answering the sceptic include Stern (2000) Transcendental Arguments and 
Scepticism, Oxford University Press; Hamid Vahid (2003) The Nature and Significance of 
Transcendental Arguments, Kant-Studien, 93, pp. 273-290; Westphal (2003b) Epistemic Reflection 
and Cognitive Reference in Kant’s Transcendental Response to Skepticism, Kant-Studien, 94, pp. 
135-171; and Scott Stapleford (2005) Transcendental Arguments: Superfluity and Scepticism, 
Theoria, 71, pp. 333-367; (2006) Kant’s Transcendental Arguments as Conceptual Proofs, 
Philosophical Papers, 35, pp. 119-136. 
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directly aimed at refuting Cartesian scepticism.1 By extension, although 
transcendental arguments are “relevant to some forms of scepticism...their 
relevance has to be understood as an indirect consequence of another primary 
goal.”2 In fact, it is very important to recognise that if Kant was concerned 
with any variety of scepticism in the Deduction, it was more the Humean 
variety of scepticism about reason.3 We can see this fact if we reflect upon the 
orientation of Kant’s arguments contained therein as being directed toward 
thinking about the objective validity of our empirical thought—seemingly an 
enterprise which one undertakes when confronted not with the threat that 
one’s empirical thought is misdirected but rather, that the fundamental 
conception of it is invalid or without adequate basis.  This is highly 
significant, especially once we see that the focus of the debate is not centred 
primarily on doubts about the actual existence of the world—which seems 
clearly not to have been Kant’s main concern—but centred rather on the 
question of how our world-directed thought can have objective validity.4 This 
shift in focus, it seems to me, brings out the deeper concern of Kant’s Critical 
Philosophy and more specifically, his Transcendental Deduction. In harmony 
with this line of thinking, it has been expressed that     
 
“the establishment of an objective world against sceptical doubts is not high up on 
Kant’s philosophical priority list. The establishment of objective knowledge, yes. But 
the transcendental deduction of the categories does not…amount to an actual proof 
                                                
1 It is, however, clear that the Refutation of Idealism was intended to secure Kant’s 
transcendental idealism from the seeming sceptical threat. That this chapter bears an intimate 
relation to the Deduction means that it is a complicated issue concerning exactly how the 
Deduction is not merely an argument against scepticism. Unfortunately, we cannot address 
this peculiarly demanding issue here.  
2 Graham Bird (1999) Kant and the Problem of Induction: A Reply to Walker, in “Transcendental 
Arguments: Problems and Prospects”, ed. by Robert Stern, Oxford University Press: p. 32, 
footnote 1.  
3 See John J. Callanan (2006) Kant’s Transcendental Strategy, The Philosophical Quarterly, 56, 
pp. 360-381. Rorty (1979a) Transcendental Arguments, Self-Reference and Pragmatism, in 
“Transcendental Arguments and Science”, ed. by Peter Bieri, Rolf-P. Horstmann and Lorenz 
Kruger, D. Reidel Publishing Company, also acknowledges this point of Hume being Kant’s 
more salient target.  
4 This is arguably the central claim which the Transcendental Deduction attempts to advance 
(in terms of the quid juris). I say “attempts” because it is not manifestly clear to many if Kant 
succeeds in this aim; it is, furthermore, not clear to others if this was even his main motive. 
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that there is, after all, an objective world out there. It rather concentrates on the idea 
that the system of categories based on the table of judgments is the only possible 
system which allows for the unification of our subjective intuitions into one 
consistent and coherent body of knowledge…I do not want to say that 
transcendental arguments are not also used to avoid sceptical conclusions. They are 
so used. But they are basically used to justify the application of concepts in the 
formation of our experience, which had been challenged.”1 
 
This comment should remind us of Kant’s intentions in his own theorising, 
although the extent to which we should take Kant’s approach as a clue for a 
rehabilitated version of transcendental argumentation is a controversial issue. 
Despite whatever else we might think about Kant’s own transcendental 
expositions and proofs, I want to place great emphasis on the sense in which 
they really needn’t be thought of solely as attempts at silencing the Cartesian 
sceptic. This point regarding scepticism is crucial and much hinges upon 
giving it full recognition. I have already noted above that the Humean variety 
of scepticism is seemingly a more significant opponent for Kantian 
transcendental argument than Cartesian scepticism and we can note further 
that this Humean concern crystallises in the recent concern with justificatory 
scepticism, as opposed to epistemic scepticism of the kind exemplified by 
Cartesian doubt about the external world.2 Justificatory forms of scepticism 
involve doubts about the validity of our claims to possess such things as 
reliable or indubitable rationality, and thus, undercut the certainty taken to be 
inherent in our most primitive intellectual procedures.  
It is a condition of this project of rehabilitating of transcendental proof 
succeeding that the interpretation of transcendental idealism I place emphasis 
on be coupled with an appropriately plausible conception of objectivity.  Since 
I suggest that transcendental proofs (and hence, by implication, the 
transcendental arguments encompassing them) function most coherently 
                                                
1 Patzig, Comment on Bennett: pp. 71-72. Quassim Cassam (1987) Transcendental Arguments, 
Transcendental Synthesis and Transcendental Idealism, The Philosophical Quarterly, 37, pp. 355-
378, also recognises this point on p. 363.  
2 Such as is discussed by Stern, Transcendental Arguments and Scepticism: Chapter 1.  
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within a transcendentally ideal model of knowledge, with the qualifier that 
we need to pair a sympathetic interpretation of this much misunderstood 
doctrine with the right conception of objective knowledge, we ought to 
further specify our conception of objective knowledge. The conception of 
objectivity within the transcendental idealist’s picture is necessarily going to 
be coupled with the idea that objective knowledge is limited or tied to possible 
experience.  Despite the vagary of this characterisation, it manages to remind 
us of the requisite Kantian specification that objective knowledge only has 
sense for us in terms of possible experience—an idea which itself might seem 
commonsensical, yet on further inspection appears to entail some 
unacceptable theses—and, via this way of phrasing the problem, suggests that 
there might be limitations of a peculiar epistemic kind specifiable in 
philosophical terms.   
To return to our main concern, we can observe that the variety of 
empiricism espoused by many 20th century analytic philosophers has been a 
contributing factor to the pervasive concern with scepticism, a point we noted 
in connection with Hume above. It would also be fair to say that the linguistic 
turn contributed to the 20th century propensity to interpret transcendental 
arguments in a way intrinsically tied to the notion of conceptual relations—in 
the form of arguments involving inferences from certain premises regarding 
facts about experience not doubtable by the sceptic to conclusions originally 
perceived as under threat from the sceptical challenge. The limitations of this 
approach have become apparent in the past fifty or so years of strenuous 
work on this set of problems, although my concern with a different approach 
does not stem from the fear of mere difficulty. There is a substantial 
philosophical issue at stake which relates directly to the way one understands 
the notion of a conceptual framework and its relation to the notion of a world. 
The fine points of this issue will unfold as we progress.   
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2.2.2 Remarks on Theses 2 and 3 
 
The idea articulated by Thesis 2, “Transcendental arguments (merely) 
articulate (necessary) conceptual relations,”—the notion that transcendental 
arguments involve mere deductive inferences between propositional 
contents—is widespread.1 Given our recognition of Stroud’s Challenge above, 
it is immediately apparent that if transcendental arguments proceed this way 
all they stand to establish are necessary connections within a particular 
conceptual framework; in particular, in a particular conceptual framework for 
thinking about the world and our experience of it. Under this conception, the 
power of transcendental arguments is sapped; for since such a framework 
could be otherwise, transcendental arguments are seen to rely on something 
which is not “universal and necessary”,2 but is rather simply the object of 
strong belief, and this means that such arguments consist in expositions of 
what one must believe given certain other beliefs. From within this viewpoint, 
the enterprise entered into here of making transcendental claims would suffer 
a collapse. Additionally, given the Kantian conception of transcendental as a 
descriptive that characterises necessary conditions of the possibility of 
something being a certain way (the fact that it is for us does not weaken the 
notion), not it merely being believed to be a certain way, the aforementioned 
account constitutes a mis-construal.   
Given the above considerations, we can observe the depth of the 
opposition between the commonplace accounts of transcendental arguments 
involving the assertion that transcendental arguments merely articulate 
                                                
1 Salient cases in the literature include the following: Strawson, The Bounds of Sense; Stephan 
Körner (1966) Transcendental Tendencies in Recent Philosophy, The Journal of Philosophy, 63, pp. 
551-566; (1967) The Impossibility of Transcendental Deductions, The Monist, 51, pp. 317-331; 
Stroud, Transcendental Arguments; Rorty (1970) Strawson’s Objectivity Argument, The Review of 
Metaphysics, 24, pp. 207-244; Hamid Vahid, The Nature and Significance of Transcendental 
Arguments. Salient cases that go against this idea include: Allison, Transcendental Idealism and 
Descriptive Metaphysics; Charles Taylor (1978) The Validity of Transcendental Arguments, 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 79, pp. 151-165; Ameriks, Kant’s Transcendental 
Deduction as a Regressive Argument; and Sacks, The Nature of Transcendental Arguments. As far 
as I know, The Nature of Transcendental Arguments represents the only focussed attempt to 
explicate what might be involved in a construal of transcendental arguments (reconceived as 
transcendental proof) that is not purely concerned with conceptual relations. 
2 To refer to Kant’s characterisation of the a priori. 
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conceptual relations, and the positive account I am putting forth here. It is of 
course true that Kant’s Transcendental Deduction articulates conceptual 
relations in a limited sense, but this cluster of arguments does something 
much more—it advocates a much stronger thesis regarding the very idea of 
the linkage between conceptual relations and the idea of an empirical world 
(nature)—so it is inappropriate to interpret the final consequences of Kant’s 
transcendental project (and ours here) as a thesis about necessary conceptual 
connection. To be sure, however, the qualifier regarding the link between the 
idea of a conceptual scheme and Kant’s wider doctrine of transcendental 
idealism above is necessary as these two ideas do need to be thought of as 
connected in some way.  
A further related way of thinking about transcendental arguments, 
expressed by Thesis 3, involves construing them as attempting to establish the 
uniqueness of a particular categorial scheme.1 Stephan Körner has argued for 
the impossibility of transcendental deductions (and thus presumably, by 
extrapolation, transcendental arguments in general) by showing that such 
things cannot be adequately constructed. He claims that 
 
“A transcendental deduction can now be defined quite generally as a logically sound 
demonstration of the reasons why a particular categorial schema is not only in fact, 
but also necessarily employed in differentiating a region of experience. This 
definition is very wide indeed and will presently be shown to cover Kant’s 
conception of a transcendental deduction.”2 
 
Körner goes on to argue that to show the necessity of a particular schema it is 
first required that a method of differentiating a region of experience definitive 
of that scheme be established. It is then to be demonstrated that no schema 
                                                
1 This phrasing of the issue is, for most intents and purposes, the same as that expressed by 
Thesis 4. That is, the uniqueness of a particular categorial scheme is supposed to amount to its 
necessity in differentiating a region of experience. Despite this, for expository purposes, 
Thesis 2 and 3 have been grouped together, as the following section deals with Stroud’s 
Challenge. 
2 Körner, The Impossibility of Transcendental Deductions: pp. 318-319. 
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can be shown to be “unique” (a term presumably to be equated with 
“necessary”, although in a limited sense given Körner’s argument) since this 
would require that: 
 
(1) The schema in question be compared with undifferentiated experience 
and evaluated as to the adequacy of its application; 
(2) The schema in question be compared with other schemas and 
evaluated as to its relative validity or soundness; 
Or, 
(3) The schema in question is examined internally to assess its validity.1 
 
We can see how these ways of attempting to show the uniqueness of a 
particular categorial schema must fail, although there is some quite general 
difficulty with the approach of the argument. The first two options are clearly 
not viable—the notion of undifferentiated experience being recognisable to us 
is unintelligible and, even if interpreted charitably, would amount to us 
simply seeing such undifferentiated experience through the lens of our 
current methods for differentiation and thus, would involve us continuing to 
work within our current ways of recognising items within experience and 
thus within our current conceptual scheme. Regarding the second option, 
comparing an alternate conceptual scheme to our existing one, we would 
have a similar result since we cannot make intelligible the notion of having 
the requisite independent method of assessment to evaluate an alternate 
conceptual scheme if we are working inside our current one. So the problem 
repeats itself. The third option is surprisingly spurious—what of value could 
come as a result of an internal examination of one’s conceptual scheme? It is 
not manifestly clear what this means and is difficult to see how this could 
achieve anything of relevance. 
 Consider now Davidson’s attack on “the very idea of a conceptual 
scheme”.1  As Davidson’s argument should make abundantly clear, any sense 
                                                
1 This argument structure essentially condenses Körner’s claims in op. cit.: pp. 320-321.  
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in which we attempt to conjure up alternative conceptual schemes will result 
in a kind of mirroring of our existent scheme; and this is seemingly at least 
part of what Körner intends to show. As such, the very idea of a scheme 
becomes incoherent if we cannot make the notion of alternate schemes 
intelligible. Of course we need to appreciate the extent to which the notion of 
a conceptual scheme may not be isomorphic to that of a language; we might 
surmise that the possibility of translation hinges on the possession, by 
linguistic subjects attempting translation of different languages, of a common 
scheme which can make comparison by way of adequate translation possible. 
Thus a conceptual scheme could be thought of as something more general 
than a specific language—but then what could this mean if not an equation of 
the phrase “conceptual scheme” with the phrase “generally shared linguistic 
traits” and thus an appeal to something like the recognisable similarity 
between languages (or, a “general language” underlying sufficiently similar 
particular languages)? However, this seems like an obfuscation of what a 
language, after all, is. For the explanation of why translation between 
languages is in general possible comes down to the fact of the existence of 
certain shared practices which users of different languages have, and if we 
cannot tie the notion of a language directly to practices with which it is caught 
up, what can we tie it to? We certainly do not need the notion of a “conceptual 
scheme” to mediate between the notion of a language and the forms of life or 
practices through which a language shows itself to be valid, so why do we 
need it? It would appear that this superfluity may be part of what Davidson 
has demonstrated. 
The point of this analysis is that the attack on transcendental arguments 
from the perspective in which they are thought of as making mere claims 
about conceptual relations relies on a dubious assumption about the nature of 
a conceptual scheme: that we can make intelligible the notion that there are 
conceptual schemes so radically different from our own that they shirk even 
                                                                                                                                       
1 Donald Davidson (1984) On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme, in “Inquiries into Truth and 
Interpretation”, Oxford University Press. 
. 
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the most basic features of a language embodying basic particulars, such as the 
ones Strawson claims for our conceptual scheme in Individuals. The point is 
not that radically alternate conceptual schemes are logically impossible, but 
rather that we can have no coherent conception of them. 
In light of this, let us consider Körner’s definition of a transcendental 
deduction as 
 
“a logically sound demonstration of the reason why a particular categorial schema is 
not only in fact, but also necessarily employed, in differentiating a region of 
experience.”1 
 
I think there is nothing prima facie worrying about this understanding of a 
transcendental deduction—although I think an important aspect of their 
nature is omitted, viz., the aspect to be emphasised in our rehabilitation of 
transcendental proof which construes the role of synthetic a priori judgment 
as depending not on mere relativity to a scientific paradigm (or other shape of 
inquiry) as in Carnap, but instead to non-revisable features of anything that 
might count as experience—so we might think of the above quote as 
articulating one requirement of the final reconstruction we will come to.  
For our project here, a categorial schema would have to be shown to be 
necessarily employed in a particular region of experience by way of reference 
to Kant’s concern with searching for the conditions of a concept’s relation to 
an object. Kant’s concern with the notion of possible experience (and thus, 
possible experience of empirical objects) should suggest to us how a deeper 
connection between the notion of a categorial schema and the notion of an 
empirical object is to be established by a genuine transcendental deduction; in 
terms of our project here, by a coherent account of transcendental proof. The 
claim being that to (knowledgeably) perceive objects we must have particular 
and consistent ways of identifying and re-identifying them in a spatio-
temporal framework; we must then be in possession of concepts which are 
                                                
1 Körner, The Impossibility of Transcendental Deductions: pp. 318-319.  
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necessarily employable in this form of experience. Moreover, the employment 
of concepts in experience must bear a priori relations to experiential objects—
for the structure which the latter are experienced as having is dependent on 
the shaping influence of the former. Now it is important to again note that we 
can dodge commitment to the Categories whilst saying that  there is an 
insight contained in the claim that certain logical functions determine the 
nature of anything that is to have a conceptual structure (such as the 
experience enjoyed by a rational subject).1 We will have to return to this 
theme later and now consider one final objection to Körner’s attack on the 
notion of a transcendental deduction.  
Körner’s argument against the transcendental deduction fails for the 
additional reason that he focuses solely on an argument which is analogous to 
what Strawson has called the “thesis of objectivity” contained in the 
Transcendental Deduction. Körner misses the relevance of the “thesis of the 
necessary unity of consciousness”, without which the “thesis of objectivity”2 
on which he focuses loses its force anyway. Simply put, the idea of 
individuating the content of experience in terms of a particular scheme does 
not do the requisite epistemological work unless one can ascribe that content 
and those individuations to oneself as one’s own mental states. For what 
meaning could such individuation have without such self-reference? This idea 
effectively constitutes the definitive objection, formulated by Eva Schaper,3 to 
Körner’s attack on the notion of a transcendental deduction. Schaper reminds 
us of the ramifications of rejecting a theory aimed at articulating the 
possibility of a self-conscious subject having objectively valid thought about 
an empirical world, without addressing the question of what it takes to be 
                                                
1 The point is to come to an understanding of how Strawson’s central argumentative strategy 
in Individuals might work given certain supplementations. In the terms of our project here, 
this would occur through the re-establishment of a link between the possibility of a 
“descriptive metaphysics” and a transcendentally ideal model of knowledge, as articulated. 
We will attempt to make this connection to Strawson’s “descriptive metaphysics” in Chapter 
4, although only briefly.  
2 Both these broad theses are identified, I think rightly, by Strawson as the two central theses 
of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction. These theses are listed as (2) and (3) in Strawson, The 
Bounds of Sense: p. 24. 
3 Schaper (1972) Arguing Transcendentally, Kant-Studien, 63, pp. 101-116. 
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such a subject—that is, to have one’s states of consciousness unified and, as 
such, thinkable as ones states of consciousness.1 I take her reply to be quite 
decisive in this regard, since what Strawson refers to as the “thesis of 
objectivity” and the “thesis of the necessary unity of consciousness” are 
inextricably linked. Furthermore, given the orientation of the reconstruction 
of transcendental proof to be undertaken in the next chapter, recognition of 
the importance of the “thesis of the necessary unity of consciousness” will 
become crucial for such a reconstruction since the account of transcendental 
proof advocated here, unlike the majority of transcendental arguments in the 
literature, will necessarily involve reference to the thinker implicated in the 
construction of such transcendental proof to be argued for.   
One more important note needs to be made before we leave these 
reflections. With regard to Körner’s attempt to demonstrate the superfluity of 
transcendental deductions we can note a further reason for this attempt 
appearing misguided. Jeff Malpas outlines a consideration which we raised 
earlier, although he employs this consideration differently with respect to 
Körner. He says that  
 
“the conclusion of this [his] paper is...a clearer recognition of how right Schaper was 
in her diagnosis of Körner’s position. The twist is that Schaper herself seems to fall 
foul of the same incoherence. Indeed, if Davidson is right, such incoherence begins 
precisely with the assumption of a dichotomy between knowing subject and object 
known. Only by relinquishing that distinction can knowledge be understood as 
possible.”2 
 
The relevant consideration is the issue of how the modern understanding, 
within analytic philosophy, of “conceptual schemes” relates to Kant’s own 
conception of the components of knowledge. As was noted earlier, Kant’s 
concept/intuition distinction does not fit neatly into the modern analytic 
                                                
1 Op. cit.: pp. 115-116.  
2 Jeff Malpas (1990) Transcendental Arguments and Conceptual Schemes: A Reconsideration of 
Körner’s Uniqueness Argument, Kant-Studien, 81 pp. 232-251: p. 251. 
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notion of “conceptual schemes” since the latter effectively encompasses both 
side of Kant’s distinction, yet construes them in a different way. Of course, 
Kant’s construal of knowledge in terms of concepts and intuitions takes place 
within a transcendentally ideal model of knowledge quite unlike the typical 
modern epistemological conception widespread in analytic philosophy of a 
form of so-called “empiricism” or “naturalism”, so many complications are 
raised by Malpas’s claim that the “abandonment of the scheme-content 
distinction”1 makes Schaper’s objection to Körner superfluous. Effectively, I 
take it that we can learn from Schaper’s criticisms insofar as they point in the 
direction of the fundamental dependence between the two central theses of 
the Transcendental Deduction as identified: the “thesis of objectivity” and the 
“thesis of the necessary unity of consciousness”. This dependence, as noted, 
will become more apparent as we progress. 
 
2.2.3 Remarks on Theses 4 and 5 
 
These theses, which claim that “Transcendental arguments establish the 
necessity of a certain minimal conception of experience” and “Transcendental 
arguments establish the necessity of a mere belief in a certain minimal conception of 
experience”, represent the Strawsonian reconstruction of Kant’s 
Transcendental Deduction and Stroud’s refutation of it, respectively. Putting 
these theses in opposition thus makes clear the consequences of construing 
transcendental arguments in mere conceptual terms and also, of making the 
refutation of scepticism their focal point. The former Strawsonian idea that 
there necessarily is a “certain minimal conception of experience that we could 
make intelligible to ourselves” stems from the felt threat of scepticism that 
might render unintelligible how we can be so sure that our experience really 
is unified and objective. Strawson insists, by arguing “analytically”,2 that “for a 
                                                
1 Ibid. 
2 This is how Strawson construes his strategy. He says that his intentions in The Bounds of 
Sense are to extract the “analytical” argument from Kant’s Transcendental Deduction, while 
leaving behind the transcendental psychology which he, Strawson, saw it as unfortunately 
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series of diverse experiences to belong to a single consciousness it is necessary 
that they should be so connected as to constitute a temporally extended 
experience of a unified objective world.”1 That is, given the very notion of 
self-consciousness there are certain conditions that purportedly make it 
possible; these conditions being phenomena that a sceptic could have doubted 
had not they been shown to be necessary for the very fact of self-
consciousness itself—something beyond doubt.2  
The idea contained in Thesis 5, that we rely on the mere belief in the 
necessity of a “certain minimal conception of experience that we could make 
intelligible to ourselves”, expresses Stroud’s doubts that it is enough to 
merely claim that the “fact of experience” is only possible given certain 
conditions. We could still doubt, so says Stroud, whether we might be 
mistaken as to these conditions since one salient form of the sceptical 
challenge, as he formulates it, is that “our belief that objects continue to exist 
unperceived can never be justified.”3 This way of thinking assumes that 
justification might be the only available epistemic strategy here, which it need 
not be. Unfortunately, we are not able to go into this here.4 
Stroud’s Challenge to transcendental arguments then appears to convert 
the method of philosophising inherent in such arguments to talk about the 
mere necessity of a belief in experience as being unified and objective (or, of a 
                                                                                                                                       
entangled with (Strawson, The Bounds of Sense: p. 16). To note, there is possible terminological 
confusion to be had here, of the kind already given voice to, in respect of characterising this 
strategy as “analytical” insofar as this invites comparison with the “analytic method” in Kant. 
We will come to the details of Strawson’s reading of the Deduction in Section 2.2.5. 
1 Strawson, The Bounds of Sense: p. 97. 
2 That the additional extreme move involving rejection of this proposition is not available 
should be quite clear—and correlatively, it is not quite clear what could be meant by this 
move at all; what could one be denying through performing it? Of course one could give lip 
service to the idea that “what we have is not self-consciousness”, although this would just 
seem to betray an inadequate grasp of the concept itself (thus reducing matters to definitional 
scruples), or perhaps indicate irrationality—something which cannot be argued with. But 
does this then suggest an attitude to the sceptic of this same form—one of dismissal? Not if 
the sceptic referred to is taken to accept the "fact of self-consciousness". But is there a problem 
here if we cannot make clear what is meant by denying the "fact of self-consciousness"? Only 
for the misguided sceptic under this impression of denial, we might think.  
3 Stroud, Transcendental Arguments: p. 247. This phrasing of the problem is of course relevant 
for Strawson’s project in Individuals as well. 
4 A recent account of this area of questioning is given in William P. Alston (2006) Beyond 
Justification: Dimensions of Epistemic Evaluation, Cornell University Press. 
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unified and objective world) and thus threatens to give way to varieties of 
conventionalism which assert the mere fact that we have particular ways of 
justifying certain beliefs and no form of justification for others; the point being 
that we could simply give up our current ways of speaking and thinking and 
adopt new ways not reliant on the same currently endorsed conditions of 
particular things making sense.1 But is this right? Can we do this? To what 
extent might certain features of our conception of the world not revisable?  
What Stroud’s Challenge leads to is the admission that transcendental 
arguments, as they have been known in Kantian and Strawsonian forms, are 
not possible. But does this mean we cannot further revise them? Is it possible 
to rehabilitate the thesis that ampliative steps are to employed in 
transcendental argumentation—and thus, the thesis that synthetic a priori 
judgment (under a particular interpretation) is possible—such as to make 
such argumentation (and proof) a more powerful epistemic strategy than 
Strawson’s “analytical” argument, which itself reduces to claims about what a 
certain operative conceptual scheme requires? Showing this possibility is 
precisely our task here.  
 An additional, brief remark can be added here. With respect to our 
recognition of the target of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction as a form of 
Humean scepticism, we can observe also that Stroud’s own objection turns on 
similar principles. We might think of Kant’s rebuke of Hume as perhaps not 
adequately appreciate by those who argue as Stroud does; thus, we might say 
such arguers have missed Kant’s point in his Copernican turn in general and 
his conception of “transcendental” in particular.  
 
 
                                                
1 See Carnap (1956) Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology, in “Meaning and Necessity: A Study 
in Semantics and Modal Logic, enlarged edition”, University of Chicago Press, for example. 
Carnap’s understanding of “internal” and “external” questions can usefully be brought to 
bear upon our interpretation of the relation between his understanding of synthetic a priori 
judgment and Kant’s understanding of such.  
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2.2.4 Remarks on Thesis 6 
 
The notion, contained in Thesis 6, that “Transcendental arguments rely on a 
(dubious) verificationist principle” was a charge developed fairly early in the 
literature, and has done much to encourage recognition of shared traits 
between Wittgensteinian and Kantian patterns of argument.1 Rorty 
summarises the verificationist principle neatly: 
 
“In order for ‘X’ to have meaning there have to be criteria for identifying X’s, and the 
sceptic cannot even talk about X’s unless he accepts that these criteria are sound. 
Since these criteria are obviously satisfied, he cannot deny that there are X’s.”2 
 
And as we saw above in Section 2.2.3, Stroud concluded from this kind of 
principle that the most it can establish is that, given certain assumptions about 
the world—certain beliefs we have about it—certain other ones follow.  
Stroud’s original attack on transcendental arguments to the effect that they 
rely on a dubious verificationist principle was initially formulated as an attack 
on Strawson’s account of “Particulars” in the first part of Individuals. Stroud 
sees Strawson as moving from a claim (as a premise in an argument) about 
the idea of the world as “containing objective particulars in a single spatio-
temporal system” to the claim (as a conclusion of that argument) that “objects 
continue to exist unperceived”, via the additional premises to the effect that 
spatio-temporality is sufficient for identification and re-identification of 
particulars, and that satisfaction of our best criteria for identification and re-
identification permits us knowledge of objects as existing unperceived. Stroud 
sees this chain of reasoning as relying on a verificationist principle of meaning 
insofar as it relies on the fact that our very ability to formulate the thought of 
“our best criteria for identification and re-identification” requires that we 
posit such criteria which we could, obviously, then not be wrong about (since 
                                                
1 See, for example, Peter Hacker (1972) Are Transcendental Arguments a Version of 
Verificationism?, American Philosophical Quarterly, 9, pp. 78-85; Rorty (1971) Verificationism 
and Transcendental Arguments, Nous, 5, pp. 3-14; and Stroud, Transcendental Arguments. 
2 Rorty, Verificationism and Transcendental Arguments: p. 4. 
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it was us who determined them). And if knowledge of these criteria is all that 
is needed to license our claim to satisfactory fulfilment of their purpose, then 
transcendental arguments appear to turn on circular principles. The idea is 
that the sceptical challenge cannot be adequately formulated due to the fact 
that the proposition “objects do not exist unperceived” cannot be verified by 
way of experience. Henceforth, so says Strawson, the sceptic cannot make 
sense of this very doubt.1   
We can see how a charge like this threatens the notion of transcendental 
arguments as construed in Strawson’s terms, since if we think of such 
arguments as involving inferences from assumptions about the “fact of 
experience”, or in Strawson’s terms, from the assumption of the existence of 
self-consciousness, to conclusions about the necessary preconditions of such 
experience or self-consciousness, then it appears that no sceptical attack can 
be coherently formulated on such arguments due to a spurious principle; and 
surely this is a weakness of their form so construed.  
Regardless of whether the verificationist charge is to be felt as a decisive 
damnation of transcendental arguments, it is important to see how the 
account of transcendental proof recommended here is immune to that same 
charge. The main reason for this is the point of difference we have been 
focussing on thus far: the fact that the construal recommended here is not 
wholly describable in terms of the notion of conceptual schemes, as Theses 3 
and 4 are. It is clear that Strawson’s account in The Bounds of Sense is open to 
this charge and this is one reason among several which leads to my 
suggestion that we need a stronger and more thoroughly Kantian construal of 
transcendental argumentation as transcendental proof.  
 
 
 
                                                
1 Stroud, Transcendental Arguments: p. 247. 
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2.2.5 Remarks on Theses 7 and 8 
 
As we noted in a preliminary way above in Section 2.2, the claim that 
transcendental arguments (or transcendental proofs) involve a regressive 
procedure, or are themselves wholly regressive arguments, is a complex one 
with numerous relevant points of consideration. The first question that arises 
(in terms of historical extrapolation) is whether Kant’s Transcendental 
Deduction itself can be regarded as a regressive argument (thus also re-
engaging the persistent background concern of whether Kant’s procedure was 
the best or only available procedure for transcendental argumentation, or 
proof). This initial question is relevant for us insofar as we have been 
considering a more faithfully Kantian approach to the notion of 
“transcendental” than is generally exemplified in the literature. Congruently, 
a consideration of whether Kant’s Transcendental Deduction can be regarded 
as involving a regressive procedure will allow us to elaborate further the 
issues raised above with respect to the relationship between the analytic 
method, on the one hand, and regressive argumentation, on the other.  
To begin treatment of this question we can look to the work of Karl 
Ameriks who, in his paper entitled Kant’s Transcendental Deduction as a 
Regressive Argument, gives persuasive reasons for answering in the affirmative 
with regard to the topical concern of this section. The central claim contained 
in that paper is the following: 
 
“I will argue...that it is necessary and profitable to understand the deduction as 
moving from the assumption that there is empirical knowledge to a proof of the 
preconditions of that knowledge.”1 
 
Additionally, Ameriks regards this reading of the Transcendental Deduction 
as “unique” and at variance with the interpretations given by people such as 
Strawson, who regard the Deduction as “aiming to provide a proof of 
                                                
1 Ameriks, Kant’s Transcendental Deduction as a Regressive Argument: p. 273.  
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objectivity which will answer scepticism”.1 This latter reading is characterised 
by Ameriks as construing the Deduction as a progressive argument, whereas 
Ameriks himself views the Deduction as a regressive argument. The 
complication comes in attempts to explain just what this apparent variance 
consists in.  
As a preface to the above problem, we must first appropriately situate the 
reading of the Deduction with respect to Kant’s understanding of both the 
analytic and synthetic methods. As we noted earlier, Kant’s pre-Critical 
adherence to a Leibinizian conception of the metaphysical enterprise meant 
that the term “regressive” could be readily conflated with the term “analytic”, 
since the former involves moves up a syllogistic chain of inference toward 
more and more general concepts—precisely the kind of procedure involved in 
the analysis of concepts of which such Leibnizian metaphysics was essentially 
composed. Contrariwise, Kant’s later transcendentally ideal conception of 
knowledge forbids the previous faith held in this method for arriving at 
metaphysical truths since it is direct conflict with the notion that the only 
metaphysical truths available are ones limited to possible experience—
something which the former method extends illegitimately beyond. In fact, 
due to Kant’s later faith in the role of synthetic a priori judgment, metaphysics 
can only show itself to be a valid and worthwhile enterprise if it can be shown 
to contain such synthetic a priori judgment.2 Thus, metaphysical truths will be 
arrived at synthetically, not analytically as was previously conceived by Kant. 
Despite this, in Kant’s Critical Philosophy there is still a place for talk of 
regressive explanation. It is important to clarify just what role this talk plays 
for us here. 
To note, and as is widely recognised, Kant’s definitions of both “analytic” 
and “synthetic” judgments turn on a dubious psychological criterion3 of what 
is thought in a concept. His classification of the judgment that “all bodies are 
                                                
1 Ibid. 
2 And it is of course the central task of the Critique to prove this possibility. 
3 A classic case of this objection can be found in A.J. Ayer (2001) Language, Truth and Logic, 
with an introduction by Ben Rogers, Penguin: Chapter 4. 
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extended” as “analytic” in virtue of the fact that the concept “extension” is 
contained in the concept “body” is now regarded as inappropriate; nowadays 
the term “analytic” is reserved, roughly, for those statements that are deemed 
true in virtue of the meanings of the terms involved (although this is still by 
no means entirely unproblematic or uncontested). Additionally, Kant’s 
classification of synthetic judgments, as of the type exemplified by “some 
bodies are heavy”,1 involves an appeal to a similarly dubious principle. This 
principle effectively defines itself negatively whereby the concept “heavy” 
cannot be said to be contained in the concept of body; thus, such a judgment 
cannot be analytic, so by extrapolation it must be synthetic. Much more could 
be said regarding these preliminary definitions although such a rudimentary 
account as has been given ought to suffice to further our discussion for now. 
Given both the negative attitude displayed toward Kant’s criteria for 
analytic and synthetic judgments above and the generally reconstructive 
nature of the project here, it is not necessary to concur with Kant on such 
definitions. It will be enough for us to agree to the general definition of  true 
analytic judgment as “true in virtue of the meanings of the terms involved” 
and that of true synthetic judgment as “true in virtue of the meanings of the 
terms involved in addition to the relevant empirical content” (such as was 
stated roughly above). This operative definition is general enough to concur 
also with Kant’s characterisation of analytic judgment as “explicative” and 
that of synthetic judgment as “ampliative”.2 This basic definition will become 
important for us as we attempt to explain in Chapter 3 how there might still 
be a legitimate conception of synthetic a priori judgment available, given the 
appropriate construal of transcendental proof. Let us return to our topic of 
focus and pick up again with these reflections shortly. 
We noted above that there is a point of conflict between Ameriks’s reading 
of the Deduction and Strawson’s reading given in The Bounds of Sense. We can 
observe a remark by Ameriks to elucidate the source of this conflict: 
                                                
1 This example, as well as the previous one regarding analytic judgment, is found in Kant, 
Prolegomena: p. 72.   
2 Ibid.  
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“The major departure of this [Ameriks’s] interpretation is that it takes the Critique to 
accept empirical knowledge as a premise to be regressively explained rather than as 
a conclusion to be established.”1 
 
That is, Ameriks takes the Deduction to be a specific form of the 
argumentative structure typically thought of as exemplifying a transcendental 
argument: 
 
i. There is experience. 
ii. It is a necessary condition of the possibility of experience that p. 
iii. Therefore, p. 
 
Now, given Ameriks’s statement of his strategy as quoted above, the 
Transcendental Deduction will be read by him as constituting a regressive 
explanation of the proof of the preconditions of empirical knowledge. Ameriks’s more 
specific version of that argument can be transferred from his mode of 
presentation into a syllogistic form: 
 
i. There is empirical knowledge.2 
ii. Empirical knowledge (“experience”) is possible only if the “original 
synthetic unity of apperception” applies to it. 
iii. The “original synthetic unity of apperception” is possible only if pure 
concepts have validity. 
iv. The validity of pure concepts requires that transcendental idealism be 
true. 
v. Therefore, transcendental idealism is true.3   
                                                
1 Ameriks, Kant’s Transcendental Deduction as a Regressive Argument: p. 276. 
2 Kant indeed says that empirical knowledge is only possible given the transcendental unity 
of apperception (B137), but it would be improper to suggest that this is a valid criticism at this 
point in the argument since empirical knowledge is being regressively explained anyway. 
3 This effectively contains Ameriks’s proposed version of the argument of the Deduction 
(ibid.).  
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Now the above argument might be taken to represent Ameriks’s reading of 
Kant’s Transcendental Deduction. This reading is thus in conflict with 
Strawson’s reading of that argument whereby Strawson begins his argument 
with the premise that we are self-conscious and argues to the conclusion that 
there is a unified, objective world. In his terms, Ameriks see Strawson as 
reading the Deduction “as showing that one can be self-conscious only if there 
is an objective world of which one is aware.”1 In opposition to this, Ameriks 
sees Kant “essentially to be arguing that for us there is objectivity, and hence 
empirical knowledge, only if the categories are universally valid.”2 An 
additional complication raised by Ameriks is the idea that “the deduction of 
the categories has a material dependence on transcendental idealism” and this 
is, we might think, a direct consequence of thinking of the Transcendental 
Deduction as having the precise structure as just outlined. Thus, with this 
additional remark Ameriks situates his reading even further from those, such 
as Strawson, who attempt to extract what they see as the core argument of the 
Deduction from the purportedly unacceptable epistemological edifice of 
transcendental idealism. The latter point regarding the material dependence 
of the Transcendental Deduction on the doctrine of transcendental idealism 
will become important for us as we elaborate our theory of transcendental 
proof, for as we will see in Chapter 3, such proof will involve “quasi-logical” 
moves similar to what has been called “material inference”.3  
Further to the criticisms already attended to, we can observe Ameriks’s 
declaration that Strawson and others have read the Transcendental Deduction 
as “deducing empirical knowledge from consciousness and its conditions.”4 
However, Ameriks contends, “Kant nowhere states that it [a transcendental 
deduction] is to give the sufficient conditions of empirical knowledge or is a 
                                                
1 Op. cit.: p. 277. 
2 Ibid.  
3 For our purposes here the most relevant work on material inference is in Sellars and 
Brandom. This issue will be discussed in Section 3.2. 
4 Op. cit.: p. 280. 
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proof that there is an objective world.”1 Ameriks sees Kant as, instead, 
providing a proof of the objective validity of the categories, something that 
requires that the categories themselves be shown to apply a priori in 
experience, since they are purported conditions of its possibility.2 
Interestingly, Ameriks construes this pattern of argument as “regressive” but 
not trivial, as might be suggested by the possible conflation of the phrase 
“regressive argument” with the notion of “analysis”, which we noted above 
when discussing Kant’s pre-Critical and Critical Period conceptions of the 
“analytic method” and “synthetic method”. As such, this construal requires 
that an alternate conception of “regressive” be available that is not to be 
related to the term “analytic”. For although these terms may not be 
equivalent, it is easy to see how they may be taken by some to be sufficiently 
related to cause trouble for the transcendental arguer who makes the kind of 
proposal Ameriks suggests one finds in Kant. It is important then that the 
term “regressive” be understood here as applying to an argument that moves 
from some fact or thing to its explanation. For example, Ameriks’s reading of 
Kant’s Transcendental Deduction construes it as moving from the existence of 
empirical knowledge to conditions which stand to explain its possibility. 
Strawson’s reading, on the other hand, as interpreted by Ameriks as 
“progressive”, moves from the assertion of the existence of apperception to a 
claim about what this means about experience more generally (that it is 
unified and objective), viz., experience of a unified, objective world is 
regarded as a sufficient explanation of apperception.        
Now, we need to specify just what Ameriks means by characterising his 
reading of the Deduction as “regressive” and Strawson’s reading as 
“progressive”. In doing this, we need to observe a remark by Kant insofar as 
Ameriks distinguishes his conception of the two relevant terms in a slightly 
different way. Kant offers an interpretation of a terminological point 
regarding the relationship between the analytic and synthetic methods and 
                                                
1 Ibid. 
2 Op. cit.: pp. 280-281.  
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the notions of regressive and progressive argumentation respectively that is 
worth subjecting to lengthy quotation: 
 
“Analytic method, insofar as it is opposed to the synthetic method, is something 
quite different from a sum total of analytic propositions. It only means that one starts 
from what is being looked for as if it was given and ascends to the conditions under 
which alone it is possible.1 In this method one often uses nothing but synthetic 
propositions, as in the example of mathematical analysis, and it might be better to 
call it the regressive method, in distinction from the synthetic or progressive method.”2  
 
Now we are not given any help in the text of Kant’s Transcendental 
Deduction as a Regressive Argument as to exactly how Ameriks understands 
Kant’s position with respect to this distinction (except through Ameriks’s 
revision of the distinction itself) although an explanation seems to come easily 
enough. Ignoring Kant’s point regarding the precise relationship between the 
“analytic method” and the “regressive method” for one moment, we can say 
that these (similarly conceived) methods involve uncovering the “necessary 
conditions of the possibility” of the particular phenomenon to which they are 
applied. Kant’s statement that “one starts from what is being looked for as if it 
was given and ascends to the conditions under which alone it is possible” 
suggests this much. By contrast, we might suppose that the “progressive 
method” involves explaining sufficient conditions of some fact or thing, by 
moving from it to what might be possible (possibly sufficient) explanatory 
inferences or extrapolations from it (in the case of Strawson’s view of our 
conception of experience as necessarily of a “unified, objective world” as a 
sufficient explanation of apperception, or self-consciousness). 
Ameriks, by contrast, offers a more specific and slightly altered version of 
Kant’s definition. He says that merely defining "regressive" and "progressive" 
as descriptives characterising argument that articulate necessary conditions 
                                                
1 As should be clear, this “ascension” is exactly the kind of procedure Ameriks reads the 
Transcendental Deduction as involving, insofar as it is viewed by him as “regressive”. Such 
ascension is not to be equated with the analytic method however. 
2 Kant, Prolegomena: p. 82, footnote labelled *.  
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and sufficient conditions respectively is unhelpful. He puts forward a more 
specific definition of this distinction in the following way: 
 
“once the epistemological concern of transcendental arguments is taken into account, 
I believe adequately distinguishing definitions of ‘progressive’ and ‘regressive’ are 
available: a regressive argument would show that y is a necessary condition of 
knowledge x; a progressive argument would show that z is a sufficient condition of 
knowledge x, where x is a type of representation not defined as epistemic1.”2 
 
Thus, Ameriks provides the additional specification that a progressive 
argument not merely aims to provide sufficient conditions of a piece of 
knowledge—in Strawson’s case, apperception—but also that this piece of 
knowledge be a “non-epistemic representation”. Read this way, Strawson’s 
argument construes the Transcendental Deduction as moving from 
apperception, as a non-epistemic representation, to what would be a sufficient 
condition of it; namely, a unified, objective world of experience. We can see an 
additional point of conflict arising from this construal of Strawson’s argument 
as progressive, insofar as a truly Kantian argument of the kind intended 
would seek necessary conditions, not merely sufficient conditions. 
The advantage of the way these terms are defined above is that it 
encompasses those demands that Strawson places on the structure of his own 
argument(s)—and thus on the idea of a progressive argument, insofar as such 
                                                
1 We might find ourselves disturbed by the characterisation of “x” in this definition as 
referring to both “knowledge” and “a type of representation not defined as epistemic”. I am 
unsure exactly how to take this apparent conflict of terms although I assume the general 
thrust of the point to be the following: for the progressive argument referred to (Strawson’s), 
“x” stands in for “apperception”, which, on the one hand might be characterised as 
“knowledge” (possible insofar as it involves a kind of self-knowledge; self-consciousness), 
yet, on the other hand, might be defined as “non-epistemic” since the notion of apperception 
does not strictly involve any knowledge claim of the typical kind involved in claims to know 
the world through empirical knowledge. This explanation is unsatisfactory however, since it 
could easily be reversed or even overturned altogether quite easily. We might say that 
“apperception” is a kind of “epistemic representation”, yet one that ought to not count as 
knowledge in the strict sense. However, this reversal seems to invite further criticism to the 
extent which results in a collapse of the point attempting to be made. Unfortunately, it is 
difficult to discern what the precise meaning of this specification is, so this attempt at 
explanation will have to do for our purposes here. 
2 Ameriks, Kant’s Transcendental Deduction as a Regressive Argument: pp. 281-282.  
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arguments might be interpreted in that fashion.1 Importantly, it becomes clear 
through thinking about “regressive argument” in Ameriks’s way that such 
arguments need not look trivial (or, metaphysically blunderous if viewed 
under something like the pre-Critical lens of Kant where regressive 
arguments are easily conflated with the analytic method). The important 
difference between Ameriks’s understanding of “regressive” and what he sees 
as Kant’s understanding of the same is that Ameriks’s notion of “regressive” 
allows for synthetic a priori principles to operate as conclusions in regressive 
arguments whereas Kant purportedly saw synthetic a priori principles as 
fitting into the premises of such arguments2 (thus readily inviting the 
metaphysical error of inferring to conclusions beyond possible experience).  
In sum, we can note that the important difference between Ameriks’s 
reading and Strawson’s is that by contrast, Strawson begins with the notion of 
apperception as a posit and infers from that to the notion of a unified and 
objective world of experience. Problematically for Strawson though, by Kant’s 
lights, the very notion of unified and objective experience is written into the 
notion (or, meaning) of apperception. This ensures that Strawson’s reading 
looks trivial; a point which Ameriks makes in a helpful way: 
 
“Kant makes it clear that the transcendental unity of apperception is a necessary 
condition of empirical knowledge; representations which cannot be unified as mine 
cannot be representations which amount to knowledge (B137). If it is also the case 
that the condition that representations agree with the transcendental and not merely 
the empirical unity of consciousness just means for Kant that they are objectively 
related, then ‘original apperception’ would be a sufficient condition of empirical 
knowledge as well, though by definition and not because of any progressive 
argument.”3 
 
                                                
1 As Ameriks reads him. I have yet to see Strawson use the term "progressive" although it is 
implied by his approach that this is his intended strategy of argument even if he did not 
understand it as such. 
2 As might be suggested by the quotation above from Kant, Prolegomena: p. 82, footnote 
labelled *.   
3 Op. cit: p. 283. 
Transcendental-Phenomenological Proof and Descriptive Metaphysics 
Byron Clugston 
61 
So it appears that Strawson’s strategy, and that of others who take 
apperception as a premise and the notion of an objective, unified world of 
experience as something to be explained, include the error of missing the 
basic interconnection between these fundamental ideas. Additionally, such 
strategies also misunderstand Kant’s general task in the Deduction insofar as 
they place weight on the task of ensuring objectivity in order to rebut 
scepticism instead of providing a proof of the necessary conditions of the 
possibility of a particular kind of empirical knowledge. Importantly, and as 
we have already mentioned, rebutting scepticism need not be thought of as 
Kant’s main task. As has been maintained here, the rebuttal of scepticism is 
not a main task as such for Kant at all, but rather a mere result given his main 
project which aims at something more profound—namely, a reshaping of the 
landscape in which those types of questions arise.  
We might think of it as a conclusion of the above considerations that 
Kant’s Transcendental Deduction is a regressive argument and, by extension, 
that all transcendental arguments are regressive arguments. However, it is 
clear that the regressive procedure as proposed by Ameriks does not fit at all 
with the typical construal of transcendental arguments yet instead requires a 
commitment to a form of transcendental idealism in the sense we have made 
here, if the notion of regressive explanation is to be taken in terms of the 
phrasing of “conditions of the possibility” in the sense in which we have 
employed that phrase. This reading of Kant’s Deduction can now be extended 
to connect up with our account of transcendental proof by considering a point 
made by Ameriks which serves to bring out the peculiar nature of both. 
Near the beginning of his paper Ameriks gives an example of Kant’s 
conception of a “transcendental exposition”, as exemplified by his account of 
space in the Transcendental Aesthetic, to make clear his reading of the 
Deduction. Ameriks says that 
 
“surprisingly little attention has been paid to Kant’s explicit designation of the 
argument of the Transcendental Aesthetic as a transcendental deduction (B 119). In a 
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remarkably systematic paragraph added in the second edition Kant explains what he 
means by a “transcendental exposition” and how it is that his analysis of space is 
one. Briefly Kant declares a transcendental account of a particular representation (B) 
to be one which shows how B explains the possibility of a kind of synthetic a priori 
knowledge (A). Such an account has two parts: 
(1) For this purpose it is required that such knowledge does really flow from the 
given concept, (2) that this knowledge is possible only on the assumption of a given 
mode of explaining the concept (B 40).”1 
 
Now, Kant’s transcendental exposition of space in the Aesthetic is instructive 
for us since it makes the connection between such an exposition (and by 
extension, what we refer to here as “transcendental proof”) and the doctrine 
of transcendental idealism. We can observe further that 
 
“This means that the transcendental deduction in the Transcendental Aesthetic in 
particular must show (1) how the science of geometry “really flows” from the 
representation of space, and (2) how geometry is possible only if that representation 
has a particular (in Kant’s view, ideal) nature. This suggests that a transcendental 
deduction of a particular type of knowledge demonstrates its necessary and 
sufficient conditions.”2 
 
The opacity of the requirement of “really flowing” (which we might suppose 
means not simply logical entailment, but perhaps something more like 
material inference,3 yet in a rather peculiar form) notwithstanding, we can see 
how this construal is helpful. Namely, in Kant’s argument “geometry is 
possible as a science only if the representation of space is an a priori intuition, 
which is possible only if space is transcendentally ideal.”4 In applying this 
same reasoning to the Transcendental Deduction, we can say that empirical 
                                                
1 Op. cit.: p. 274. 
2 Ibid. 
3 We will discuss the relationship of this notion to our account of transcendental proof in 
Section 3.2, entitled “Situated Thought”.   
4 Ibid. 
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knowledge is possible only if the Categories apply a priori in experience, and 
the a priority of the Categories entails transcendental idealism.  
Thus, although we must conclude generally that the term “regressive” 
does not apply to transcendental arguments in the literature as a whole 
(something I take to be established by the diagnosis of Strawson’s strategy as 
at odds with the “regressive” reading), this is no problem, since the account 
on offer here has deliberately set itself apart from the typical treatments given 
in the literature. The way forward is to take Ameriks’s account of the 
Transcendental Deduction as a clue for explicating transcendental proof and 
that task will occupy us shortly. The most important thing to recognise about 
the reading of the Transcendental Deduction one finds in Strawson is the 
extent to which this reading makes the Deduction look superfluous. 
Strawson’s strategy of arguing from apperception to its consequences looks 
like—given the right conception of apperception and its entailments—not 
merely an “analytical” argument, but a straight out “analytic” argument 
(where “analytic” is taken to mean “true in virtue of the meaning of the terms 
involved”). This is because, properly thought out, Strawson’s reconstruction 
makes Kant’s Transcendental Deduction look like a tautology since a full-
blooded conception of the transcendental unity of apperception itself already 
involves the notion of a unified, objective experience; we cannot have these 
two ideas at opposite ends of a syllogism and expect to get away with it. And 
as Ameriks says, this would obviously not represent “Kant’s best intentions.”1  
Now, although the focus of this section has been primarily on Thesis 7, we 
can briefly outline the link to Thesis 8, focus on which will be the task of 
Chapter 3. Thesis 8 states: “transcendental arguments establish necessary 
conditions of the possibility of particular kinds of knowledge; they articulate 
epistemic conditions.”  
It seems that the appropriate link to make between Ameriks’s reading of 
the Transcendental Deduction and this conception of transcendental 
arguments (and proof) is as follows. The regressive procedure outlined with 
                                                
1 Op. cit.: p. 276. 
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respect to the Deduction is to be taken as central to the construal of 
transcendental proof (via the device of situated thought) to be given in 
Chapter 3. Since the regressive procedure, when read as applying to the 
Transcendental Deduction, involved articulation of the necessary conditions 
of empirical knowledge—taken by Ameriks’s Kant to include, roughly, the 
Categories and transcendental idealism—we can make the appeal that such 
necessary conditions are epistemic conditions of the kind appealed to by Allison 
in his two-aspect reading of transcendental idealism. We will elaborate upon 
this thought in the coming sections. 
 
2.3 Overview 
 
We have seen through the foregoing analysis of some general claims that 
have been made vis-à-vis transcendental argumentation that there is much 
regarding current orthodox views that may be questioned. The general list of 
theses listed in Section 2.2 can be reduced to a chain of claims which 
interrelate closely. We can observe the following: 
 
(1) The general idea that “transcendental arguments aim to refute 
the sceptic by establishing necessary conditions of the possibility 
of the unity and objectivity of our experience” was seen to lead to 
a focus in the literature on justificatory scepticism which, from the 
outset, understood the traditional mind/world gap to be a 
problem to be explained. This focus included general 
commitment beyond the construal of this philosophical problem, 
as inherited from Hume. Namely, it included a commitment to a 
generally “naturalised epistemology” which rejected the Kantian 
“transcendental” approach to accounting for the mind/world 
problem. This general orientation then meant that the focus on 
conceptual construal of transcendental arguments dominated. 
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(2) The ideas that “transcendental arguments (merely) articulate 
(necessary) conceptual relations” and “transcendental arguments 
establish the uniqueness of a particular categorial scheme” stem 
from (1) where the only viable conception of “transcendental” is 
seen as one which involves mere conceptual necessity, and not 
commitment to any purportedly metaphysical theses. 
(3) The influential nature of Strawson’s reading of the 
Transcendental Deduction allowed the idea that “transcendental 
arguments establish the necessity of a certain minimal conception 
of experience” to become the generally accepted version of 
transcendental argumentation. A central problem with 
Strawson’s reading raised by Stroud in his claim that 
“transcendental arguments establish the necessity of a mere belief 
in a certain minimal conception of experience” has led to the 
understanding of there being problems with transcendental 
arguments in general.  
(4) The claim that “transcendental arguments rely on a (dubious) 
verificationist principle” can be seen as a charge arising from the 
same general view of transcendental arguments as phrased 
above, which we rejected. 
(5) Finally, the idea that “transcendental arguments are regressive 
arguments”, which was discussed in relation to Ameriks’s paper, 
was seen to lead us a conception of such arguments which 
diverged from Strawson’s interpretation (and thus, the dominant 
view in the literature). The reading of Kant’s Transcendental 
Deduction as a regressive argument led us to a view of 
transcendental proof as having a similar form which will be 
explained with respect to the notion of “situated thought” in the 
next chapter. 
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Given these generally negative diagnoses of the approach to accounting 
for transcendental arguments in the literature we can now advance some 
preliminary, positive claims. 
The crucial conception to appreciate is that of the linkage between 
transcendental proof and a certain conception of the synthetic a priori, a linkage 
which involves recruiting the notion of “situated thought”. This connection 
serves to strengthen the possibility of providing a suitable reconstruction of 
what has been called transcendental proof and, whilst not involving a passive 
acceptance of Kant’s doctrine of transcendental idealism, certainly advocates a 
thorough reconsideration of the merits of a way of thinking similar to this.  
A related thought is that, whilst providing an excellent departure for, and 
material for the rehabilitation of, transcendental argumentation, the general 
Strawsonian “austere” interpretation of “transcendental” is certainly no 
longer acceptable in its original form; as we have seen from above sub-
sections, the general philosophical community has long been possessed of this 
thought. Indeed much of the dispute regarding transcendental argumentation 
has its basis in the revision, in one way or another, of Strawsonian theses. By 
placing a line between those who, on the one hand, think that Strawson’s 
general strategy was correct yet in need of revision, and on the other hand, 
those who think that Strawson’s attempt at a conceptual construal of 
transcendental arguments was wrong-headed, we divide the scope of 
transcendental inquiry into weak and strong construals respectively. Clearly, 
this reconstruction falls in the latter camp. 
This criticism notwithstanding, the Strawsonian interpretation provides an 
excellent and clear way of thinking about some of the central aspects of 
transcendental argumentation. And it has been one intention of mine in this 
chapter to take note of the idea that the notion of a “conceptual scheme”,1 
whilst not a central feature at work in transcendental proof, is a feature 
nevertheless, insofar as such proofs are contained within the conceptual 
                                                
1 Despite the well-known criticisms of this notion in Davidson, On the Very Idea of a Conceptual 
Scheme. 
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structure of transcendental arguments and distinguished by the synthetic a 
priori moves which constitute their primary epistemic virtue. Mark Sacks 
makes this point nicely when he says, giving a suggestion as to how such 
transcendental proof should be structured, that  
 
“We should set out the formally valid deductive arguments as the shell, while 
recognizing that the central moves, which can be regarded only as premised in the run 
of the argument, need to be established independently by way of transcendental proof – 
working through the relevant propositional content in situated thought. If that is done, the 
status of propositions that are synthetic but a priori stands to be established (and 
their scope appropriately restricted).”1 
 
And this recommendation should point us toward a strengthened version of 
transcendental proof that makes a claim strong enough to be significant, and 
is palatable enough to be accepted as a genuine philosophical option when 
thinking critically about what it means to have, potentially, empirical, world-
directed thought about an objective order independent of our subjective 
apprehension of it. Of course this recommendation is here opaque as it stands, 
so the notion of “situated thought” will be subject to a thorough analysis in 
the next chapter.  
A final word on this chapter. I think a helpful way to gain a broad 
perspective of the landscape I have sketched thus far is by way of considering 
the consequences of the various forms of what have been called 
“transcendental arguments”. On one extreme, we have a fully collapsed 
picture of these kinds of arguments which see them as superfluous talk about 
what we can say either on the basis of the mere conceptual scheme we employ 
in talk about the world or, in an even weaker account, what we can say about 
the conditions of the possibility of our experience given our mere belief—
perhaps erroneous—in the necessity of such conditions. And, as has been 
asserted repeatedly, this picture does not contain anything even roughly 
                                                
1 Sacks, The Nature of Transcendental Arguments: pp. 455-456. My emphasis; here intended to 
point out the sense of vagary which ought to be dispelled and replaced with serious 
philosophical analysis).  
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resembling an example of true transcendental proof, and more generally, does 
not seem to constitute an epistemologically interesting project worth 
pursuing.  
At the other extreme we find an unnecessarily strong form, or more 
accurately, a distorted vision of what it means to talk about conditions of the 
possibility of experience, which comes in those accounts of “transcendental” 
which take it to mean something ontological about what the “conditions of 
the possibility of the existence of empirical objects” are. In fact, at the sentence 
level this account almost gets it right since the term “existence” needs merely 
to be replaced with “perception”;1 what Kant meant as an epistemological—or 
perhaps even semantic2—claim is interpreted wrongly in this picture as an 
ontological claim.  
 
3 The Proposed Reconstruction 
3.1 The Proposal 
 
Up to this point I have been suggesting that a full reappraisal of 
transcendental argumentation ought to be possible given (amongst other 
things) a consideration of the merits of the two-aspect reading of 
transcendental idealism. This requires some elaboration. We can articulate 
reasons for this suggestion which follow from one another and are themselves 
threefold: (1) the traditional two-world view of transcendental idealism 
necessarily engenders an untenable version of transcendental psychology3 
                                                
1 Kant would have said “representation”, although we can avoid the danger of putting the 
point in those terms and instead, place emphasis on the role of perceptual experience by 
employing the term “perception”.  
2 McDowell, for instance, has read Kant this way. I think it is important to see how closely this 
“semantic” reading of transcendental idealism comes to the classic two-aspect position. 
Whether this renders transcendental idealism trivial is a separate question to be answered 
elsewhere. Of course, for our purposes here the answer is in the negative.  
3 That is, precisely the transcendental psychology that Strawson saw fit to reject. The kind of 
naturalised Kantianism one finds in the work of people like Patricia Kitcher gives a different 
take on the notion of transcendental psychology that seems to inadequately fulfil the meaning 
of this notion to the point of the term “transcendental” being unrecognisable. Therefore, the 
transcendental psychology I speak of here is the full-blooded Kantian one. Also, where I refer 
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that involves the thought that all we find to have the character of necessity in 
the empirical world—that of experience—is attributable to the constitution of 
our mind in the sense that implies an eternal, ahistorical, and necessary 
structuring element in thought about the world internal to ourselves, given 
certain elements of our constitution, and should be seen as in need of 
revision;1 (2) a more faithfully Kantian account of transcendental 
argumentation as transcendental proof is able to resist what we have referred 
to as Stroud’s Challenge and is thus able to withstand the majority of the 
related attacks on what have been known as transcendental arguments; (3) the 
connection established between transcendental proof and the two-aspect 
reading of transcendental idealism is able to coherently explicate (through the 
philosophical device of situated thought) the fundamental meaning of the 
idea of epistemic conditions being operative in the thought and experience of 
a subject in possession of a discursive intellect—more specifically, it provides 
the tools for one to conjure a coherent account of the structure of subjectivity 
which explains the capacity for having viable, world-directed empirical 
thought.  
We can observe that the assertion of the need for the revision mentioned in 
(1) issues as a reply to worries about two thoughts that arise given the 
                                                                                                                                       
above to a version of transcendental psychology this seems to implicitly allude to the 
possibility of alternate versions (apart of course from the naturalised version already 
mentioned) which might be tenable. This does not mean my advocation of a theory of 
transcendental proof is committed to such a possible transcendental psychology—my 
advocation intentionally avoids the phrasing of the matter in terms of “psychology” and 
instead emphasises the epistemic role of transcendental proof—thus the matter is left open as 
to what role a conception of transcendental psychology might play. Despite this, a brief and 
helpful remark ought to serve to close the matter here. Due to the ambiguous nature of Kant’s 
own theory of transcendental psychology, the reconstruction here avoids the usage of that 
terminology to characterise the subjective aspect of the project in the Deduction. The 
reconstruction here then takes what Kant might have phrased as “transcendental 
psychological conditions” and converts them to “epistemic conditions” (not to suggest, of 
course, that Kant’s own account is fundamentally at odds with the interpretation offered 
here). 
1 This is of course not to say that the two-aspect view excludes the possibility of thinking of 
the matter in these terms, especially in the innocuous sense in which this may be taken, 
although it does not encourage this view as the two-object view does. Additionally, it should 
be added that the two-aspect view of transcendental idealism (as argue for here) forestalls 
any attempts to reduce what might be called the “limiting factors” in our experience to 
psychology; empirical most obviously, but transcendental as well. This remark relates directly 
to the note above. 
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conception outlined above, claimed to be contained in the two-world view.1 
The first thought is that there are genuine internal structures inherent in our 
minds (such as are referred to as “cognitive faculties” by Strawson) that 
function to create the world of appearances not merely in terms of its form, as 
Kant is read as claiming under the two-aspect view, but also in terms of its 
matter;2 this being the traditional ontological reading referred to. The second 
thought is that there are constraining elements in our experience that 
necessarily make it as it is except that these are merely empirical and resultant 
from our actual physical makeup being as it is; this second thought is that 
contained in recent attempts at naturalising Kant’s transcendental psychology 
(and as the combination of the two terms “naturalised” and “transcendental” 
should indicate, when brought to a logical conclusion, this latter thought 
leads to either an unacceptable watering down of the concept 
“transcendental”, or renders contradictions). It should be clear that the need 
for revision stems from the philosophically unsatisfying character of these 
two ways of thinking about the relationship between limiting factors in 
experience and the subject for whom there are such limiting factors; it is 
precisely this relationship that is up for revision.3 And as should be clear by 
now, the attempt at revision here consists in the elaboration and defence of a 
third alternative which combines the said two-aspect view of transcendental 
idealism with an account of transcendental proof which itself turns on 
situated thought. 
                                                
1 Notice that this conception is wide enough to include both the ontological reading of 
transcendental idealism as well as the naturalised reading of transcendental psychology. 
2 This way of putting the point draws attention to Kant’s Aristotelian distinction between 
matter and form in cognition. The distinction in Kant is tied to the idea that the content or 
matter for cognition is received sensibly and shaped by the mind intellectually in terms of its 
form. The ontological reading is then seen as erroneously supposing that the mind creates the 
matter, or content, of its own cognition—a view that can lead to equating Kant’s approach to 
that of Berkeley’s, and thus to thinking of Kant as claiming something analogous to 
Berkeley’s notion that “esse es percipi”, or “to be is to be perceived”.  
3 Notice that one can view a naturalised transcendental psychology with suspicion for many 
reasons, but most pertinently here because it is not clear that taking such a view of the mind 
combined with a metaphysical orientation of “robust realism” allows one to sidestep the 
sceptical worry anyhow, even though it is precisely the naturalisation of transcendental 
psychology that is meant to make this problem disappear. Sacks, Objectivity and Insight: 
Chapter 5, has an excellent exploration of this point. 
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To give ourselves a wider berth in thinking about this issue we can 
observe that the notion of the “mind making nature” in the psychological sense 
implied by the phrase “cognitive faculties” employed by Strawson generates 
the two-world view, whereas the notion of the “mind making nature” in the 
epistemological sense combined with the shape of inquiry implied by the 
phrase “epistemic conditions” is inherent in the two-aspect view. This 
distinction was foreshadowed in my remarks in the introductory section 
Transcendental Reflection (Chapter 1), regarding the philosophical and non-
philosophical notions of limitation. We can make the further cursory 
suggestion here that the philosophical notion of limitation intended coincides 
with the general thrust of McDowell’s assertion regarding the space of 
reasons as being sui generis. McDowell’s claim can be contextualised by 
relating it to the conception of the subject as a free actor in the space of 
reasons. To avoid getting off track here we can simply embrace McDowell’s 
notion as phrased above. 
As the above considerations evidence, it is central to the project here that 
the correct relation between “epistemic conditions” and “cognitive faculties” 
is established. This is due to the fact that the former notion is relevant for an 
epistemic construal of transcendental idealism, whereas the latter notion is 
more easily accommodated into a view of transcendental idealism which 
advocates a form of transcendental psychology. And since the shape of the 
rehabilitated version of transcendental proof has been tied to a certain 
conception of the two-aspect view of transcendental idealism we need to 
focus here on what makes epistemic conditions salient—as having a sui generis 
character—in a way that defends them from absorption into the notion of 
cognitive faculties and thus a form of transcendental psychology. Articulating 
the uniqueness of epistemic conditions will thus be the central task for us in 
defending a form of the two-aspect view.1 
                                                
1 As a side note, we can express surprise at how negative most reactions still are to the term 
“idealism” (now sometimes called “anti-realism”—a fact itself that evidences the very point 
itself). Unfortunately we cannot concern ourselves with this at the moment, although it is a 
point worth flagging. Namely, how the concept “idealism” should be understood is by no 
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To relate this point to our main aim we can assert that there is something 
sui generis about the character of the philosophical sense of limitation 
employed in the talk of “epistemic conditions” set over against the non-
philosophical (albeit scientific) notion of limitation present in talk about 
“cognitive faculties”. This assertion of a sui generis character does not of 
course mean that translatability between these forms of considering the 
notion of experience and its limitations is impossible. Rather, it means that the 
notion of “epistemic conditions” is at least ineliminable and perhaps in some 
way—not able to be shown here—irreducible. Allison makes a helpful point 
regarding the question of objectivity—precisely what is at issue here—in his 
essay On Naturalising Kant’s Transcendental Psychology, which attempts to 
show why the appropriate construal of the Transcendental Deduction, as quid 
juris, follows epistemically relevant lines: 
 
“what is required for objective representation is not simply the de facto presence of a 
rule-governed unity of representations in consciousness (something like Kitcher’s 
“contextual dependence”), but the thought or conceptual recognition of this unity. In 
other words, this unity must not only be in a single consciousness, it must be for that 
consciousness in the sense that the mind must be able to represent itself to itself, or 
equivalently, to recognize it as such. This reflexive dimension of cognition follows 
directly from the normative nature of the claim of objective connection. For unless 
the mind could think, that is, represent to itself or recognize the rule-governedness of 
                                                                                                                                       
means a matter of consensus—almost to the point of farce. The continual identification of 
Kant with Berkeley and thus the systematic mistreatment and misapprehension of what 
transcendental idealism means in its essence is evidence of this (at least in terms of one brand 
of what is called “idealism”). It is interesting that those who detect something important at 
the heart of transcendental idealism and yet feel repelled by the purported metaphysical 
excesses of Kant’s additional commitments decide that any essential insight at the heart of 
that doctrine must thereby be separable from it. Why not simply rethink the additional 
commitments of transcendental idealism, revise their expression or rethink their meaning 
instead of do away with that unwieldy philosophical badge? Perhaps it is a matter of taste 
whether one sees that label as necessary baggage for an independent reconstruction of a 
philosophical position. Strawson is not a target of this remark since his reconstruction is quite 
radical; Sacks is a target however, since his attitude toward transcendental idealism is 
somewhat complicated. Despite this, in The Nature of Transcendental Arguments Sacks’s 
attitude toward transcendental idealism is seemingly more sympathetic than in Objectivity 
and Insight. For this reason I take Sacks’s account of transcendental proof in the former work 
as a focal point. We will come to this issue shortly.  
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the unification of it representations, it could not affirm the objective validity of this 
unification. It would remain a merely contingent, causally conditioned connection of 
mental states without any epistemic significance.”1 
 
So, given this remark, it ought to be clear what motivations there are for 
preserving an epistemic reading of the main claim of transcendental idealism, 
which itself is arguably present in precisely the aspect of the Transcendental 
Deduction as just referred to. For, as Allison says, “it is absolutely essential to 
keep firmly in mind the normative concern of the Deduction.”2 Although 
indeed, that “the concern of the Deduction is normative is itself hardly 
controversial, since Kant famously distinguishes the quid juris from the quid 
facti and contends that he is only concerned with the former (A84-85/B116-
17).”3 
Now, despite these considerations, there might be a possible reply for 
those who view the two-aspect interpretation of transcendental idealism as 
“anodyne”. Namely, a two-world theorist might be tempted to say: “Well, ok, 
I grant you the notion of “epistemic conditions” you seem so keen on, but can 
this notion really do you any good? What if it is asserted that the notion you 
recommend is something that anybody would accept, since it is so minimal, 
and something which is incapable of supporting the kind of heavy argument 
seemingly required to sustain the picture of the “mind making nature” in any 
non-trivial sense?” The notion referred to of course being that transcendental 
idealism, at its core, claims that our cognition has specifiable limits, and these 
limits are bound up with the fact that our cognition is necessarily of a spatio-
temporal form, and necessarily of a particular conceptual, discursive structure.  
Despite this worry I think it is possible to see my foregoing proposal 
regarding a particular conception of the subject as having a sui generis 
character as holding up under this strain. This is because the main claim 
                                                
1 Allison (1996) On Naturalising Kant’s Transcendental Psychology, in “Idealism and Freedom”, 
Cambridge University Press: pp. 59-60. 
2 Op. cit.: p. 58. 
3 Ibid. 
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contained in the conception of the epistemically located subject, which I have 
insisted is intrinsically tied to the notion of having epistemic conditions1 at 
work in one’s experience, is itself no weak assertion. In fact there might be 
many who would accept the two-world theorist’s attack on the supposedly 
“anodyne” two-aspect view of transcendental idealism, as phrased by our 
imaginary interlocutor above, who might not be willing to assent to the claim 
of this epistemic view of the subject as sui generis. This is not to suggest that 
all two-world theorists are thoroughgoing naturalists (indeed, some who 
respond positively to such a reading of Kant might be immaterialists) who 
would eschew any talk of “epistemic limitations”, although it should be seen 
that this second claim of mine entails something stronger than the mere idea 
that we have epistemic conditions shaping our experience. It is the further 
qualification that these conditions are in some sense irreducible. This is not a 
particularly anodyne claim. It might in fact be an irritant to many. 
Moreover, once we see the need for revision of the two-world conception 
of transcendental idealism, we can see how conceding that all transcendental 
arguments  stand to do is provide descriptions of the natural limitations of 
particular perceptual apparati—or, elucidations of the limits of our conceptual 
schemes to allow for the thought of such-and-such—is not necessary. The 
strength of the proposed account together with the coherence of the two-
aspect reading of transcendental idealism means that fully-workable 
transcendental proofs stand to be provided.2 
                                                
1 These epistemic conditions would be analogous to what I outlined crudely above—the 
condition of spatio-temporality and the condition of a particular conceptual structure. We 
might think of these as quasi-Strawsonian and thus, more general versions of Kant’s 
conception of sensible and intellectual conditions of cognition. Notice that it is much easier to 
argue for the necessity of spatio-temporality than it is to argue for something analogous to the 
Categories. The question of course arises then, if one accepts the necessity of spatio-
temporality, if all concepts are necessarily of spatio-temporal kin. This is an appealing 
thought, though difficult to establish.  
2 As a final clarification of this point, and since my purposes here are not exegetical, I will 
assume that the two-aspect version of transcendental idealism is a theory that can stand of its 
own accord without pledging of allegiance to Kant, or even further confirmation as to 
whether this is Kant’s “official” view. It is enough to show that it is a viable philosophical 
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Through showing how adherence to the traditional two-world conception 
of transcendental idealism typically leads to a negative dismissal of 
transcendental arguments (as they have been conceived hitherto) and, jointly, 
debunking the prejudices of this traditional conception, a way through the 
landscape appears to open up. We seem then to have a path to tread between 
the two cliffs of, on the one side, an overly ambitious ontological project of 
talk about what makes the existence of experiential objects possible, and on the 
other, a philosophically diluted conception of the link between experience and 
its “conceptual conditions” or “requirements of held beliefs” that seeks 
merely to talk about which beliefs or concepts make other beliefs or concepts 
possible—or, put another way, which frameworks are required for other 
frameworks to be put in place. This latter project appears to be accepted by 
many as all that is left of the transcendental landscape. However, it would 
seem that any attempts to theorise in this direction are superfluous and 
philosophically impotent, whereas the former project is committed to a 
seemingly indefensible, overly ambitious view.  
It seems that the appropriate passage between these unpalatable options 
runs like this: the correct account construes the key moves of transcendental 
arguments as involving transcendental proof. Such transcendental proof is tied 
to a form of transcendental idealism which is structured primarily in terms of 
epistemic conditions. These epistemic conditions can be evidenced as 
operative in actual cases of thought and experience by examining the 
philosophical device of situated thought which itself brings into the picture 
the role of synthetic a priori judgment, transcendental content, and relevance 
of something like material inference in cases of empirical knowledge claims. 
However, thus far, a major obstacle to accounting positively for 
transcendental argumentation in the terms just iterated has been lack of an 
adequate explication of the relationship between epistemic conditions and 
transcendental proof in the literature. The notion of “epistemic conditions” 
needs to be given a more thorough explication than has hitherto been the case; 
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their vagueness has been an obstacle to serious progress in explaining just 
what one means when one talks this way.1  
 
3.2 Situated Thought 
 
The central insight contained in Mark Sacks’s rehabilitation of 
transcendental proof is the importation of the notion of “situated thought” 
into the debate and the linkage between it and the notion of “epistemic 
conditions” proposed by Henry Allison.2  It will help to here give a systematic 
exposition of this paper in which Sacks’s proposal is contained since such a 
proposal will be central for us in understanding the structure of 
transcendental proof and such proof’s connection with the notions of both 
“situated thought” and “epistemic conditions”. 
Firstly, we can look to Sacks’s own description of the task assigned to his 
paper The Nature of Transcendental Arguments to obtain a summary of its 
structure. The general aim there for Sacks is to “cast light on the kind of proof 
involved in central transcendental arguments”.3 Importantly, the structure of 
this proof offered by Sacks is at odds with much of the contemporary 
literature on such arguments. Sacks suggests that “some of the difficulty 
associated with such arguments may result from the tendency to construe 
them simply as articulating relations between concepts or propositional 
contents.”4 Sacks, by contrast, gives an account of the proof involved in such 
arguments in terms of “phenomenological description” which is “outlined...as 
                                                
1 In Kant’s Transcendental Idealism Henry Allison gives a sympathetic account of the “sensible” 
and “intellectual” conditions of human cognition. My account of “epistemic conditions” will 
proceed differently by attempting to explain such conditions by way of the notion of 
“situated thought”; that is, by taking such conditions to derive from the structure of “situated 
thought”. I thus take the notion of “situated thought” to be more primitive. This strategy will 
be relevant for our explication of the “core set of theses” taken to be contained in, or 
extrapolated from, the two-aspect view of transcendental idealism. This will be attended to in 
Section 3.5. 
2 This rehabilitation occurs in Sacks, The Nature of Transcendental Arguments. 
3 Op. cit.: p. 439. 
4 Ibid. 
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a way of bringing out the force of these arguments.”1 Sacks then makes a 
connection to Kant by stating that “it can be fruitful to think in terms of this 
construal in understanding some of Kant’s transcendental proofs.”2 
Additionally, Sacks makes a close connection, which I have insisted on 
establishing here, between transcendental arguments and a set of core theses 
found in transcendental idealism—a relationship which is given elucidation 
through the account of transcendental proof as referred to.3  
The framing of Sacks’s task above impels us to examine closer what it 
might mean to give a construal of transcendental proof, which it is claimed is 
involved in central transcendental arguments, in terms of “phenomenological 
description”, instead of conceptual relations. To begin, we can present Sacks’s 
reason for this orientation by quoting him as saying: 
 
“the significant drawback to concentration on conceptual schemes in approaching 
transcendental arguments is that it reinforces the view that transcendental arguments 
are concerned with conceptual structures, hived off from the objects of experience, 
rather than the experienced objects themselves (however conceptual that experience 
might be).”4 
 
By way of this understanding, we can make a connection between the notion 
of an experiential object and the role of phenomenological description in 
transcendental proof. Such a connection, we might further suppose, 
establishes a link to transcendental idealism, although how this is done is not 
yet clear. A preliminary suggestion might be that transcendental proof is 
                                                
1 Ibid. 
2 Ibid. 
3 To note, I say “set of core theses found in transcendental idealism” because Sacks does not 
commit himself to any further specified form of transcendental idealism, although he 
suggests that there links between parts of that doctrine and transcendental proof. This 
strategy concurs with “Strategy A” as mentioned in Chapter 1. My strategy, of course, fits 
with the alternative “Strategy B” which opts not to extract this purported “set of core theses” 
from transcendental idealism itself. Of course, it is still not sufficiently clear whether, and to 
what extent, the former and latter strategies might coincide in principle, however much they 
might differ in verbal matters where A opts for rejection of the traditional conception of 
transcendental idealism and B opts for reinterpretation of that same doctrine. Luckily, this is 
not our focus just now. 
4 Op. cit.: p. 440. 
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concerned with giving a regressive explanation of particular cases of 
empirical knowledge—itself necessarily of objects of experience—in terms of 
the conditions of the possibility of these experiential objects having the 
particular nature that they do (cf. Ameriks’s account of the Transcendental 
Deduction in 2.2.5 above). We can look to Kant’s way of putting the point to 
make this more explicit: 
 
“the a priori conditions of a possible experience in general are at the same time 
conditions of the possibility of objects of experience.”1 
 
And Kant’s conception of the Categories, which is relevant insofar they 
constitute one portion of “a priori conditions”, is that they are: 
 
“fundamental concepts by which we think objects in general for appearances...so far 
as the form of thought is concerned, through them alone does experience become 
possible.”2 
 
So, given our alignment with Ameriks’s reading of the Deduction, we could 
say that this Kantian conception of objects of experience accords nicely with 
the task assigned to transcendental proof insofar as such proof proceeds from 
premises containing claims for the existence of empirical knowledge (of 
objects) to a regressive explanation in terms of conditions of possibility which 
implicates transcendental idealism. The one step we must insist on omitting, 
however, is the commitment to the particular conception of a priori concepts 
which Kant commits to. As we have noted already, endorsement of a form of 
transcendental idealism need not commit us to the precise articulation of that 
doctrine given by Kant. Transcendental idealism is employed here to make a 
claim for the existence of necessary conditions of the possibility of experience, 
although the exact form of such necessary conditions is left open here where 
we instead must be content with an account of what function such necessary 
                                                
1 A111. 
2 Ibid. 
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conditions fulfil—and it is precisely the point of our focus here on situated 
thought to attempt to explain this.  
Returning to our main point, we can see how phenomenological 
description would function within the appropriate regressive explanation by 
considering the following: in the case of regressively explaining the 
conditions of the possibility of experiential objects having a particular nature, 
an appropriate phenomenological description of an experiential object would 
include an account (at least implicitly) of how such an experiential object 
comes to be perceived or apprehended. That is, such phenomenological 
description would articulate what is involved in such empirical knowledge. 
To advance to the next step in our analysis, we can further the insistence 
on a form of transcendental proof which speaks not merely of conceptual 
relations by making a link between both Sacks’s understanding of the task of 
such proof and Kant’s understanding of the structure of synthetic judgment. 
Sacks says that the relations of “presupposition” or the place for “necessary 
condition[s]” purportedly established by most contemporary transcendental 
arguments are "understood in terms of logical entailment or deductive 
inference.”1 Now of course “[S]uch construals cannot capture the genuine 
increase in knowledge claimed to be contained in transcendental 
arguments.”2 That is, “[U]nless the sceptic is of no interest whatsoever, the 
conclusion of the transcendental argument is a substantial statement, one that 
says more than the premiss(es): the move from premisses to conclusion is, we 
might say, synthetic.”3 So “a deductive inference from premisses to conclusion 
could not in itself be responsible for the addition of substantive content along 
the way. Making implicit logical entailment explicit might, to put it in Kant’s 
terms, increase our explicative knowledge, but we are looking for expansive 
or ampliative knowledge. There must then be some point at which the process 
                                                
1 Sacks, The Nature of Transcendental Arguments: p. 440. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
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of simple deductive inference is disrupted, and a synthetic or ampliative 
move is made.”1 
Now it should be clear that this understanding of the basic function of 
transcendental proof is of a piece with Kant’s understanding in the Critique of 
how his there proposed metaphysics of experience is primarily composed, 
viz., of synthetic a priori judgment. And as we have already noted, Kant 
explicitly links his account of synthetic judgment with ampliative 
knowledge,2 so it should be clear that, despite what else Sacks says with 
respect to Kant and to transcendental idealism, there is a crucial 
interconnection between the above understanding of transcendental proof 
and the latter (transcendental idealism).  
We can now say a little more about Kant’s Critical Period conception of 
synthetic judgment which should suffice to establish some links which will 
become important for us, particularly in seeing how the account of 
transcendental proof offered here connects up with a host of debates in 
contemporary philosophy. An initial and interesting characterisation of 
synthesis, in its relation to analysis, can be found in a footnote in Theoretical 
Philosophy 1755-1770 where Kant is paraphrased thus:  
 
“Kant claims that rendering objects distinct is the function of synthesis, whereas 
rendering concepts distinct is the task of analysis. Likewise, synthesis creates a distinct 
concept, whereas analysis renders a concept distinct (cf. Logic [1800], Introduction VIII 
[AK 9:64]).”3 
 
And this paraphrase connects up quite neatly with Kant’s understanding of 
the Critique as following a “synthetic method” (to be paired with “synthesis” 
as referred to above) insofar as that work began merely with the idea of pure 
reason itself and proceeded to evidence what could be inferred from it, 
namely by “trying to determine in this source itself, according to principles, 
                                                
1 Op. cit.: pp. 440-441. 
2 Kant, Prolegomena: p. 72. 
3 Kant, Theoretical Philosophy 1755-1770: p. 443, footnote 4.  
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both the elements and laws of it pure employment.”1 By contrast, Kant’s 
approach in the Prolegomena follows the “analytic method” (to be paired with 
“analysis” as referred to above) insofar as it begins with the idea that 
synthetic a priori judgment is indeed possible and from there “looks for 
support” by “ascending to the sources”, “which are not yet known, and 
which, when discovered, will not only explain what we knew already, but 
will also exhibit a large extent of cognitions which spring from all these same 
sources.”2 The question of the Prolegomena is therefore “How are synthetic a 
priori propositions possible?”3 And this fits with the central guiding task of 
the Critique itself, which is effectively the “complete estimation of synthetic a 
priori cognition”4—an answer to which is supposed to determine the 
possibility of legitimate metaphysics, for Kant.  
To end our digression, and to provide a further idea to be explored, we can 
hazard one final reference to this division as neatly expressed by Allison. As 
he notes: 
 
“in the Jasche Logic...Kant...presents the analytic-synthetic distinction as a contrast 
between a “formal” and a “material” extension of knowledge. Analytic judgments, 
he tells us, extend our knowledge in the former and synthetic judgments in the latter 
sense (JL 9: III; 606-7).”5 
 
Thusly we establish the basis for a connection between synthetic judgment 
and what has in recent times been referred to as “material inference”.6 We will 
explore this connection shortly. 
                                                
1 Kant, Prolegomena: p. 79. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Kant states the rubric for the Prolegomena on p. 81. 
4 A14/B28.  
5 Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: p. 91. 
6 This notion was first given focussed treatment in Sellars (1953) Inference and Meaning, Mind, 
62, pp. 313-338. More recently, Robert Brandom has made use of this notion in his project of 
inferentialist semantics.  Historically, the idea in Sellars comes from Carnap, who seems to 
have gotten the notion from the early Frege (as noted in Brandom (1994) Making it Explicit: 
Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Harvard University Press: Part One, 2.IV). 
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To pick up from where we left off with our discussion of Sacks, we can 
appreciate a now expanded conception of what is at stake in claiming that 
transcendental proof involves a synthetic a priori move.1 That is, such proof 
stands to provide a genuine, substantial increase in knowledge. This 
knowledge is not only ampliative but also involves a material extension, 
according to Kant. And we can here give support to that claim by way of 
alluding to a connection to be explored between synthetic a priori judgment 
and material inference.2 The significance of this connection will consist at least 
partly in the difference in philosophical orientation with respect to the project 
here and to those who appeal to material inference.  
Now, to focus our discussion we can observe Sacks’s explicit reminder 
that, regarding synthetic a priori knowledge, “[I]t is clear that whatever else 
they do, transcendental arguments are supposed to deliver just such 
knowledge.”3 The difficult question comes in explaining just where and how 
synthetic a priori judgment fits into transcendental proof. We can begin 
reflection on this problem by considering the traditional conception of 
transcendental arguments as proceeding by deductive inference. Sacks 
enumerates four classic cases of such arguments: 
 
1. If experience of succession is to be possible, there must be something 
that is invariant. 
2. If experience of change is to be possible, the empirical world must 
abide by causality. 
3. If experience of items as distinct from me and one another is to be 
possible, they must be located in a unified spatio-temporal world. 
                                                
1 We are careful here not to say “synthetic a priori inference” for reasons that will become 
apparent below. 
2 Unfortunately, we will not have space to address the concern of how much Sellars’s 
conception of material inference coincides with the synthetic a priori in the historical Kant, 
although that would be an interesting topic to consider. 
3 Sacks, The Nature of Transcendental Arguments: p. 441. 
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4. If self-awareness is to arise, I must recognize others as themselves 
persons who recognize me.1 
 
Now it should be clear that these above cases have notorious cousins. 
Number (1) mirrors Kant’s First Analogy, (2) Kant’s Second Analogy, (3) 
Strawson’s “thesis of objectivity”, which he claims to find in Kant’s 
Transcendental Deduction, and (4) looks very much like Hegel’s dialectical 
result in Chapter 4 of the Phenomenology of Spirit2 which discusses “The Truth 
of Self-Certainty” with regard to “Self-Consciousness”.3  
The above conditionals are represented as turning merely on material 
implication; if they are accepted, the arguments containing them are to be 
valid. The drama begins in explaining how such arguments are to be 
demonstrated to be true, or established as true. The task would be to show 
“what kind of move could be involved here in each case, such as would 
render these crucial propositions synthetic and yet such that their truth can be 
established a priori”.4 The idea is to go beyond the domain of formal logic 
(and its questions of validity), which pertains to the propositional contents of 
the argument, into the domain of transcendental logic (which has its own 
unique conception of validity such as entails the qualifier “objective”). The 
key move involved in engaging with situated thought is thus the shift of focus 
of the inquiry from the propositional contents of the transcendental proof to 
the “a priori grounds for its being true.” And “[S]ecuring the latter requires 
shifting from the conceptual level to something like the phenomenological 
level, the level of experience.”5 Thus this key move brings out precisely what 
is meant by Sacks’s insistence on the role of “phenomenological description” 
in transcendental proof. Such proof, as distinct from transcendental 
arguments which involve mere deductive inference, involves an explication of 
                                                
1 This list is not numbered in the original. It is found in op. cit.: p. 442. 
2 G.W.F. Hegel (1977) Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. by A.V. Miller with analysis of the text 
and forward by J.N. Findlay, Oxford University Press. 
3 This will interest us in Section 3.4.2 and in most of what follows. 
4 Sacks, The Nature of Transcendental Arguments: p. 442. 
5 Op. cit.: p. 443. 
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the a priori grounds of the truth of the argument contained within it. What 
exactly that might come to will be difficult to explain. 
A common way to characterise the “a priori grounds of truth” is in terms 
of “conditions of possibility”, yet, as Sacks notes, this characterisation is “too 
vague”. For “conditions of possibility” could be interpreted in terms of 
“semantic conditions for the possibility of a given concept making sense”;1 
something at odds with the account intended here. An alternative way of 
characterising such “a priori grounds of truth”, Sacks offers, is in terms of 
Allison’s notion of “epistemic conditions”—“a condition for the possibility of 
knowledge or experience.” However, as has been recognised, neither Kant nor 
Allison (nor any other source in the literature for that matter) gives a 
satisfactory definition of this notion, despite the fact that “this notion is 
central to Kant’s whole transcendental enterprise”.2 Sacks quotes Allison as 
stating that such a condition “is one ‘that is necessary for the representation of 
an object or an objective state of affairs.’” This condition is of course intended 
to be different from a psychological or ontological condition, as we have already 
noted.3 
In Allison’s terms, such epistemic conditions appear to consist in the kind 
of sensible and intellectual conditions of cognition proposed by Kant in the 
Transcendental Aesthetic and the Transcendental Analytic, respectively. By 
contrast, and as I have suggested already, my approach to the question of 
what epistemic conditions consist in will involve an explanation of such 
conditions in terms of situated thought whereby this latter philosophical 
device allows for an alternate conception of the former to become available. 
To explain the reason for this strategy we can quote Sacks as saying the 
following: 
 
                                                
1 Ibid. 
2 Allison (1983) Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, Yale University Press: p.10; as quoted in ibid. 
443. 
3 Ibid. The material in single quotes is from the same source in Allison as quoted directly 
above. 
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“In saying of a thought that it is situated, I mean that it is construed as being the 
thought that one would have from a particular point within a framework, the content 
of which is informed by it being grasped as if from that perspective. It is not bare 
propositional content considered as if from nowhere, but is rather informed by being 
phenomenologically embedded and directed. In saying that what is so situated is a 
thought, I mean to distinguish it from mere phenomenological or perceptual 
experience.”1 
 
So we have here a conception of an epistemic device that is meant to give 
voice to exactly what is involved for a thinker to come into contact with the 
world; something that will allow for the articulation of reasons for experience 
as being of a certain nature. It is the fact that situated thought has this 
character that ought to allow for it to explain the nature of epistemic 
conditions. As Sacks says, situated thought “involves appropriating in 
thought” a “subject’s perspective onto the perceptual scene that corresponds 
to the bare propositional content”.2 That is, it involves “thinking ourselves 
into what is involved for the subject in his being positioned as he is in 
grasping the perceptual content.”3 Verily, a preliminary thought might be that 
via this conception, a connection is made between the kind of thing a thought 
is and how it is that it comes about; how it comes to be had by a thinker.  
In the human case at least, we intuitively think of a natural story of 
ourselves being a certain kind of animal located spatio-temporally such as to 
have a spatio-temporally articulated experience (with the additional issue of 
the conceptual articulation of that experience). However, we need not take 
this only in the naturalised tone; the tone of the claim here is more general. 
The issue concerns something of the order of the logical requirement for 
having a thought, although we do not want this account to amount to an 
analysis of what is required for thought given a mere definition of thought. The 
aim is to elucidate the minimal conception of experience required such as 
                                                
1 Sacks, The Nature of Transcendental Arguments: p. 444. 
2 Op. cit.: p. 445. 
3 Ibid.  
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would articulate the requirements for anything counting as experience. In line 
with this, Sacks makes two qualifications vis-à-vis the notion of “situated 
thought” to set it apart from the notion of mere phenomenological experience 
itself, and we can make note of these as they further evidence what structure 
is being claimed for any experience in which situated thought figures: 
 
(1) “Any experience must be internally structure, or articulated, on pain of 
it not qualifying as an experience at all: without that articulation, 
sufficient to distinguish one type of experience from another, there 
would be nothing that it is like for the experiencing subject to undergo 
it.1 But saying that experience must be articulated is not the same as 
saying that it must be linguistically articulated or indeed linguistically 
articulable by the subject in question; it is not even to say that that 
articulation is fully cognitive. Part of the point of talking of a situated 
thought is precisely to focus on that articulation, and to make it 
cognitively salient in a way that it might not be in a brute experience.”2 
 
Hence a claim is made for the unique epistemic status of situated thought 
insofar as that notion functions to bring out what is involved in epistemic terms 
for a subject enjoying a particular experience. Thus we can propose that it is 
precisely this out of which the notion of epistemic conditions feeds. To put the 
point briefly, and in Strawsonian terminology, we might consider that the 
minimal conditions of experience include the possibility of identification and 
re-identification of items in a framework which can be regarded in some way 
                                                
1 There is thus an implicit, unexplored issue here regarding the phenomenological quality—
the “what it is like”—of an experience. This issue is treated in, amongst many places, the 
classic paper Thomas Nagel (1974) What is it Like to be a Bat?, Philosophical Review, 83, pp. 
435-450. In Nagel (1986) The View From Nowhere, Oxford University Press, it is acknowledged 
that the philosophical import of that idea was gleaned originally from T.L.S. Sprigge (1982) 
The Importance of Subjectivity: An Inaugural Lecture, Inquiry, 25, pp. 143-163. Interestingly, 
much of what Sprigge says in that paper bears directly on the kind of philosophical method 
employed in talking of “situated thought”. Additionally, the issues raised in that paper make 
clear the epistemic import of phenomenological method—that to which the notion of 
“situated thought” is related in a suggestive, rudimentary fashion here.  
2 Sacks, The Nature of Transcendental Arguments: p. 444. 
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as unified and objective (such as would constitute a unified, objective world). 
A further minimal condition might be the possibility of self-ascription of such 
cases of experience as might be composed this way. The former represents 
Strawson’s “thesis of objectivity” and the latter represents the “thesis of the 
necessary unity of consciousness”; we thus have a fairly neat connection, 
through this Strawsonian terminology, to Kant’s original notions of sensible 
and intellectual conditions.1 Furthermore, by giving an explanation this way, 
we are able to construct a story which takes situated thought as a primitive 
notion out of which the notion of epistemic conditions feeds. This reading has 
the additional benefit of mirroring the structure that Ameriks imputes to the 
Transcendental Deduction insofar as he reads the Deduction as beginning 
with the premise of empirical knowledge (or, experience) and regressively 
explaining this by way of positing the Categories and transcendental idealism 
as necessary conditions of its possibility. We might then propose the 
following: situated thought articulates the structure of the kind of empirical 
knowledge that is to serve as a premise in transcendental proof, so conceived. 
The very structure of such empirical knowledge, as construed in terms of 
situated thought, allows for a regressive explanation of the necessary 
conditions of its possibility which thusly implicates transcendental idealism. 
As for the conception of “articulation”, or the “articulability” of something 
conceived of as experience, we can make some points which, although they 
may not be satisfactorily resolvable here, serve to draw attention to the 
relevance of this account of situated thought to recent debates in the literature 
on non-conceptual content. Firstly, we can note that for the conceptualist (one 
                                                
1 We might become concerned at this point about adopting such a Strawsonian conception 
since, given some remarks we made earlier, it would appear that Strawson’s “austere” 
reading of transcendental idealism is in conflict with our reading here. Additionally, given 
the opposition we made note of between the notion of “epistemic conditions” and Strawson’s 
term “cognitive faculties”, it might seem misguided to give a Strawsonian reading of such 
epistemic conditions. Despite this, I believe there is no inherent conflict here. Simply phrasing 
epistemic conditions in terms of the “austere” conception of transcendental idealism does not 
forbid such epistemic conditions from being committed to more than what Strawson intended 
in his use of the phrase “minimal conditions”, as I have referred to. It is enough to suggest 
that the perspicuity of Strawson’s phrasing of the problem is motivation to adopt his 
terminology and advance it in our own way here by extending such terminology to account 
for more than the “austere” conception of transcendental idealism.  
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who insists that anything deserving of the name “experience” is necessarily of 
a conceptual structure), Sacks’s references above to the role of “articulation” 
in situated thought ought to include only articulation of a conceptual variety. 
However, since Sacks says “saying that experience must be articulated is not 
the same as saying that it must be linguistically articulated or indeed 
linguistically articulable by the subject in question; it is not even to say that 
that articulation is fully cognitive”,1 we are given pause to consider what 
other forms such articulation may take. The notion of non-conceptual content 
immediately suggests itself here since if such articulation as Sacks is referring 
to here is non-linguistic, and perhaps even non-cognitive (assuming these do 
not necessarily denote the same thing), then, given the assumption that 
“conceptual” and “linguistic” coincide entirely with one another, we have an 
allusion to the existence of non-conceptual content. Despite this, our 
assumption that “conceptual” and “linguistic” coincide entirely may be hasty 
and more difficult to establish than we assume, if we grant that the problem is 
more than definitional. If this is so, then it is possible that Sacks would find no 
place for the notion of non-conceptual content in his account of situated 
thought, and indeed, there is no prima facie need for it as far as the rest of his 
account is concerned. The suggestion might be however that, insofar as 
Sacks’s account of transcendental proof and situated thought is meant to be 
more faithfully Kantian than most other treatments of this area, it ought to 
rely on something like Kant’s notion of intuition as a form of non-conceptual 
representation.2 An additional reason for this reliance might stem from the 
use Sacks makes of the synthetic a priori in his claims for the role of 
ampliative knowledge in transcendental proof. That is, given his conception 
of transcendental proofs as necessarily involving a “synthetic...ampliative 
                                                
1 Ibid. 
2 We will omit the qualification here that, given this point, Sacks’s account of situated thought 
would seem to depend on “pure intuition” since we are not able to adequately account for 
that claim here. It should be apparent however that even if one wants to resist appeals to 
something “Given” in experience, it seems that a structure analogous to Kant’s notion of 
“pure intuition”, not “empirical intuition”, is necessary to give full voice to the epistemic 
point intended by an account of situated thought.  
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move”1, that is also a priori, it might seem odd if he did not endorse non-
conceptual content, since in Kant’s terms at least, the validity of synthetic a 
priori judgment depends on  an epistemological model that involves intuition 
as a form of non-conceptual representation.  
We can now look to Sacks’s second characterisation of situated thought 
which sets it apart from the notion of mere phenomenological experience: 
 
(2) “a situated thought differs from the corresponding experience in that 
the situated thought does not require that the subject actually be 
situated – only that he approximates in thought to what would be 
delivered up to him if he were so situated. We might put this by saying 
that the situated thought is phenomenologically informed without 
itself being a phenomenological experience. In this respect the situated 
thought can be considered to fall between, on the one hand, the bare 
propositional content and, on the other, an experience the content of 
which is expressed by that propositional articulation. It falls short of 
actually being an experience; it is rather a matter of representing in 
thought a situated construal of a propositional content: considering 
what it would be like to be so situated as to have an experience of that 
content.”2 
 
There are a couple of ideas here which it is important to explain carefully, as 
they will have consequences for how our final account of situated thought is 
to be structured. We can say the following: (1) in virtue of being structured 
this way, situated thought appears to be capable of functioning as a directive 
for the appropriate constitution of a framework of which experience might be 
possible, or in which experience might figure. We can think of cases as diverse 
as dreams (cases of which would need a coherent structure, but given the 
minimal notion of a framework employed here, it is likely few dreams would 
                                                
1 Op. cit.: p. 441.  
2 Op. cit.: p. 444. 
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fall short), imaginative constructions, fictional universes, and virtual reality 
simulations. That is, the device of situated thought appears to articulate those 
conditions which must be fulfilled by anything that is to count as an 
experience which participates in the structural properties of a coherent, 
unified and potentially objective framework. The novel character of situated 
thought is that it places emphasis on a much tighter connection between such 
a framework and the subject for who there are experiences of it;1 (2) since 
situated thought is construed as falling between the “bare propositional 
content” and the “experience the content of which is expressed by that 
propositional articulation”,2 we can repeat again that it involves “thinking 
oneself into what is involved” for one to perceive such bare propositional 
content as obtaining. Given this, we might propose that situated thought 
embeds the appropriate structure for aperspectival content to be viewed 
perspectivally, perhaps by a process similar to the attachment of indexical 
expressions to such content which function to represent precisely their 
conditions of realisation in an experiential context. This latter idea is 
presumably what is meant by Sacks’s remark that “a situated construal of a 
propositional content” involves “considering what it would be like to be so 
situated as to have an experience of that content”.3 I say that the process is 
only similar to the process of attachment of indexical expressions to such 
content since Sacks’s account of situated thought, with respect to the example 
“there is a tree in the garden”, does not explicitly insert such expressions. I 
take it that claiming that such a bare proposition can be regarded as having 
experiential import precisely in virtue of the notion of situated thought 
represents this equivalence.4 
The above reflections ought to get us some way to understanding the 
structure and function of situated thought such that its role in transcendental 
                                                
1 We will see some links to this conception drawn in our discussion of “permanence” in 3.4.1. 
2 Op. cit.: p. 441.  
3 Op. cit.: p. 444.  
4 The opacity of this idea will become apparent below when we explore just what might be 
involved in making the apparently valid move from the statement “there is a tree in the 
garden” to the statement “there is a tree in front of me”. 
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proof may be a little clearer. To recap, we can note that above we made 
mention of Ameriks’s reading of the Transcendental Deduction and suggested 
that if the notion of empirical knowledge taken to be contained in the initial 
premise of that argument was conceived of as having the structure of situated 
thought, then we could legitimately give a regressive explanation of the 
conditions of its possibility in terms of such things as the possibility of 
identification and re-identification of items in a framework, which could be 
regarded as unified and objective, in addition to the requirement of self-
ascription of such thoughts in terms of a parallel to Kant’s notion of 
apperception. The further extension could then be made to a model of 
knowledge which allowed these synthetic moves to be made a priori (such as 
would invite a comparison to transcendental idealism and Kant’s actual 
Transcendental Deduction).   
At this point we ought to consider a concrete case of situated thought lest 
we get caught too firmly in abstractions. To remind ourselves, the relevant 
account relates to the possibility of explicating certain minimal requirements 
for anything that could count as an experience in terms which also appreciate 
the character of the one having the experience, which then crucially requires 
investigation into what bearing a thinker’s being situated appropriately has to 
such a thinker’s thought being thusly situated. 
A helpful way to explain the matter is by way of example. Imagine I am 
standing in a garden in front of an apple tree,1 at point A. It is arguably part of 
the structure of my thought that “there is an apple tree standing in the 
garden” that such a thought gets its content in virtue of me being situated 
appropriately; that is, by my being perceptually related to the tree such as to 
have the veridical perception, or thought, “there is an apple tree standing in 
the garden”. Now, it is in virtue of this structure of my perception that, in 
order to gain an alternate vantage point of the tree’s plumage, say, from point 
B, I know precisely what it is I ought to do to gain such an alternate view. 
                                                
1 This recalls both Sacks’s example (employed in op. cit.: p. 445 and ff.) as well as Husserl’s 
famous references to “the apple tree standing in the garden”. 
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That is, one knows what is involved for one to position oneself such as to grasp 
the perceptual content from point B. I take it that this is the basic idea 
operative in the notion of situated thought; one we have been working our 
way towards from various angles thus far. And involved in any case of 
perceptual experience is the capacity to think and act in this way when 
granted the full use of one’s mental faculties.1 It is this character of our 
experience, as articulated through the notion of situated thought that allows 
us to make synthetic a priori judgments about it; that is, judgments which are 
not logically valid yet may be made without recourse to experiential evidence. 
We need to make a brief note here however, to defend against an obvious 
misunderstanding of what is meant by this practical capacity to form future 
beliefs about what one’s actions might bring about. Talk of “knowing what it 
takes” to move from point A to point B vis-à-vis an apple tree also looks like 
what we might call a behavioural manifestation or exemplification of the 
holding of a particular belief, or set of beliefs—as spoken of by William James 
in The Tigers in India,2 for example—about the tree and one’s actions vis-à-vis 
it which has been informed by past experience of dealings with apple trees 
(and other kinds of trees and objects for that matter) in gardens (and other 
spatial regions as well). This would suggest that our ability to form 
expectations about what our experience will deliver up to us were we to do 
such-and-such is informed by mere a posteriori sources, not a priori sources as 
we have been claiming situated thought is structured in terms of. Despite this, 
the subtle point to be made is that although the particular content involved 
with the forming of expectations of this kind is undeniably an empirically 
informed matter, the capacity to have experience such that one can perceive 
spatial relations in this way is an a priori matter. The point is similar to Kant’s 
                                                
1 Putting matters this way appears to open one up to objections which stem from the fear that 
this might be a chauvinistic account of what constitutes “full use of one’s mental faculties”. 
Despite this, it seems to me at least that in engaging in rational thought certain idealisations 
need to be made and are indeed made all the time (at least insofar as we might call an 
abstraction an idealisation).  
2 William James (2000) The Tigers in India, in “Pragmatism and Other Writings”, ed. with an 
introduction and notes by Giles Gunn, Penguin. 
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characterisation of the a priori nature of space and time; viz., one cannot 
account for our perception necessarily being spatio-temporal by suggesting 
that we can infer from past experience (perhaps inductively) that the world 
really is spatio-temporal. The idea is that our experience is necessarily spatio-
temporal, and it is a condition of the possibility of our perceiving anything 
recognisable as experiential that it is of this character. Although we cannot go 
into this point further here, we can note that the example above of our 
capacity to move through space on the basis of information gained through 
past experience with apple trees (and other phenomena) in gardens (and 
other places) depends also on the a priori character that spatial representation 
has for us. We must unfortunately leave this point here and return to our 
main discussion. 
Sacks provides an example of the kind of move expressed above when he 
speaks of the “apple tree in the garden”. He says that, effectively, due to the 
nature of the situated thought corresponding to the proposition “there is an 
apple tree in the garden”, we can move from it to the statement “there is a tree 
in front of me”, or, the statement “there is a tree between me and the horizon.”1 
Now the precise character of this transition from one thought content to the 
other is difficult to account for. Surely we wish to say that such a transition is 
                                                
1 Sacks, The Nature of Transcendental Arguments: p. 445. It seems that there is an interesting 
point worth being noted here. In taking the assertion “there is an apple tree in the garden” at 
face value we can see it readily as an existential statement of the form ∃x(x), where x 
represents the tree in the garden. Phrased in English the epithet “there is” fulfils the function 
of the existential operator ∃. However, thinking in terms of perceptual judgments, “there” 
typically functions as a demonstrative. Although the usage of the term “there” can be 
distinguished as unique in both cases, there certainly seems to be a link, if not a dependency, 
between both usages. We might say tentatively that the existential usage is derivative from 
the perceptual usage. This suggestion is intended to link up with our generally intended 
point regarding the role of situated thought in perceptual judgment and transcendental proof, 
where the role of the “located” nature of perceptual judgment is intended to enforce the point 
that accounting for transcendental arguments (as involving transcendental proof) involves 
appealing to non-logically valid (synthetic) yet a priori judgment.    
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valid in some way, although for several reasons the nature of this transition is 
obscure. Let us see why. 
Firstly, it is clear that the move from “there is an apple tree in the garden” 
to “there is a tree in front of me” is not a logically valid inference, for nothing in 
the logical form of the former statement permits a deductive move to the 
latter statement. Part of the reason for this is that the linkage between the two 
statements depends on a structure inherent in situated thought which is akin 
to the referential import of indexicals such as “I”, “Here”, and “Now”. It is 
clear that by making explicit the role of indexical expressions in what we 
might call the “meaning” of propositional contents, one can see how certain 
valid inferences might obtain between them, however, it is not clear that the 
move involved here is of that same kind. Despite this, it is clear that at least 
part of the structure of situated thought mirrors the relevant import of 
indexical expressions for demonstrating the valid relations between 
propositional contents. 
Our next temptation might be to suggest that something about the content 
of “there is an apple tree in the garden” permits an inference to “there is a tree 
in front of me”, in a similar way that the validity of material inference is 
thought of as depending primarily on the content (yet obviously also the 
form—yet not the logical form) of the statements standing in such inferential 
relations. This latter suggestion would seem tempting and perhaps go some 
ways to explaining the relationship between the shape of situated thought 
and the role of spatial representation in the content of statements playing roles 
in an account of situated thought. However, if we examine more closely just 
what is involved in the transition referred to it becomes evident that what we 
are dealing with here is not actually an inference at all.  
The problem is that, unlike material inference, the apparently valid move 
from “there is a tree in the garden” to “there is a tree in front of me” does not 
simply involve inferring from the meaning of one statement to the other as is 
the case in Robert Brandom’s examples of the inference from: 
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1a. “Pittsburgh is to the West of Philadelphia”  
to  
  1b. “Philadelphia is to the East of Pittsburgh”,  
 
that from  
 
2a. “Today is Wednesday”  
to  
2b. “Tomorrow will be Thursday”,  
 
and that from  
 
3a. “Lightning is seen now”  
to  
3b. “Thunder will be heard soon”.1    
 
In these cases, Brandom says that “[I]t is the contents of the concepts West 
and East” that makes the first a “good inference”, whereas for the second it is 
the “contents of the concepts Wednesday, Thursday, today, and tomorrow that 
make the inference correct”. As goes the third inference, “the contents of the 
concepts lightning and thunder, as well as the temporal concepts”2 make it 
correct. By contrast, in our example of the apple tree above, it is clear that in 
the first statement no mention is made of the perceiver who is referred to in 
the second statement. For “there is an apple tree in the garden” must be taken 
as implicitly asserted by the thinker to whom reference is made in “there is a 
tree in front of me”. Since no explicit reference is made in the first statement to 
the thinker mentioned in the second we cannot really see this move as 
inferential at all, since some additional apparatus embodying the notion of 
                                                
1 Brandom, Making it Explicit: p. 98. The numbering is not in the original. 
2 Ibid. 
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spatial representation and (what we might call) the “conditions of 
assertability” must be included.  
An obvious reply suggests itself here which mimics a rebuttal possibly 
entertained by one arguing against material inference. Namely, it might be 
thought that the apparently valid move between “there is a tree in the 
garden” and “there is a tree in front of me” rests of the suppressed premise “I 
am in the garden”—or, more generously, “I am in the garden standing in 
front of the tree”—although this reply will simply not do. This rebuttal 
assumes that the purported transition between the two propositions 
constitutes an enthymeme,1 yet it is apparent that with the appropriate 
conception of what is involved in the apprehension of both thoughts, no 
reliance on a suppressed premise is necessary. The idea is that it is possible to 
make a valid move between two propositions of this form without recourse to 
additional conceptual information. It is argued that the apparent “meaning” 
of both statements is enough to secure the move between them as valid.2 
Unfortunately, for reasons of space, further explication of this idea will have 
to be left for somewhere else. 
To be sure, I think it is to be understood that Sacks was aware of the 
peculiarity just noted, yet his attempt to account for such seems somewhat 
inadequate due to the fact that his account of situated thought is, 
unfortunately, “thin”.3 This characterisation of “thinness” is Sacks’s own and, 
to be fair, results from the limited space available to him in The Nature of 
Transcendental Arguments where the device is introduced and then quickly put 
to work. This is understandable. Sacks does say, on a more helpful note, that 
 
                                                
1 This is effectively Sellars’s diagnosis of his (occasional) interlocutor’s position which rejects 
material inference. Sellars, Inference and Meaning: p. 313. 
2 We might suggest tentatively that part of the “meaning” of the two statements derives from 
(1) the act in which statement is asserted (involving something like what we referred to as 
“assertability conditions”) and (2) what would make the statements true, or the transition 
between them valid—their “quasi” inferential relations (since we have forbidden ourselves to 
say “inferential relations” plain and simple). Part of what would make the transition between 
the statements valid would of course be the spatial relationships between the perceiver 
referred to, the garden occupied, and the tree perceived.  
3 Sacks, The Nature of Transcendental Arguments: p. 444.  
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“What validates the move is something other than a conceptual relation between 
propositions. It is not the content of the thought expressed..., but what the situated 
thinker brings to the thinking of it, that stands to carry that thinker from the truth of 
the one thought to the truth of the other.”1 
 
And this characterisation makes it clear that we were right to distinguish the 
move in question from an inference since such a move depends neither on 
logical form nor content. Additionally, Sacks comments in a footnote to this 
remark that  
 
“I say ‘stands to carry’ in part because I have not gone into the kind of self-
consciousness that would in fact carry the thinker from one to the other.”2 
 
And we can perhaps take the recognition of this requisite additional task as a 
directive for furthering the insights of Sacks’s work. Unfortunately, only a 
skeletal account of what might be done to answer to this requirement will be 
given here. 
Now, at this point, it appears that we can make a connection which may 
help to illuminate the problem a little. We might liken Sacks’s example of the 
problematic move involved as somehow to be understood in relation to 
Moore’s Paradox, which is expressed in the form “P, and I don’t believe that 
P”.3 In Moore’s Paradox, like Sacks’s example of the situated thought, the 
issue turns on what relation the relevant thinker is construed as having to the 
statement given. Namely, in an exemplification of Moore’s Paradox such as 
“It is raining and I don’t believe it is raining”, it is implicit that the former part 
of the statement “It is raining” is taken to be asserted by the same individual 
who is referred to as “I” in the second part, “I don’t believe it is raining”. In a 
similar way, the first statement in Sacks’s example, “there is a tree in the 
                                                
1 Op. cit.: p. 445. 
2 Op. cit.: p. 457, footnote 14. 
3 By mentioning the possible linkage one might make here, further discussion of the 
relationship between the device of situated thought and the problems associated with 
Moore’s Paradox can be brought to light. The most relevant of these problems would pertain 
to the issue of self-reference, something which has been left as merely implicit in this essay.  
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garden”, is taken to be a perceptual judgment made by the very same thinker 
who states that “there is a tree in front of me”. The connection between these 
two statements is only implicit, although strong enough for the move from 
one to the other to be regarded as valid (although not logically valid in any 
obvious sense).  
By making the point in this way, we are again reminded of the character of 
situated thought which it has been our focus to elucidate; namely, the precise 
way in which situated thought evidences what is involved in one apprehending 
a particular thought. Of course, the focus for Sacks, and for us, has been on 
perceptual judgments or thoughts, and the idea of what is involved is construed 
in terms of the conditions of the possibility of coming into contact with the 
world in various ways such that we may occupy a position from which 
transcendental proof begins to look plausible. 
The point is that, in relation to the Kantian turn of phrase, the move made 
between the kinds of statements referred to is, in a sense, synthetic a priori. It 
is clear that such a move is synthetic since it is not logically valid, yet such a 
move can be made a priori since it can be made without recourse to inspection 
of the spatial territory encompassing oneself, the tree, the garden, and the 
horizon (as discussed in our examples above). The requirement is that the 
propositional content be regarded as apprehended by the situated thinker 
from a particular point of view within a framework. For as it is phrased 
above, “there is an apple tree in the garden” constitutes an aperspectival 
content that parallels a “view from nowhere”. To locate the thought it is 
necessary to append indexical expressions such as “I”, “Here”, or “Now” to 
ascertain the personal, spatial, and temporal dimensions respectively, of the 
thought and its relationship to the thinker for whom it is a thought (and, 
crucially, for whom there is a thought).1 It seems that for Sacks, giving 
recognition to the situated thought which corresponds to the bare proposition 
allows for a related procedure of locating such a proposition. What is crucial 
                                                
1 This latter qualification gives voice to the relevant epistemic dimension of the suggestion; 
namely, that of a thinker enjoying viable contact with the world through empirical thought. 
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for Sacks is that “the thought be grasped from my point of view and informed by 
it”1 since it is on this which the possibility of a legitimate synthetic a priori 
move, of the kind just mentioned, depends. For if we are under some illusion 
about how we relate to the content of the thought then there is most certainly 
a problem with the connection between the former and latter statements as 
referred to, such as would sever any connection we might make a claim for.2  
To bolster our example of the apple tree we can look to an additional 
example provided by Sacks in a footnote, since a further case ought to serve to 
make the point more explicit: 
 
“consider the proposition |There is a table and there is a door|. The propositional 
content alone does not entail that there is something given and perceptually available 
between the table and the door. But the situated thought does allow me to infer a 
priori that if the proposition obtains, there will also be something (it principle – it 
might, of course, be occluded) between the two objects perceived.”3 
 
Firstly, we can note that the move alluded to here is inferential, as Sacks says 
explicitly. In fact, the kind of inference supposedly involved here brings out in 
perhaps more helpful and unproblematic terms just how we might envisage 
viable synthetic a priori judgment as playing a role in transcendental proof. 
Again, like the problematic case involving implicit reference to the subject of 
the perceptual judgment, the validity of the inference here depends on a 
particular conception of spatial relations, insofar as such relations structure 
the logical space4 in which such an inference can be made legitimately.  
Importantly, this example makes even more apparent just how we might 
relate the account of the synthetic a priori judgment provided here to the 
notion of “material inference” as already alluded to, for this case has a very 
                                                
1 Op. cit.: p. 445.  
2 This problem of ascertaining the veracity of the connection as claimed for will crop up again 
in our discussion in 3.4.1 where we begin to see a possible opening for the sceptic.  
3 Op. cit.: p. 457, footnote 15. 
4 For now, we will have to ignore the fact that this phrase contradictorily suggests that 
logically valid, deductive inferences are involved in synthetic a priori judgment. The phrase 
“logical space” is employed to communicate a different meaning here which will have to 
remain unexplained.  
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similar structure to the kinds of material inferences Brandom has mentioned, 
which we noted above in distinguishing such inferences from the move 
involved in situated thought. And although we took care to distinguish the 
move involved for situated thought, it is helpful and instructive to observe 
Brandom’s conception of material inference to see what parallels might be 
drawn in addition to the disparities already noted. We can make note of the 
nature of Brandom’s position regarding material inference before we leave the 
matter to the side, by observing him as saying: 
 
“Endorsing these inferences is part of grasping or mastering [the relevant] concepts, 
quite apart from any specific logical competence...Since neither the premises nor the 
conclusions of such inferences employ logical concepts, it seems appropriate to 
distinguish them from inferences whose correctness depends only on logical form.”1 
 
So, as we noted, it might be possible (given agreement with Brandom’s 
definition of material inference as well as his own understanding of 
conceptualism) to endorse both material inference as well as conceptualism. 
The idea here is that nothing in our account of situated thought is intended to 
commit one endorsing it to a variety of conceptualism. The point of alluding 
to Brandom’s commitment is to draw attention to the issue of how non-
conceptual content might be regarded, and additionally, to maintain 
awareness of the relevance of that question for how the notion of situated 
thought might be further developed.   
As said, comments I have made in this vein are intended merely to draw 
attention to how the issues raised by the account of situated thought relate to 
wider philosophical debates now in currency and are not to be taken as 
argumentative. It is enough to get a sense of what further hurdles one might 
have to overcome in giving an account of situated thought which retains a 
role for non-conceptual representation (insofar as such representation might 
                                                
1 Brandom, Making it Explicit: p. 98.  
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be regarded as indispensable for the synthetic a priori judgment claimed to be 
contained in transcendental proof).  
As a general remark, we can link the construal of the synthetic a priori 
move involved in Sacks’s account of situated thought to Brandom’s 
conception of material inference by observing that in both cases the validity of 
the move depends on a particular conception of spatial relations (at least in the 
first example given by Brandom; the other two examples trade on temporal 
and causal concepts, although I take it in these two further cases the point is 
similar). As distinguished from Brandom’s account, however, the conception 
advanced here insists on a fairly explicit link between the possibility of our 
making such purported synthetic a priori judgments and the precise structure 
of our experience. The structure of experience is construed as necessarily 
having a particular spatio-temporal character which is a minimal requirement 
for such experience being intelligible. For as we noted already in Strawson’s 
terms, the identification and re-identification of items in a framework such as 
to suffice for that framework’s apparent unified, objective character, requires 
such a framework to be (at least quasi-)1 spatio-temporal. Unfortunately, we 
have no space here to address this fascinating issue, so we will leave it here. 
Now, given the consideration of the issue of spatio-temporality, we can 
note that Sacks, to his credit, manages to propose an intuitively appealing 
construal of the synthetic a priori which avoids any talk of a priori concepts. 
In The Nature of Transcendental Arguments Sacks seems to assume, but not 
argue for (as he has elsewhere),2 the import of the notion of an “abiding 
substratum” that is analogous to a spatio-temporal continuum—and it is this 
idea (in addition to that of situated thought) that will sustain the possibility of 
forming legitimate synthetic a priori judgments. We might think of this 
strategy as parallel to Strawson’s interpretation of the First Analogy, except 
Sacks seems to go further with this idea and draw stronger conclusions from 
it. To discover what these might be, in our discussion of the idea of 
                                                
1 The opacity of this apparent qualification notwithstanding. 
2 Sacks, Objectivity and Insight: Chapter 7. 
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“permanence” in 3.4.1 we will explore the above mentioned notion of an 
“abiding substratum” to give further voice to what might be involved in 
claiming that experience is necessarily of the kind of spatio-temporal 
character alluded to.  
 To switch to commentary of a more general nature, we can give a brief 
consideration to Sacks’s view of transcendental idealism and the relationship 
between it and the account of transcendental proof and situated thought he 
provides. Interestingly, although Sacks thinks of the notion of situated 
thought as involving a central insight of transcendental idealism, he thinks of 
this notion as separable from such a doctrine. The reasons for this, I believe, 
are largely ones related to his unenthusiastic response to transcendental 
idealism under the two-world view, which I have suggested we can happily 
step over. He says that 
 
“In a nutshell, the connection with transcendental idealism lies in this: in the domain 
of situated thought, or of experience, the necessity of making the move in question 
[the synthetic a priori or ampliative move] is established, and it holds true of any 
such context, regardless of whether it holds true of, or indeed makes sense to talk of 
there being, any domain that extends beyond it.”1 
 
And this analogy ought to remind us of the examples of experiential 
phenomena, or contexts, which we suggested could be explained in terms of 
situated thought (dreams, (cases of which would need a coherent structure), 
imaginative constructions, fictional universes, and virtual reality simulations). 
The problem, however, lies in the fact that this seems to invite the sceptical 
threat whereby the insistence on the limitation of the structure of situated 
thought leaves open the question of what “domain...extends beyond it”. 
Again, this fear parallels the fear felt by those who claim that Kant’s refusal to 
talk of “things-in-themselves” amounts to an admittance of ignorance of the 
real world; a happiness to instead know only the content of our own minds. 
                                                
1 Sacks, The Nature of Transcendental Arguments: p. 454. 
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By now we should be able to see that this threat simply ought not to worry us, 
although the residue of such demands linger in the background to an extent 
which makes us feel the account to be insufficient. This feeling of insufficiency 
may be deemed illegitimate although it seems that “telling the sceptic to get 
lost”1 is an unsatisfactory strategy. Our supplementations to Sacks’s account 
of situated thought will be proposed suggestively in Section 3.4.2, although 
we must firstly give ourselves over to some final considerations of synthetic a 
priori judgment. 
 
3.3 Some Further Remarks on Synthetic A Priori Judgment 
 
We need to extend our reflections on the notion of the synthetic a priori a 
touch further to clarify just what is involved in the crucial move outlined in 
transcendental proofs which trade on situated thought. To begin, we can 
consider a balder conception of the synthetic a priori than the one proposed 
here, expressed by Körner. He reflects on the notions of “synthetic” and “a 
priori” thus: 
 
“A method of differentiation belongs to a schema…if, and only if, it employs 
attributes which are constitutive of all objects in the domain and attributes which 
individuate all of them. The constitutive and individuating attributes are the schema. 
A statement is synthetic if, and only if, it is not logically valid with respect to the 
logic being considered. Thus we must, distinguish e.g. statements synthetic with 
respect to classical from those synthetic with respect to intuitionist logic. A statement 
is a priori with respect to a schema if, and only if, it is compatible with any statement 
in which an attribute is applied to one or more distinct objects by means of any 
method which belongs to the schema.”2 
 
                                                
1 As Rorty’s general conclusion seems to be. See Davidson (2001) A Coherence Theory of Truth 
and Knowledge, in “Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective”, Oxford University Press: p. 156. 
2 Körner, The Impossibility of Transcendental Deductions: p. 329. 
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Thus, in these terms, a way of understanding the synthetic a priori would be 
that, with respect to a particular categorial schema, statements articulating the 
moves from thoughts like “there is a tree in the garden” to “there is a tree in 
front of me”, although not logically valid, would still be possible a priori since 
they would be “compatible with any statement in which an attribute is 
applied to one or more distinct objects by means of any method which 
belongs to the schema”.1 However, we might be puzzled by what kind of 
statement could articulate the “quasi-logical” move—the synthetic a priori 
move—here. For as we saw above in our discussion of situated thought, the 
reason why the transition between thought contents such as this could be 
made validly is entirely dependent upon the fact that such thought contents 
be regarded as expressive of situated thoughts. Taking the point in Körner’s 
terms forces us to express the move in purely propositional form and because 
the validity of the statement which might express the move involved 
(consider: “If statement A is expressive of a situated thought and B is 
expressive of a situated thought, then valid synthetic a priori relations obtain 
between them such as would allow for transitions from one to the other to be 
made on the basis of the epistemic import of the structure of such situated 
thought”) would make no sense in isolation from an understanding of the 
particular thought contents expressed, we can at the most hope for an 
unsatisfying abstraction.  
Summarily, in the relevant cases, what allows the synthetic a priori move 
to be made is the situatedness of both thoughts and by extrapolation, the 
situatedness of the thinker making the statements as, knowingly, being in the 
garden.2 This corresponds to Sacks’s insistence that the thought be “grasped 
from my point of view and informed by it.”3 
                                                
1 Ibid. 
2 Both these conditions matter. It is important that the subject actually be in the garden and 
knows they are in the garden if the connection is to be of the right kind. 
3 Sacks, The Nature of Transcendental Arguments: p. 445. 
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Körner regards synthetic, non-uniquely1 a priori judgments to be possible, 
which in effect amounts to an agreement with one part of Kant’s program (the 
Transcendental Analytic) with the proviso that such metaphysics of 
experience really can amount to no more than a descriptive enterprise of the 
judgments we are entitled to make, given our current conceptual scheme. In 
this sense Körner’s argument parallels Strawson’s since the latter’s task in The 
Bounds of Sense was to show how Kant’s transcendental arguments could 
retain validity only if their shape was restricted to the form of “analytical” 
arguments whose form was to be licensed by our conceptual practices—
something in itself revisable and subject to change. As Körner says, 
 
“contrary to Kant’s convictions, not only methods of differentiation but also the 
schemata to which they belong can and do change, the task cannot be completed 
once and for all, but must be undertaken again and again.”2 
 
This construal of transcendental arguments as being bound up with particular 
conceptual practices is in conflict with the understanding attributed, I think 
rightly, to Kant that transcendental arguments occur in the “material mode, in 
terms of the conditions of the possibility of certain ways of thinking and 
experiencing.”3 Clearly, this latter understanding fits more comfortably with 
the project here.  
Additionally, this latter characterisation displays a subtle difference which 
we need to appreciate: the notion of the conditions of the possibility of 
“thinking and experiencing” is a wider definition than that of the mere 
presuppositions of successful application and usage of a conceptual scheme 
since the former requirement bears an essential link to our capacity to have 
                                                
1 By “unique” it appears that Körner means something akin to Kant’s conditions of a priority 
(necessity and universality). It would thus seem odd and somewhat contradictory for Körner 
to use the term “a priori”, although it helps to bear in mind that Carnap (as we saw above) 
also regarded a priori judgments as relative to a paradigm which itself might be subject to 
change.  
2 Körner, The Impossibility of Transcendental Deductions: p. 331. 
3 Schaper, Arguing Transcendentally: p. 102. 
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representations1 of empirical objects like leaves, tables, and pieces of cheese 
and arguably, the latter requirement, for the presuppositions of successful 
usage of a conceptual scheme, involves our mere ability to make judgments 
about, or talk about, such things. Here arises a problem: since cognition might 
be thought of as inherently judgmental—at least by Kant—how can we 
understand the idea, in this context, that having representations of empirical 
objects has a less stringent requirement on it than the making of judgments, 
presumably themselves of empirical objects? The important point to grasp is 
that talk of “certain ways of thinking and experiencing”, even if wholly 
conceptual or judgmental, need not equate to “certain ways of judging” since 
“certain ways of thinking and experiencing” ought to imply the wider sphere 
of activity encompassing judgment—not mere judgment itself. The wider 
sphere is not to be equated with “forms of life”, or “cultural practices”, but 
instead is to be thought of as the logical structure of thought and experience. 
At this point we appear to have muddied the waters. What is intended by 
the phrase “logical structure of thought and experience”? In line with our 
investigations into the nature of situated thought in the previous section, we 
can say, firstly, that the logical structure of (at least empirical) thought and 
experience derives from the way our perception of the world is shaped by our 
implicit sense of what is involved in particular cases of such experience. To 
refer back to the example of moving from point A to point B with respect to 
the apple tree in the garden in order to gain an alternate take on its plumage, 
we can note that it is cases of precisely this kind which evidence such 
structure. It might seem to be problematic that our implicit ability to do this 
comes from a posteriori sources (that is, our past experience in dealings with 
trees, gardens, and our own situatedness with respect to such phenomena). 
However, no problem exists here if we give the Kantian point regarding the a 
priori character that spatio-temporal representation has for us its due. In fact, 
we can say that the empirical character, or element, here is itself dependent 
                                                
1 We will be here ignoring the possible problems which might arise given the usage of this 
term. 
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upon what we have already noted as the synthetic a priori structures inherent 
in situated thought itself. Namely, such a role reserved for memory in 
imaginatively constructing our future action depends on an isomorphic 
structure in both the memory and the current perception and it is the 
situatedness of all thoughts of this kind that allows for inferences to be drawn 
in this way. We can say that although our empirical knowledge of spatial 
relations depends on certain kinds of experiential familiarity with how one 
moves through space (temporally of course; thus implicating time), our very 
capacity to perceived space stems from a priori sources, as Kant insisted. In 
the same way, despite the role of empirical thought in making inferences 
about the actions one ought to take to achieve placement in a particular 
spatial location, the ability to have and relate thoughts such as this stems from 
a priori sources. We might make this clearer with respect to Kant by saying 
that the former kind of imagination is akin to the “reproductive imagination”, 
whereas the latter kind is similar to what Kant refers to as the “productive 
imagination”. We will have to content ourselves with brevity with respect to 
this issue, despite its tendency to fascinate. 
To continue our reflections, we need to further specify the synthetic a 
priori move involved in situated thought. Consider the statement “there is a 
tree in the garden” and the possibility of moving from this to the statement 
“there is a tree in front of me”. As we have pressed, these statements, taken 
merely as pieces of conceptual information, bear no special relation to one 
another. The uniqueness of the relation between them emerges only in 
connection with the idea of their being expressed by the same subject who is 
appropriately situated to make such statements truthfully. 
When we make the transition from “there is a tree in the garden” to “there 
is a tree in front of me” we find ourselves in possession of new information 
which was not logically deducible from the mere propositional content of the 
former statement. Now, it is worth rehearsing the point again which we made 
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above in relation to material inference,1 for it might be ponderously imagined 
that we could indeed infer from the former to the latter statement in virtue of 
mere deductive logic yet this supposition, in one form, might rely on an 
assumption about our spatial position—assuming that the inference relies on 
an additional proposition of the form “I am standing in the garden”, or, more 
generously to our interlocutor, “I am standing in the garden in front of the 
tree”. However, even given this additional premise, the argument is still not 
logically valid since the insertion of the indexical “I” does nothing to improve 
validity since indexicals can play no relevant logical role here.2  
The central element we find missing in the account construed in purely 
conceptual terms is the sense in which the mere proposition expressive of 
spatial position is not sufficient to constitute bodily knowledge of one’s 
position in terms which allow for knowing what it would be to apprehend a 
particular thought content from a particular point of view.3 What informs the 
synthetic a priori move from “there is a tree in the garden” to “there is a tree 
in front of me” is precisely the situatedness of both thoughts; this involving an 
implicit awareness of what it would take for such a thought or observation to be 
true. And although what it would take for one to be in such a position as to 
apprehend a perceptual observation or thought is arguably acknowledgeable 
in terms of a purely propositional transcendental argument, what is critical 
and crucial about such a construal is not explicable in merely these terms, as 
we have noted by our insistence on a role for non-logically valid inferences 
which nevertheless yield veracious statement.  
To advance Sacks’s understanding of situated thought further, we can say 
that the construal in terms of situated thought aims to bring out the 
                                                
1 This relates to the objection we mentioned Sellars’s interlocutor as making. See Sellars, 
Inference and Meaning: p. 313.  
2 We might be tempted to insert additional (taken to be suppressed) premises which qualify 
the argument such that the notion of spatial position becomes logically viable, although the 
relevance of the indexical is simply not able to be adequately accounted for in this way. It 
relies on the kind of procedure articulated by Brandom above, in his examples of material 
inference. 
3 This is the case despite what one might suggest is the “understood meaning” of statements 
about one’s spatial position. 
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dimension in which action and perception are intimately related, in the sense 
in which our example of the movement from point A to point B with respect 
to the apple tree in the garden was employed to indicate. As a related case in 
the literature, in The Validity of Transcendental Arguments1 Taylor has argued 
that transcendental arguments should be seen as explicating fundamental a 
priori knowledge we have about our own bodily capacities—or, in his words, 
“an insight into our own activity”.2 Taylor reads the general structure of 
Kant’s Transcendental Deduction in a way analogous to the account we saw 
given by Ameriks in Section 2.2.5, viz., he reads it as a “regressive 
argument”.3 Importantly, Taylor claims 
 
“that our perception of the world is that of an embodied agent is not a contingent fact 
that we might discover empirically; rather our sense of ourselves as embodied agents 
is constitutive of our experience.”4 
 
And further, that 
 
“the connection is constitutive and not a mere correlation because we couldn’t have a 
subject with a [perceptual] field like ours who as a matter of contingent fact might 
not be an embodied agent.”5 
 
This conception of our perception of the world synthesises the ideas pressed 
in our examination of the notion of situated thought and places focus on the 
point we have taken pains to make, viz., that the appropriate conception of 
perceptual judgment—or, empirical knowledge serving as a premise in a 
transcendental proof—is structured in terms of the relation between our 
perception of the world and our actions within it. Moreover, Taylor’s 
reference to “our sense of ourselves as embodied agents” as being 
                                                
1 Charles Taylor (1978) The Validity of Transcendental Arguments, Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society, 79, pp. 151-165.  
2 Op. cit.: p. 160. 
3 Op. cit.: p. 151. 
4 Op. cit.: p. 156. 
5 Ibid. 
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“constitutive of our experience” ought to also remind us of our discussion (in 
connection with Carnap) of synthetic a priori judgments as being 
“constitutive of the objects of experience” and therefore, ought to suggest how 
the possibility of legitimate synthetic a priori judgment might depend on 
precisely the kind of “sense of ourselves as embodied agents” which we 
undeniably have.   
The kind of transcendental proof argued for here stands to explain just how 
this link emerges between perception and action, through the analysis of the 
role of the situatedness of our perceptual thinking. And as we have noted 
Sacks as saying, “it is not the content of the thought expressed” by “there is a 
tree in front of me”, “but what the situated thinker brings to the thinking of it, 
that stands to carry that thinker from the truth of the one thought to the truth 
of the other.”1 And as Sacks mentions in a footnote to this important remark, 
he says “‘stands to carry’ in part” because he has “not gone into the kind of 
self-consciousness that would in fact carry the thinker from one to the other.”2 
To reiterate, we can see the attempts here to clarify and extend the treatment 
of the notion of situated thought as aiming to explain the relevant kind of self-
consciousness referred to by Sacks; specifically, as making plain the 
relationship between the possibility of synthetic a priori inferences and the 
intimate connection between perception and action. We could perhaps here 
hedge a suggestive remark—and no more than this—that the possibility of 
allocating space for the perception-action link relates to the possibility of 
making connections between Kantian and Husserlian transcendental 
philosophy. Sacks suggests a link of this kind when he notes, at the close of 
his paper:  
 
“Specifically, the form of identified, in asking after the preconditions of what I have 
been calling situated thought, approximates to what may deservedly be referred to as 
transcendental or pure phenomenology. If what has been said here is right, then we 
have an insight into how such a pure phenomenology is of epistemic – and not 
                                                
1 Sacks, The Nature of Transcendental Arguments: p. 445. 
2 Op. cit.: p. 457, footnote 14. 
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merely descriptive – import; and how it helps to capture both the nature of Kant’s 
transcendental proofs and the confinement of their validity to empirical reality, to the 
level of possible experience.”1 
 
And we can take this remark as a mere directive at this juncture, with respect 
to at least the superficial regard we might have for situated thought as 
accounted for here. At its core, the commitment to the above link takes the 
form of supporting an essential tie between the way our perceptual 
experience and empirical thought is structured by our capacity to act in the 
world of which such experience or thought is about, and the possibility of 
making synthetic a priori inferences within the domain of such experience 
and thought. Transcendental arguments have been characterised as 
constituting an “insight into our own activity”2 and it might be said that the 
ineffability3 of this kind of insight makes adequate expression of their nature 
most difficult. As Sacks says, 
 
“the content of a situated thought cannot by fully captured as propositional content: 
the content as delivered by the situatedness of the thinker essentially extends beyond 
anything that the mere propositional construal of the content can deliver.”4 
 
And in a footnote to this remark he comments: 
 
“We might put this by saying that there is something ineffable, but directly 
accessible, to the content of situated thoughts.”5 
 
Yet although there is seemingly something “ineffable” about the content of 
situated thoughts, we can perhaps relate this content to Kant’s notion of 
“transcendental content” which is imparted by the structure of empirical 
thinking insofar as such thinking allows for synthetic a priori inference. Kant 
                                                
1 Op. cit.: p. 455.  
2 Taylor, The Validity of Transcendental Arguments: p. 160. 
3 Sacks, The Nature of Transcendental Arguments: p. 458, footnote 27. 
4 Op. cit.: p. 451. 
5 Op. cit.: p. 458, footnote 27. 
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rarely mentions “transcendental content” explicitly, although a remark by 
him with respect to the imagination can be quoted to evidence what might be 
meant by it: 
 
“the same function that gives unity to the different representations in a judgment also 
gives unity to the mere synthesis of various representations in an intuition...The same 
understanding, therefore, and indeed by means of the very same actions through 
which it brings the logical form of a judgment into concepts by means of the 
analytical unity, also brings a transcendental content into its representations by 
means of the synthetic unity of the manifold in intuition in general”1 
 
And in this remark we find a clue. That is, “transcendental content” appears 
to be imparted to representations by the “synthetic unity of the manifold in 
intuition in general”, which we might characterise as “apperception minus 
concepts”.2 That is, “transcendental content” could be thought of as the 
content necessarily included in our empirical thought if it is able to be 
apprehended by a subject as unified (we won’t yet say “objective” since such 
a term would appear to implicate concepts).3 Even though it might seem more 
appropriate to think of such a phenomenon as more accurately describable as 
“transcendental form”, we can see Kant’s reasons for phrasing the matter this 
way since “transcendental content” is meant to be imparted in tight 
connection with the faculty of pure intuition, the medium through which 
actual empirical content is realised in cognition. 
                                                
1 A79/B104-5. 
2 This makes sense for the additional reason that Kant thinks of the “function” that allows for 
both a judgment and a representation to be unified in terms of “analytic unity” and 
“synthesis” respectively, as the same. Now judgment is only coherent in terms of 
apperception, since if something cannot be recognised as “thought in me” it cannot, as it 
were, be “thought at all”. By extrapolation, Kant seems to regard the “synthesis of various 
representations in an intuition” as reliant on a similar action of the understanding. 
3 We can suggest that just as Strawson insists on the necessity of the spatio-temporality of our 
experience—if we are to be able to identify and re-identify items within it—for it to be 
regarded as unified and objective, the account of transcendental proof given here requires 
that experience be taken as necessarily spatio-temporal in something like the Kantian sense. 
That is, our experience must be regarded as structured in terms of something like the pure 
intuitions of space and time (themselves necessary conditions of the possibility of experience).  
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Given this consideration, we might suppose that the content of situated 
thought is similar to “transcendental content” since both are related to 
something like the faculty of pure intuition. The former notion of situated 
thought is claimed to license synthetic a priori inferences which purportedly 
gain intelligibility from the way we are able to think about space (and perhaps 
time also, although this has not been our focus), whereas the latter notion of 
“transcendental content” could be thought of as the content of synthetic a 
priori judgment itself, whereby the structure of such judgment depends on 
transcendental conditions. We will have to content ourselves with these 
tentative suggestions as we must now move on to consider some actual cases 
of transcendental proof. 
 
3.4 Some Attempts at Constructing Transcendental Proof 
 
Before we begin our discussion of Sacks’s transcendental argument for an 
“abiding substratum” it will be helpful to make a few general comments 
about the differing strategies in his work. The text I take as giving the right 
construal of transcendental proof is his paper entitled The Nature of 
Transcendental Arguments, to which we have so far devoted much attention. 
Sacks’s earlier book Objectivity and Insight as a whole seems to represent a 
different orientation (at least at the textual level) with respect to the issues 
dealt with here. Despite this, I will not hesitate to employ arguments similar 
to those presented by him in that book insofar as I take them to be 
independently convincing apart from his wider commitment to forms of 
transcendental argumentation shorn of transcendental idealism. Notably, it 
seems that Sacks was pushing toward a view of which he was perhaps 
unaware of as, virtually, isomorphic to a variety of the two-aspect view of 
transcendental idealism, although he was unwilling, however 
understandably, to pledge commitment to something of that order. By 
contrast, it has been a contention of mine thus far that retaining a 
transcendentally ideal framework explicitly allows one to enjoy the power of a 
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reconsidered version of the synthetic a priori which is seemingly unavailable 
to alternate positions.1 
 
3.4.1 The Argument for Permanence2 
 
Importantly, Sacks’s proposal in Chapter 7 of Objectivity and Insight for an 
approach to transcendental argumentation mirrors Ameriks’s interpretation 
of the Transcendental Deduction as discussed in Section 2.2.5. Sacks takes a 
minimal conception of experience (what he calls a “heterogeneous 
presentation”) as his starting point (or, premise) and argues regressively from 
that to the existence of an abiding quasi-spatio-temporal substratum (as a 
conclusion). In doing this, Sacks sidesteps the appeal to a priori concepts and 
instead appeals implicitly to the arguments of the Analogies (in particular the 
First Analogy) to sustain the idea that a minimal conception of experience that 
we can recognise as an experience must at least take a spatio-temporal form 
that itself suggests the existence of an abiding substratum sufficient to sustain 
such an experience. To begin, we can observe Sacks’s reference to the First 
Analogy in The Nature of Transcendental Arguments: 
 
“If experience of succession is to be possible, there must be something that is 
invariant.”3 
 
We can break this argument down into a modus ponens form4 as follows: 
                                                
1 One needs to be careful here since there might be cases where the existence of synthetic a 
priori judgment might be taken to be congenial to philosophical orientations other than 
transcendental idealism. It is true that this matter may reduce to a terminological quibble. I 
take it, however, that these claims for the existence of synthetic a priori judgment would be 
committed to different conceptions of such judgment; to conceive of such judgment in a 
manner similar to Kant involves accepting Kant’s doctrine of transcendental idealism at least 
under some interpretation of it—whether that be an epistemologically oriented two-aspect 
view or an ontologically oriented two-world view.  
2  I will here say “permanence” instead of “substance” since the former is more general and 
seemingly less ontologically committed than the latter. 
3 Sacks, The Nature of Transcendental Arguments: p. 442. 
4 Interestingly, and perhaps detrimentally, by doing so we make the validity of the argument 
seem to rest on merely formal principles. If we leave the conditional as it stands, the sense in 
which it might depend on material principles of inference can be made readily apparent.  
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i. We have experience of succession. 
ii. It is a necessary condition of the experience of succession that 
something in experience be invariant. 
iii. Something in experience is invariant. 
 
This appears to be a version of the argument from the First Analogy in the 
Critique and we can begin our analysis by considering the initial premise. It is 
clear that in one sense the first premise is a contingent, empirical truth, or, 
something taken to be true. In another sense, we might say that insofar as 
there is to be experience at all it is necessarily true, but that is controversial and 
not what is meant here. We could of course reframe the premise as “there is 
experience of succession” or “there is succession”, although this would blur 
the picture since these two ways of reframing this statement undermine 
precisely the view that is to be constructed here insofar as the former 
encourages elimination of the notion of a self or subject and the latter 
eliminates the notion of experience in terms of which “succession” gains 
coherence.1  We can note in a preliminary way that by this it is meant that 
both of these re-framings suppose that the notion of “succession”—not the 
notion of “a sequence of events”, which is seemingly less sensitive to what we 
might call the “subjective dimension” than the former notion, insofar as 
“succession” seems to be an experiential notion whereas “a sequence of 
events” seems to refer to something entirely independent—can be analysed 
on its own in isolation from the notion of experience and still retain 
coherence. This seems prima facie to be wrong. 
We can make additional remarks once the second premise is in place. As 
the second premise claims, experience of succession depends on something in 
experience being invariant. We might conjecture that this item of invariance is 
                                                
1 The extreme sceptic may suppose that these details raise further problems to be solved, 
although it can easily be countered that such scepticism that makes the usage of certain 
concepts completely unintelligible—in a sense above and beyond the charge of 
unintelligibility normally levelled at the sceptic—and is not a threat to be taken seriously.  
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us, but this would seem to be a little quick off the mark and would be open to 
Hume’s objection that there is no self present across our states of 
consciousness; we need to look for this principle of unity elsewhere. We 
might instead venture that there is a background, independently existing 
world which contains objects, to which the series of our perceivings belong, or 
to which they are related. However, this suggestion already traffics in the 
notion of a spatio-temporal framework that is tied to the notion of an 
independently existing world that the argument is attempting to explain. But 
what if we suggest this: we need not claim that there is any one thing that is 
present across all our states of consciousness, since it is evident that there 
simply cannot be; the content of our experience is constantly in flux and it is 
only in virtue of our capacities for identification and re-identification that we 
are able to knowingly perceive the same empirical objects again and again, 
through periods of their presence and absence from the actual content of our 
experience. Instead, it is enough that we can have perceptions which 
themselves exhibit a structure such as to be locatable in terms of the structural 
properties of a framework that, generally, allows for exhibition of features or 
properties (or is inhabited by objects) such as to allow linkages between 
adjacent perceptions. The idea being that where there are linkages between 
such perceptions (thinkable as “regions” of that framework) they are 
commensurable. This merits explanation. 
If we consider the problem of securing a notion of invariance, all we really 
require is sufficient similarity between adjacent cases of perception. I am not 
here speaking of the possible thought experiment where one might be 
walking through a room with a strobe on, hence where one’s capacity to find 
one’s way is reliant on re-identifying, across periods of darkness, similar 
items which one encountered in adjacent periods of lightness. The claim is 
more general and much wider. Consider the sceptical problem of thinking 
that, for any currently unperceived (though presumably previously 
perceived) empirical object, we can doubt that it exists unperceived. The 
familiar Strawsonian reply will be that this kind of doubt reduces to the 
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tautology that “you do not continuously observe what you do not 
continuously observe”, thus “the standard for being sure” about the re-
identification of such objects, “while meaning what we do mean” when we 
say that we perceive them, is “set self-contradictorily high”.1 What this 
amounts to is the fairly straightforward idea that if we are not logically in a 
position to confirm or disconfirm something’s existence, it does not make 
sense to raise the question. Obviously, it simply won’t do to redirect the 
problem by claiming that hypotheses exist to predict the existence of currently 
unperceived objects, since the possibility of testing these require at least 
indirect perception of the objects in question and in which cases the problem 
disappears anyway.  
The additional Strawsonian reply is that to ask the sceptical question 
whether the stretch of experience one is currently enjoying is indeed of the 
same objects one experienced earlier and which have since endured stretches 
of non-continuous observation is simultaneously to doubt and to presuppose 
the framework in which such individuation occurs and only in which it 
makes sense. That is, the notion of a spatio-temporal framework relies on 
accepting, in at least some cases, particular-identity where non-continuous 
observation occurs. If we did not hold ourselves to this conception of 
particular-identity then the notion of a spatio-temporal framework would 
collapse; we would have no choice but to conceive of every case of 
observation as observation participating in the structural properties of an 
independent framework entirely unrelated to every other. Thus, the question 
of whether an item in one framework was related to one in another 
framework could not arise, since these systems would be, as said, 
independent or, unrelated, which comes to the same thing. There would thus 
be no common criteria for individuation of properties or objects in those 
frameworks and hence no grounds for the question being raised. The idea is 
that it is a condition of having intelligible criteria for the individuation or the 
identification and re-identification of empirical objects that there is a kind of 
                                                
1 Strawson, Individuals: p. 34. 
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continuity across cases of observation. It is not necessary that we have a single 
point of reference across all experiences; it is enough that at least one element 
ties things together across experiences although the role of such a tie between 
experiences might be fulfilled by something different from one case to the 
next. Ultimately, this is to make it intelligible that such disjointed cases of 
observation fulfil the requirements for evidencing that they participate in (or, 
share the structural properties of) the same framework.1  
It might then seem that the possibility of invariance in experience is 
sustained by the existence of rogue elements which persist, as it were, from 
one case of observation to the next. But this cannot quite be so. Consider the 
commonsense thought experiment mentioned above regarding the strobe-lit 
room. Surely in cases such as this there is no common element in some 
perceptions if one happens to step through a doorway, for example, during a 
period of darkness, into the next room which is completely different from the 
previous one. To take this objection to be relevant is to have missed the point, 
and to have missed the Strawsonian counter-argument above. The point, to 
reiterate, is more general. The idea is that the spatio-temporal framework in 
which such cases of observation occur is continuous; all cases of observation 
occur within the same framework, or at least sub-regions of it. I will not rely 
on the more tendentious argument that we cannot make intelligible other 
forms of individuation since our current conceptual scheme limits us from 
conceiving of alternate kinds of framework other than the spatio-temporal, 
viz. that our concepts are necessarily spatio-temporal. For one, the 
Strawsonian argument for the role of a “conceptual scheme” has been 
challenged by Davidson, for the other, it is not quite to the point. Rather, what 
we are after is something more substantial.  
                                                
1 Of course, again, it is not to be thought that going to sleep and waking up in a different 
place than where one closed one’s eyes raises a problem here. Obviously in these cases the 
region of the framework may be different yet the capacity for individuation of the region of 
experience is analogous. The idea is that one could not wake up, be considered conscious and 
be faced with a world that one could not, in principle, observe. This would simply be for 
one’s unity of consciousness to have dissolved. 
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Here we can make a transition to Sacks’s account in Objectivity and Insight 
of how we build up the notion of a necessary quasi-spatio-temporal 
framework inherent in any experience. Sacks’s first step is to describe, in the 
Strawsonian tone, a “minimal conception of experience”. He proceeds by 
taking what he sees as a step back from Kant’s notion of apperception in the 
Transcendental Deduction, to a more primitive notion, that of the minimal 
structure of any experience that could be subject to unification in such a case 
of apperception.1  
Sacks’s first claim is that for any experience to count as an experience it 
must involve a distinction between two elements: a “subjective component” 
(that for which there is something that it is like) and a “content component” 
(the something that it is like).2 The connection between this and a well-known 
Strawsonian thesis is worth bringing out, since Strawson says: 
 
“There can be no experience at all which does not involve the recognition of 
particular items as being of such and such a general kind. It seems that it must be 
possible, even in the most fleeting and purely subjective of impressions, to 
distinguish a component of recognition, or judgement, which is not simply identical 
with the item recognized, which forms the topic of judgement.”3 
 
The relevant point is that, given the thought expressed above, there needs to 
be a distinction between the recognition of the content of an experience and 
that content itself. Strawson goes on to state: 
 
                                                
1 It is interesting to note that, given this orientation, Sacks seems to hold the view that 
Strawson’s reading of the Deduction is correct; namely, that apperception is indeed the 
starting point of Kant’s argument. Sacks’s tactic of taking the argument one step further back 
to the notion of a minimally conceived experience then seems to mirror Ameriks’s reading of 
the Deduction as actually beginning from the supposition of the existence of empirical 
knowledge. That is, in Ameriks’s case we start with empirical knowledge, in Sacks’s case we 
start with a minimally conceived experience; although the extent to which these are 
equivalent is up for debate. Given my arguments thus far, Sacks’s approach then seems to be 
in accord with the actual approach of the Deduction.  
2 Sacks, Objectivity and Insight: p. 224.  
3 Strawson, The Bounds of Sense: p. 100. Sacks, to his credit, flags the issue that one needn’t 
construe recognition of such items as necessarily judgmental; that is, as having the same 
logical structure as judgment. 
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“Recognition implies the potential acknowledgement of the experience into which 
recognition necessarily enters as being one’s own, as sharing with others this relation 
to the identical self. It is the fact that this potentiality is implicit in recognition which 
saves the recognitional component from absorption into the item recognized (and 
hence saves the character of the experience as an experience) even when that item 
cannot be conceived of as having an existence independent of the particular 
experience of it.”1 
 
It is worth making note of two varieties of recognition at work here, in 
addition to a third which will form the topic of our discussion of self-
awareness in 3.4.2. The first two are mentioned by Sacks: 
 
(1) Recognition internal to an experience of the content of that experience.  
(2) Recognition of the kind fundamental to self-consciousness: the 
recognition of an experience or item as being one of mine.2 
 
The first is “necessary to avoid the collapse of an experience into a mere event 
(albeit possibly a cognitive one)”; the second is seen as a way of saving those 
experiences which fail on the first count, viz., sensations which cannot be 
prised apart from the very experience or awareness of them, yet are still 
thinkable as items of our consciousness if they allow for unification in such 
consciousness. And we have our third sense: 
 
(3) Recognition of another subject as a subject who recognises oneself as a 
subject. 
 
We will come to this third point later on, although it is worth mentioning now 
as the connection with the two other kinds will become important. The details 
of this discussion of recognition serve as the groundwork for Sack’s minimal 
conception of experience—and also serve as the basis for my criticisms of how 
                                                
1 Op. cit.: p. 101. 
2 Sacks, Objectivity and Insight: p. 226. Not numbered in original.  
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this conception is extended, given the sense of importance I place on (3). For 
now we need to see how Sacks’s argument plays out.  
The next step is to consider what more can be said about the necessary 
structure of such minimally conceived experience “considered strictly on its 
own, prior to adding it to a unified series of other such experiences”.1 To 
avoid commitment to a position on the debate about the extent to which 
experience is wholly conceptual or not, Sacks introduces some terminology to 
characterise what such a minimal conception of experience as we have been 
characterising must be like. He thinks of the “individual experience as a 
whole” as a “domain of presentation” and the ‘content component’ within it as 
the “presented domain”.2 Sacks then makes the further distinction between 
homogeneous and heterogeneous domains of presentation. The former is 
conceived of as having potential to support the recognition of (no more than) 
one property, whereas the latter are thought of as having sufficient structure 
to allow for recognition of different (multiple) properties. Initially, his 
discussion of these domains of presentation is restricted to “momentary 
experience”, which is meant to be the “briefest temporal span that can be 
psychologically significant,”3 although this will be seen to render them 
incoherent and thus lead on to the thesis of necessary spatio-temporality.  
Sacks is rightly quick to conclude that for a domain of presentation to have 
the potential for recognition of no more than one property is for it to fall short 
of being epistemically significant. The first point of failure is that such a 
domain of presentation has no room for a foreground-background structure 
that is necessary to place a property or to identify an object to which such a 
property might belong, since this would require recognition of more than one 
element. The second failure is on the fall-back option of a simple 
homogeneous field; such a domain of presentation could not even take the 
                                                
1 Op. cit.: p. 229. 
2 Ibid. 
3 It appears that Sacks should have said “epistemically significant” since presumably his 
account here is intended to be more than psychological. The problem with this however is 
that it suggests that homogeneous domains of presentation might count as epistemic 
representations, whereas the conclusion is to be that they do not. 
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form of a homogeneous field—say, a red (quasi-spatial) expanse—since the 
recognition of (quasi-spatial) properties would require identifying more than 
one property, or rather, more than one instance of the same property of 
redness, which would then require individuation of spatial location within 
such a domain – itself a type of property.  
The claim that such a field might be possible in terms of a mere quasi-
spatio-temporal structure, as examined in Strawson’s example of the sound 
world in Chapter 2 of Individuals, is familiar and not worth going into here 
since that structure fails on the count of “independent access to various 
locations”,1 that is, the master sound in Strawson’s argument, on its own, 
would not bear the capacity of being (quasi-spatially) located in a variety of 
places since there would be no external measure to it which could fit the bill—
there would be no analogue in the sound world of an “abiding substratum” 
which, it is argued here, is a viable and necessary conception in the structure 
of our ordinary experience—there would thus be no viable conception of 
quasi-spatiality. This is all we can say about this here.  
An additional complication that is worth noting, but into which we shall 
not go too deeply here, is that experience looks, in this picture, necessarily 
conceptual. This is because once homogeneous domains of presentation have 
been dispensed with the heterogeneous domains of presentation left over are 
nothing less than fully conceptual episodes, insofar as their structure 
necessarily admits of being individuated thusly. Insofar as recognition and 
individuation are arguably conceptual matters and insofar as a heterogeneous 
domain of presentation, as having the structure to support recognition of 
multiple properties, is thusly individuated, such domains of presentation 
seem to be conceptually articulated. This leaves us with an apparent 
commitment to a conceptualist thesis—where such a thesis is taken to involve 
an assertion for the necessary (but not necessarily sufficient) role of concepts 
in experience—if we are to accept the rest of what has been said. One 
alternative is to follow Strawson in saying that experiences that fall short of 
                                                
1 Op. cit.: p. 231. 
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being conceptual are able to be recognised by a component external to them, 
in terms of being ascribable by us as our own states of consciousness. 
Something like this alternative is ascribed to Kant by Sacks, which we will see 
in a moment.  
Once it is established that anything counting as experience must be 
minimally, in Sacks’s terms, heterogeneous, that is, contain two or more 
elements or properties, it is noted that a mere momentary case of such an 
experience simply cannot be classed as epistemically stable. Such a domain of 
presentation can only be recognised as having more than one property if such 
co-existing properties as there might be can be experienced successively; that 
is, over a passage of time.1  
Here it is worth bringing out a point that Sacks makes about this strategy. 
There are two potential ways to enrich the conception of a heterogeneous 
domain of presentation such as to make it more epistemically viable. The first 
strategy, which is ascribed to Kant by Sacks, would be to fit such a domain of 
presentation into a wider framework of a single consciousness for which there 
were other domains of presentation, both homogeneous and heterogeneous. 
The unifying principle in this case would be the transcendental unity of 
apperception and this would lead us to Kant’s premise in the Deduction (as 
Sacks sees it, and as I have shown Strawson above in Section 2.2.5 as arguing 
in his reconstruction) which then seeks to explain the “conditions for such 
discrete experiences to being ordered under a single consciousness of them 
all.”2 Sacks’s alternate strategy is to enrich the conception of a heterogeneous 
domain of presentation not externally, in the way just noted, but internally by 
spelling out how such a domain of presentation also requires, minimally, a 
temporal element within it. According to Sacks this strategy amounts to 
starting a transcendental argument a “step earlier than Kant does”, and thus 
                                                
1 At this juncture it is worth flagging, but not worthwhile going into, the subtle issues at stake 
in calling such an element a “passage of time. This expression will have to do for now. 
2 Op. cit.: p. 235. 
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beginning with “an even more rudimentary and hence less debatable 
premiss.”1 
We can see the intuitive appeal of this strategy by simply reflecting on the 
fact which I noted above that, for such recognition of multiple properties 
within the kind of domain spoken of here, it is necessary that a temporal 
element be present since even to recognise co-existing properties requires, one 
might say, as many “moments” as there are properties. As Sacks says, 
 
“for the contrast between two properties to be drawn, it must be possible to attend 
discreetly to each point. And that can only mean that it must be possible to attend 
first to the one then to the other. And this already presupposes the availability of 
temporal relations.”2 
 
Of course this does not mean that the properties themselves necessarily occur 
in a temporal sequence, since they may be co-existing, but merely that the 
recognition of them must. Sacks goes on to say that “there must, internal to 
the experience, be the resources to attend to the properties in temporal 
sequence.”3 And, more strongly, it is claimed that this fact just iterated 
“explains the transcendental status of time”, namely, that it “is essentially 
presuppositional to any differentiation of properties.”4 
The next stage in the argument is as follows. It is claimed that the 
recognition of multiple properties within a heterogeneous domain of 
presentation requires that such recognition be accompanied by a single 
consciousness such that the recognition of those properties can be coherently 
envisioned as related in some way, i.e., such that there can be “experienced 
contrast”5 between them. This raises the question of what the conditions are 
under which we can preserve the unity of consciousness within the 
heterogeneous domain of presentation. Sacks’s response is this: 
                                                
1 Ibid. 
2 Op. cit.: p. 238. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Op. cit.: p. 240.  
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“The unity of the subjective component presupposes unity of the objective element of 
the presentational domain. For the different experiences to belong to a single 
consciousness there must be some way of relating them to one another. For that to be 
possible there must be a background matrix, or grid, onto which those experiences 
can all be plotted.”1 
 
Of course, we are then open to the worry of the grid changing from one 
experience to the next. The idea is that when this occurs the disjointed grids 
are re-aligned or made commensurable2 by way of reference to a more general 
background grid, in relation to which they may be plotted. When there is 
radical shift in cases of perception, recourse to a more primitive grid must 
occur, and this, it must be said, is simply an argument for permanence;3 the 
argument for the necessity of an abiding substratum which sustains the 
capacity to make spatio-temporal individuations.  
The worry that this abiding substratum might change can be shown to be a 
non-starter. Either the change “falls outside the experiential capacity of the 
unity of consciousness in question”,4 in which case the problem is a chimera 
or, the change between one grid and another is sustained by the mechanics I 
described above. Of course, the further possibility that in some instances there 
might be no further recourse to a more primitive matrix simply leads to the 
unity of consciousness to a collapse.5 The basic point is that it is not possible 
                                                
1 Ibid. 
2 This is a self-conscious allusion to Kuhn. The suggestion is not that we can readily assimilate 
the idea of change in the structure of our experience wholly to change in our conceptual 
scheme (or however one wants to refer to linguistic practice), yet by making this link 
interesting questions are raised. 
3 As the title of this section suggests. 
4 Ibid. 
5 That this suggestion does not constitute a problem ought to be clear. We are clearly aware of 
when our unity of consciousness has collapsed, or, more accurately, in those cases in which 
this happens we do not have sufficient awareness to be deceived about whether or not our 
unity of consciousness has collapsed. To say that our previous unity of consciousness has 
collapsed into a hallucination or wide-ranging perceptual error is not to threaten this idea. 
Rather, such hallucination can simply be accounted for in the usual way in retrospect by way 
of comparison with both earlier and later experience. In the possible case of a permanent and 
radical shift in the thread of one’s perception of the world—in the case of an individual who 
has undergone a permanent and radical psychological trauma which has trapped them in a 
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to experience a change in the fundamental grid or matrix which supports the 
capacity for recognition of properties in heterogeneous domains of 
presentation.1 And as Sacks states: 
 
“The unity of consciousness requires a single unified and unchanging matrix onto 
which all change can be plotted. And that is just the unity of the objective world.”2 
 
We can say two things about this: (1) according to Kant at least, unity of 
consciousness and a recognisably unified, objective world are interdependent, 
so nothing is discovered by reasoning this way; (2) this conclusion might 
seem to be a little unguarded (and thus vulnerable). Let us see why. 
The above account seems to have left a hole. The possibility that the 
background matrix or grid could undergo unperceived change seems to 
suggest an opening for a further sceptical dilemma. What if, indeed, the 
background matrix (supposing the sceptic is willing to grant us that posit) 
does undergo unperceived change? Does this mean that our experience is then 
an illusion since we miss whatever alteration it is that might have occurred? 
This appears to be Stroud’s Challenge showing itself, since the basic worry is 
again “what if our belief in the necessity of our conception of experience is 
false?” We have dealt with that worry already, although it seems we have not 
given a satisfactory reply. What we are working on is an account of how 
certain relevant transcendental arguments (insofar as they encompass 
transcendental proofs) can do more than articulate necessary conceptual 
connections within what is perceived to be a necessary conception of 
experience. This account, as we have seen, requires that transcendental proofs 
include a synthetic a priori, ampliative step in them which will tie them to the 
                                                                                                                                       
mass hallucination—there is no need to assume that a transcendental argument is required 
for explanation. Deference to empirical explanation is rightly performed in cases such as this.  
1 We can relate this idea to a famous remark made by Kant where he says: “A coming to be or 
ceasing to be that is not simply a determination of the permanent but is absolute, can never be 
a possible perception.” This quote is from Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. by Norman Kemp 
Smith: A188/B231 (my italics). Kemp Smith’s translation is used here because this particular 
passage reads more elegantly and shows itself as more relevant to our purpose under that 
translation. 
2 Sacks, Objectivity and Insight: p. 240.  
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notion of possible experience and a version of the two-aspect reading of 
transcendental idealism which focuses on epistemic conditions. The quick 
answer to Stroud’s Challenge is that what we have argued for thus far is to be 
supplemented by an additional argument that mirrors what has been 
interpreted as Hegel’s completion of Kant’s Copernican Revolution.1 But for 
now, we need to continue filling in some details of the argument for the 
objective framework which we are currently discussing. As a preliminary hint 
at the additional argument against the sceptic, precisely why it won’t make 
sense to question the existence of a kind of background matrix or grid stems 
from the remark I made about the kind of recognition expressed in (3) above.   
To return to our main theme, we can observe that I set out a brief summary 
of the argument for time above. A parallel argument can be set out for space, 
equally briefly. The quite straightforward idea expounded above with 
reference to time was that it was presuppositional to making any kind of 
individuation whatsoever, since to identify one or more properties requires 
knowing what it is for something to be what it is and not something else, 
which requires precisely that one be able to differentiate between what 
something is and what it is not—which requires, even in the most elementary 
cases, a temporal element for such individuation to thus occur. The parallel 
argument for space is as follows. 
Individuation of properties is dependent not only on a temporal element 
but also a fundamentally spatial element2 since such individuation is reliant 
on the capacity for recognising particular properties as being thus-and-so, that 
is, as they are, and not as something other than what they are. This 
recognition requires that such properties be somehow placed in a context or 
frame of reference against which (or within which) they might show 
                                                
1 Although we cannot adequately address Hegel here it is worth noting some references 
which typify this reading. Such works include Robert Pippin (1989) Hegel’s Idealism: The 
Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness, Cambridge University Press and Paul Redding (1996) Hegel’s 
Hermeneutics, Cornell University Press. 
2 For simplicity I will here drop the qualifier “quasi” since it should be clear by now that this 
argument is wholly more general than one tied to any realisation of a particular spatio-
temporal structure. 
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themselves. Additionally, being able to tell the difference between two co-
existing properties requires that such properties may be placed in a particular 
relation to one another; there must be a “specifiable difference of locus”1 
between them. Without this possibility recognition of such properties could 
not occur, since to be recognised by a single consciousness requires room for 
comparison between them such as to allow for their identity to be made 
manifest. And to link up with our discussion above of a “background matrix” 
or “grid”, we might say that without the potential for being placed relative to 
one another such properties as there might be could not be conceived of as 
participating in the same grid. That is, no recognition of a relation could arise. 
The additional important qualification here is that despite the parallel 
structure between the argument for the necessity of both space and time, there 
is still an asymmetry. The argument for space above still requires the capacity 
for individuating a spatial network in terms of a range of places where 
properties might be realised. The fundamental mechanism here is still 
temporal; individuation of a spatial framework still requires, more 
fundamentally, temporality.  
It might help at this point to review the account of a unified, objective 
framework proposed by reconsidering the shape of Sacks’s transcendental 
argument. An argument similar to that presented at the opening of this 
section can be found in Chapter 7 of Objectivity and Insight: 
 
i. We have (at least some) heterogeneous experiences. 
ii. It is a condition of the possibility of having heterogeneous experiences 
that there is a permanent spatio-temporal order. 
iii. There is an abiding spatio-temporal structure.2 
 
Now, as we noted briefly above, it still appears that this argument, insofar as 
it is representative of the account given thus far, is open to Stroud’s 
                                                
1 Sacks, Objectivity and Insight: p. 242.  
2 This argument is similar to that presented in op. cit.: p. 271. 
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Challenge. There is however a route we can take to an argument for the 
“condition of self-awareness” which was alluded to in the third kind of 
recognition as mentioned briefly above, via the considerations of Sacks’s 
version of the argument for substance of the First Analogy.1 This later version 
of Sacks’s reconstruction employs the notion of situated thought and is thus a 
stronger argument with additional ramifications for the broader account 
proposed here. The reconstruction begins with the consideration of a 
proposition similar to the “central move” of Kant’s First Analogy: 
 
“All change is merely the alteration of an underlying substance.”2 
 
It is claimed that this proposition appears to be a piece of “metaphysical 
dogma”, that is, until the purported a priori truth of the statement is taken to 
be “expressive of a situated thought”.3 Here we have recourse to the general 
approach Sacks takes toward transcendental proof. Sacks’s curious 
employment of the example similar to Husserl’s “apple tree standing in the 
garden” can be embellished to supply us with an explanation of the tie 
between thought about “substance” and the situatedness of a thinker thinking 
about “substance”. The example involves considering the circumstance of a 
tree in front of us which has just gone up in smoke; an event the recognition 
of which requires some comprehension of a perceptual backdrop sufficient to 
sustain the thought of a continuous surrounds for the event, the kind that 
would be necessary to place the event spatio-temporally in relation to other 
objects, events, and properties.   
Sacks’s emphasis is here on the fact that merely entertaining the 
propositional content articulable of such an event, namely “there was a tree in 
the garden, and now there is not a tree in the garden” will not allow for full 
recognition of what is involved in such a happening in our perceptual life; a 
recognition of what is required to sustain the occurrence of such a happening, 
                                                
1 As quoted from Sacks, The Nature of Transcendental Arguments: p. 442. 
2 Op. cit.: p. 447. 
3 Ibid. 
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or event. Instead, to emphasise the role of situated thought, we must again 
come to see what would be involved in apprehending such a perceptual 
occurrence or event; in Sacks’s terms, we need to think ourselves into what it 
would take to be beholden to such a perception. In this case, we need to 
understand what sustains the perception of the disappearance of the tree, 
followed by the plume of smoke, and further, followed by a perception of the 
tree’s absence in the spatial region where the tree stood moments prior; that 
is, precisely the kind of abiding substratum which we have been for. The key 
move is to insist on the perceiver’s situatedness in that framework (or 
substratum). We can look to Sacks remarks on this to elucidate: 
 
“for the situated thought to make sense, it would have to be thought that there is, 
throughout, something in front of me, a perceptual backdrop, such that the demise of 
the tree is an event, an alteration, of that underlying substrate.”1 
 
This is because 
 
“For the change between there being a tree in the garden at t1 and there being no tree 
in the garden at t2 to be given within the confines of one situated thought, there must 
be presupposed, within the domain that the thought encompasses, an abiding spatio-
temporal world.”2 
 
Given this, and in alignment with the Kantian thought quoted above (“All 
change is merely the alteration of an underlying substance”3), taken to be 
expressive of the central move of the First Analogy, we ought to feel the force 
of the argument even if the exact letter of Kant’s version is unacceptable. As 
we noticed above in our analysis of the notion of an abiding substratum, such 
a notion might function as a suitable alternative to Kant’s notion of an 
“underlying substance” and thus free us from any seeming commitment to an 
untenable metaphysical doctrine.  
                                                
1 Ibid. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
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The device of situated thought makes it seem promising that the notion of 
an abiding substratum is fully coherent and is necessary for perceptions of the 
kind we have been discussing due to the way in which an a priori move can 
be made from the statement “things change” to “there must be some object 
that is invariant underlying such a change”. The way in which the move from 
the first statement to the second can be made a priori can be evidenced by 
considering the situatedness of both thoughts; thinking oneself into what it 
would take to apprehend the first thought brings out the extent to which the 
second thought is accessible by an a priori move. Consider the example of the 
tree. The statement “things change”, which represents a thought one would 
have in the case of the disappearing tree, provides access to the claim for a 
form of invariance—either as substance or as an abiding framework—since 
such a thought about change can only arise if the (at least implicit) notion of a 
perceptual backdrop is in place. Simply put, the notion of change can only be 
rendered coherent if there is some kind of continuity, something unchanged 
in relation to the object about which change is predicated. Additionally, the 
notions of variance and invariance depend on the relations between events 
evidencing such phenomena and the subject in relation to which those events 
are situated in terms of the same framework.  
To return to our criticism of Sacks above, we can raise doubts once more as 
to whether situated thought is entirely effective in strengthening the kernel of 
the First Analogy. We might find ourselves troubled by the prospect that it is 
simply the appearance of a thought’s reliance on a perceptual backdrop to 
render it coherent that is needed. But what could this mean? To say that it is 
enough to have the impression of a thought’s being about a world which is 
necessarily structured spatio-temporally (in four dimensions) is to have quite 
missed the point pressed thus far. Suppose the extended form of the objection 
involves postulating a world consisting of random, unconnected happenings 
entirely devoid of collective participation in an abiding substratum or, in the 
Kantian register, “substance”. It is not simply that this world would fall short 
of the basic requirements for a possible perception, let alone a string of related 
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possible perceptions; it is not simply that we could not conceive of an 
experience that would be had of a world like this, although this is indeed true; 
it is rather that the structure of such a world falls short of the requirements for 
a world that could sustain the existence of rational, active subjects. We might 
say with Strawson that the problem’s existence is dependent on its solution 
(as is so with “all transcendental arguments”1); the imaginative case conjured 
by the sceptic can be seen as arising out of a far more comfortable commerce 
with the actual world.  
Despite its appeal, this is a familiar and unsatisfying reply to the basic 
concern arising from attempts on the transcendental project2 and it has been 
thematic thus far that replies to sceptic of this form which skirt the issue or 
attempt to dissolve it in weakened versions of transcendental argumentation 
are not to be relied upon. We can come now to the stronger reply which 
depends upon an argument, more Hegelian than Kantian in orientation, to 
explain the further depth we can give to the background of the argument for 
an abiding substratum as sustaining spatio-temporal thought about a unified, 
objective world. This argument will link up with Strawson’s project in 
Individuals in Chapter 4 insofar as it makes a case for the primitive nature of 
the category “persons”, albeit in a somewhat different manner.  
 
3.4.2 The Condition of Self-Awareness 
 
We can begin by considering the fourth example of a transcendental 
argument as quoted from Sacks above in Section 3.2: 
 
“If self-awareness is to arise, I must recognize others as themselves persons 
who (can) recognize me.”3 
 
                                                
1 Strawson, Individuals: p. 40. 
2 I say “arising from” because, as I have stated at numerous points, external world scepticism 
was arguably not Kant’s main motivation for constructing his transcendental philosophy. 
3 Sacks, The Nature of Transcendental Arguments: p. 442. 
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We might feel tempted to accommodate this conditional within a modus 
ponens argument thusly: 
 
i. We1 are self-aware.  
ii. It is a necessary condition of self-awareness that I recognize others as 
themselves persons who (can) recognize me. 
iii. Therefore, I recognize others as themselves persons who (can) 
recognize me. 
 
As a preliminary way of bringing out the general intended force of this point, 
consider the account above given in 3.4.1 regarding the notion of a necessary 
abiding substratum, or background matrix or grid onto which all domains of 
presentation—the minimal conception of experience—must be plotted to be 
anything for us. We saw there that a fairly thorough analysis can be given 
which seemed to suggest the necessity of such a framework if we are to have 
experience. However, as we also saw, Stroud’s Challenge seemed to rear its 
head once more due to the fact that this reconstruction—as generally quite 
Strawsonian in spirit—appeared to rest on the assumption that it was enough 
to have a framework that we were merely required to suppose. That is, the 
account above still seemed like it would be open to the challenge that this was 
merely a conception of experience we believed was necessary—not one that 
was actually shown to be necessary.  
It seems fair enough at this point that one might feel this dilemma to be 
irresolvable. For what exactly can be intended by making the distinction 
between, on the one hand, a mere conception of the minimal structure of 
experience we believe is necessary and, on the other, an actual minimal 
structure of experience? How would we find out about the latter and in what 
way could this be different to our finding out about to the former? It seems 
that finding out about the latter would require crossing the 
                                                
1 I say “we” simply because saying “I am self-aware” would be in conflict with the central 
point to be pressed in this section.  
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appearance/reality gap and this is precisely the gap to be explained—or, 
perhaps, reconceived. Additionally, saying something about “reality” in the 
sense in which we are tempted to take that term here just seems to run afoul 
not merely of Kant’s principle of significance, but of the whole distinction 
pressed upon thus far between the philosophical and non-philosophical 
senses of limitation; between epistemic conditions and cognitive faculties. The 
turning point in the argument is that the difference here is between a 
posteriori and a priori forms of knowledge; finding out about the necessary 
minimal structure of experience requires a priori investigation whereas talk 
about physical limitations is merely a posteriori. This kind of claim has been 
made before and has indeed been ill-received by most. It is now incumbent 
upon us to attempt a radical revision of Kant’s point by way of a Hegelian 
move. 
  The best way to bolster the argument above in 3.4.1 is by showing how 
the condition of self-awareness underwrites the recognition of a spatio-
temporal framework as argued for above. It must be noted that in doing this 
we do not unravel the line of thought pushed thus far which indicates that 
any transcendental argument which moved from the premise of apperception 
to the conclusion of the necessity of a unified, objective world was ill-
conceived. Indeed, under the Kantian conception this line of thought looks 
tautological since apperception cannot be made intelligible without the notion 
of a unified, objective world; thus, having the two at opposite ends of a 
syllogism must be disallowed. What we have here is an altogether different 
reading of what self-consciousness is and how it comes about. The argument 
runs thus: 
 
(1) Confrontation with a world of mere objects cannot, on its own, produce 
self-conscious thought.1 
                                                
1 This relates to what we noted earlier about the significance of the difference between the 
forms of recognition mentioned in Section 3.4.1.  
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(2) Communion with like-minded entities is required for the existence of a 
language. 
(3) Language usage (in the full-blown rational sense of conceptual, 
systematic thought) is not possible without self-consciousness (in the 
full-blown rational capacity to reflect on one’s own experience—
possibly to think of it as a subjective route through an objective 
world)—it is in fact inherently bound up with it. 
(4) Recognising another subject (who is also an object in the world) as such 
a subject who thus recognises oneself as a subject (and an object in the 
world) is a necessary condition for self-consciousness. 
(5) Self-consciousness requires that one is aware of oneself as a locus of 
abilities to act and, also, as an empirical object in the world that can be 
acted upon. 
(6) Conscious thought—for a self-conscious being—which thus requires 
the capacity to individuate a spatio-temporal framework, is derivative 
of being able to think of oneself as such a being. 
(7) The capacity to identify and re-identify (conceived of as static) objects 
and properties in a framework requires that the one so identifying and 
re-identifying is in dynamic relations with other like-minded beings.1  
(8) The original perceptual objects—the geneses of conceptual thought—are 
subjects of mutual recognition. 
 
Now, the end-point of this argument seems to leave us with perhaps an 
unacceptable identification of consciousness with self-consciousness. As 
should be plainly obvious, the major dilemmas arising from dissolving the  
distinction that is possible here are ethical ones which pertain to thinking of 
non-human animals and insufficiently mature human animals as without 
consciousness—and by implication, without the awareness of important 
phenomena in one’s mental life such as pain. It is an ever-important reminder 
                                                
1 Here “static” is not meant to denote spatio-temporally fixed, but rather lack of a mind or 
similar capacity for principled action. Correlatively, we might suppose that the term 
“dynamic” suggests mindedness.  
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that this is a mere generalisation, a drawing of a sharp line where there is 
rather a blurry boundary, between conceptual and non-conceptual thinking. 
To claim that those without fully-rational thought have no experience, or no 
consciousness, is a crude simplification. There is not only the whole issue of 
the period of transition between different forms of both non-conceptual and 
conceptual thinking, but also of deciding what precisely constitutes such 
forms of thinking.1 Unfortunately, this is no place to deal with those 
fascinating questions so we will have to content ourselves with the general 
idea expressed above; that there is, at the extreme ends of the scale of 
linguistic capability, an incommensurability between the related forms of 
thinking—conceptual and non-conceptual thinking. We can say no more 
about this matter here. 
At this point we appear to have moved from one point on the 
transcendental landscape to another. The problem of the external world seems 
to have been circumvented and the problem of other minds seems to have—at 
this juncture—potential for taking its place. For the question would now 
appear to be “How do we know which objects in the world are other 
subjects?” and “How do we really know that they have minds?” Thus it 
appears that external world scepticism might slip back into place; if we cannot 
be sure that the empirical objects we take to be like-minded subjects are such, 
then the global sceptic seems to take over once more.2 However, it helps to 
here set out more explicitly a few strong theses as regards the argument for 
recognition: 
 
(1) Self-conscious thought and language—in the fully rational sense—
presuppose mutual recognition. 
(2) Empirical thought presupposes the capacity for reflective thought, 
since being able to think of one’s experience as a subjective route 
                                                
1 Indeed, much of this issue can be rightly allocated to developmental psychology and 
evolutionary biology. 
2 As a general historical remark this might look like the problem seemingly faced by 
Husserl—that problem which Hegel managed to avoid. I say “seemingly” because this is a 
debated issue.  
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through an objective world requires one to be able to think of objects of 
empirical thought (perhaps imaginatively1) in a multitude of perhaps 
un-experienced contexts.  
(3) The richness of one’s conception, or empirical thought, about 
properties or objects, is determined by the richness of the discourse 
potentially to be had about them; as understood by oneself as 
potentially to be had. Thus, the issue is not whether a non-rational 
animal experiences a different block of wood—merely a “less rich” block 
of wood.2 
 
3.4.3 Difficulties and Resolutions 
 
We can begin to see some problems arise with the notion of situated 
thought. A prima facie worry is the seemingly obvious objection: “The notion 
of situated thought was introduced to divert the concern of transcendental 
arguments turning into pieces of reasoning that turned on the mere conception 
we must have of our experience (Stroud’s Challenge). However, the notion of 
situated thought could be likewise attacked insofar as it can be countered that 
this notion too could be thought of as the necessary conception we must have 
of empirical thought and of ourselves as thinkers in order to make coherent 
transcendental proof.” I recognise the gravity of this counter-argument, yet 
insist that the notion of situated thought is left untouched by it. Let us see 
why. 
In 3.4.1 I explored a classic case of what has been called “transcendental 
proof” and which we saw, in the stronger case represented by Sacks’s account 
in The Nature of Transcendental Arguments, to rely on the notion of situated 
                                                
1 This can be taken in two broad senses. The common-sense notion of imagination seems to 
include creativity in the sense of exploration of aesthetic possibility; the more technical sense 
here is the slightly more Kantian notion of imagination as that which allows for one to 
reproduce in reflective thought a potentially realisable empirical state of affairs vis-à-vis the 
object in question. Both senses are of interest and relevance here although the Kantian sense is 
more important since it might be seen to underlie the former conception.  
2 Unfortunately, we cannot address all the questions which this way of putting the point 
raises. 
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thought. I admit the force of the above objection on account of 3.4.1, yet I do 
not feel such a threat with regard to 3.4.2. In fact, I believe that it is precisely 
the fact that 3.4.2 explores an argument that is not Kantian in orientation that 
we may take it as immune from the sceptical worry. The first subsection 
(3.4.1) dealt with a more or less definitive case of transcendental proof 
inasmuch as it explored the necessary conditions of the possibility of unified 
objective experience. The second sub-section (3.4.2) does indeed explore 
something like a necessary condition of unified, objective experience although 
I suggest that it does more than this. The master-thought at the heart of 3.4.2 
is that self-consciousness is tied to intersubjectivity. This master-thought is 
Hegelian and admitting the power of it entirely transforms the landscape of 
the transcendental project. 
Before we explore the consequences of this change in orientation, it is 
helpful to be reminded of a few points. Accepting the power of 3.4.2 and 
taking it to be the centrepiece of a theory about the necessary conditions of 
self-consciousness and also the necessary conditions of experience of a 
unified, objective world, does not negate the truthfulness of other classic cases 
of transcendental proof which might be explored; it merely bolsters them with 
an entirely different mode of anti-sceptical force. This anti-sceptical force 
derives from the truism that we only know ourselves in our dealings with 
others; we only possess language because we are in commerce with other 
similar beings; we are only able to recognise ourselves as subjects—who are 
also physical objects—because we are recognised as such by similar subjects 
who we recognise as recognising us—and, quite profoundly, recognise 
ourselves in such subjects’ recognition of us. This is no place for exploring the 
complexities of Hegelian dialectic although these brief points are enough to 
establish the general idea that 3.4.2 provides us with a case of transcendental 
proof, indeed reliant on situated thought, that resists the objection I noted 
above.  
To qualify further, one could not coherently raise the following objection: 
“Well, perhaps all experience requires is for one to have the conception of 
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oneself as being recognised by another subject—who is also an object in the 
world—thereby having the mere conception (or belief, perhaps erroneous) of 
recognising another subject and the mere conception that one recognises 
oneself in such a subject’s recognition of oneself?” since it should be plain that 
the very notion of intersubjectivity cannot be seen to, as it were, arise from 
nowhere. It is not as if we could construct the materials in our own 
consciousness to sustain the idea of another subject—somehow in terms of 
extrapolating from the multiplicity of items or mental states to the idea of 
multiplicity of beings like ourselves. This cannot be made intelligible since the 
conception of the former, as articulated here, is not possible without the latter. 
Apart from many other objections which might be raised against this 
counterargument, the idea is that, without external criteria, one does not have 
the materials to even recognise such a starting point in one’s consciousness—
in terms of there being mental states—which would presumably constitute 
the kind of phenomena from which one would make the extrapolation (in this 
case, supposedly fanciful) to the existence of other subjects. 
It is important to here pre-empt a familiar kind of objection. It has been 
said that making self-consciousness inherently intersubjective opens one up to 
the historicising of consciousness—a process which purportedly rids such 
consciousness of any kernel the kind of which is seemingly required for 
transcendental philosophy (as a form of foundationalism) to make sense. That 
is, if the structure of self-consciousness (and thus consciousness for self-
conscious beings) is shaped by the kind of intersubjective relations one enters 
into—the linguistic case perhaps being most salient, but not necessarily, 
although this of course depends on our understanding of “linguistic” which 
may or may not stop at the ordinary notion of “conceptual”—then it appears 
as if such a structure can have no a priori conditions of its possibility. Indeed, 
it costs little to give up on Kant’s argument in the Metaphysical Deduction, 
yet to relinquish the account given there of priori concepts is not therefore to 
relinquish the possibility of synthetic a priori judgment. As it was a task of 
our concern with the notion of situated thought to show, synthetic a priori 
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judgment can be brought into the picture through a certain conception of 
what it takes for a thinker to be such as to have a thought; we saw that this 
structure revealed a peculiar relationship between being so situated as to have 
a thought and the notion of the content of such a thought had by a subject 
thusly situated. The qualifier here in the form of intersubjective recognition is 
even more primitive – although in a bizarre way might seem to invite 
suggestion that it also relies on a more primitive conception of the former idea. 
That is, if one only becomes self-consciously aware through recognition of 
another subject’s recognition of oneself and hence recognition of oneself in 
such another subject’s recognition, then is the idea of recognition of a spatio-
temporal object—the other subject—primary and prior? It takes care to see 
why this simply isn’t so. 
The act of apprehending a spatio-temporal object in the sense suggested 
here is not the kind of apprehension of a spatio-temporal object one might 
think of a being not in possession of conceptual and rational capacities as 
having; the idea is that for self-consciousness to arise there must be a 
transition from mere sentience to full-blown sapience,1 and the idea is that 
this must occur all at once and be, in a sense, irreversible, insofar as 
advancing to the conceptual level means we give up on the primitive notion 
of one-to-one relations between word and world only sustained by a 
stimulus-response form of training for non-rational beings. The idea is that we 
are not stuck with having to explain how we go from self-consciously 
perceiving things that look like subjects to thinking to ourselves “Am I to 
recognise this as a subject recognising me, and am I therefore opened up to 
the domain of rational enquiry and thus inculcated into conceptual thinking?” 
This is to put the cart before the horse. Of course we may raise the question of 
whether some physical object is, say, either a tree or a person, yet for this form 
of thinking to exist we must already have been inculcated into a linguistic 
tradition which as I have said, presupposes intersubjective recognition. It is as 
                                                
1 I am deeply concerned with the complexities involved in the idea of a ‘transition’ although 
there is hardly space to treat this compelling issue here. 
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if there is some—for now—inexplicable point at which the transition is made, 
and when it is made, it is made all at once in a form analogous to the 
transition from sentience to sapience.1  
That is all the digression we can afford at this juncture; a return to the main 
theme must occur. 
 
3.5 Transcendental Proof and Transcendental Idealism 
 
Through the foregoing reconstruction we have seen how much in the 
realm of transcendentalism is still viable given a sufficiently sensitive 
treatment. Our main goal now is to focus on the connection between the 
account of transcendental proof given, via the notion of “situated thought”, 
and the “core set of theses” taken to be contained within transcendental 
idealism (as interpreted in terms of the general spirit of the two-aspect view), 
to which we have referred at numerous points. As we noted earlier, the notion 
of “situated thought” is taken here to be a more primitive notion than that of 
“epistemic conditions”. Our general reason for this, as hinted at thus far, is 
that the notion of “situated thought” stands to explain certain general 
intuitions about the structure of our experience which, upon closer inspection, 
reveal it as having quite a novel character and, in some deep sense, guided by 
practical demands (in the case of being able to not only move through space—
across time of course—but also able to have a priori knowledge of how we fit, 
as an embodied subject, into the spatio-temporal framework of our 
experience). The structure of our experience evidenced by the notion of 
“situated thought” was in this way shown to be constrained by epistemic 
conditions—such conditions as were contained in the fact of our experience 
having the structure which examining the notion of “situated thought” 
showed it to have. Given this thought, it becomes immediately apparent how 
the “core set of theses” taken to be an expression (or extension) of the two-
aspect reading of transcendental idealism stands to be established by taken 
                                                
1 This way of looking at the issue raises the curious question for developmental psychology as 
to what some actual physical factors might be in this “transition”. 
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the notion of “situated thought” as our clue. Let us examine this thought by 
way of enumerating the basic structure claimed for our experience and 
knowledge by the notion of “situated thought”. 
 
(1) The basic claim of transcendental idealism, under the two-aspect view, 
is that our knowledge claims must be limited possible experience. This 
phrase is taken to mean that our claims about experiential objects, for 
example, must be taken in terms of the “conditions of the possibility” 
of these objects appearing to us as they do. That is, any claims or 
judgments about these objects may be taken as implicitly accompanied 
by the phrase “under the aspect in which we experience them”. Kant’s 
principle of epistemological modesty is thus read as a claim about the 
epistemic conditions inherent in our experience and knowledge claims 
or judgments about it. This claim is to be contrasted with the two-
world (or, two-object) view which takes our experiential claims as 
about different objects than the ones which we typically think of as 
making up the real world. These opposing claims are familiar enough 
by now for a summary to be sufficient.  
The point revealed to us by the examination of the notion of “situated    
thought” is that we can move from the fairly obscure epistemic 
register of the original Kantian claim (under the two-aspect view) that 
our experience is constrained by epistemic conditions, to the somewhat 
clearer claim that our experience and our knowledge of the empirical 
world, is structured in terms of certain a priori knowledge we have of 
that world and, which knowledge is shaped by the inherent link 
between our perception of the world and our actions within it.  
We attempted to demonstrate this point, perhaps insufficiently, by our 
examination of what appeared to be certain a priori knowledge we had 
of spatial relations. We saw that this a priori knowledge was in some 
way to be related to the Sellarsian/Brandomian conception of material 
inference—although such a relation was quite suggestive and pointed 
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more to what additional work needs to be done to clarify the mechanics 
here, than to a definitive solution to our troubles. 
 
(2) The claim that all knowledge must be indexed to possible experience 
carried with it the additional idea, as alluded to by the reference to 
spatial relations above, that such a conception of experience had a 
particular character, the structure of which was taken to be 
demonstrated by the account of situated thought. This structure was 
likened to the structure Kant imputed to possible experience in one 
way, and contrasted with it in another. Let us examine these in turn. 
The point of contact with Kant came in the assertion for the necessity   
of experience necessarily having a spatio-temporal form. We phrased 
the point in Strawsonian terminology by talking of a “unified, 
objective world” which allowed for the identification and re-
identification of items in a framework which would admit of such (this 
corresponds to Strawson’s notion of the “thesis of objectivity” as 
articulated in The Bounds of Sense). This insistence on experience 
necessarily being shaped by the structural properties of a framework 
of this kind, such as would meet the appropriate identification/re-
identification demands, was shown mainly in the discussion of Sacks’s 
transcendental argument for an “abiding substratum” in Section 3.4.1. 
We also linked that conception, however, to the account we gave of 
situated thought in Section 3.2 where we saw the idea of perceptual 
experience, as articulated there, as relying on the possibility of such 
identification/re-identification as referred to. 
The divergence from Kant consists in how the notion of a priori 
concepts has been viewed. We have noted at various points the 
unattractive nature of Kant’s arguments (if we may be permitted to call 
them so) in the Metaphysical Deduction and have taken care to insist 
that it is possible to read the Transcendental Deduction as moving from 
a premise containing an assertion for “empirical knowledge” to a 
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conclusion insisting on a transcendentally ideal model of knowledge, 
without committing to a particular account of a priori concepts along 
the way. For our purposes here, due mainly to reasons of space and 
focus, we can deal with this particular issue by according it appropriate 
recognition and leaving the matter somehow open. As we discussed in 
our allusions to Hegel’s arguments in Chapter 4 of the Phenomenology of 
Spirit, we can perhaps take the view that there is something like an a 
priori structure for concepts—not particular concepts themselves, yet 
perhaps something analogous to the functions which determine their 
shape, not the particular shape of the concepts themselves (ignoring the 
opacity of this claim for present purposes)—which can be seen to 
generate from the necessary conditions of the possibility 
(transcendental conditions) of rational thought and experience; 
something in the Hegelian model that is taken to be dependent upon 
intersubjectivity. 
 
(3) A third “core thesis” of transcendental idealism which can be 
mentioned here is the other main thesis taken by Strawson to be 
essential to the Transcendental Deduction: the “thesis of the necessary 
unity of consciousness”, which effectively relates to Kant’s notion of 
apperception. The idea is that I must be able to self-consciously unite 
or unify all my thought contents—such as to maintain a logical order 
among all my beliefs—so that such thought contents or beliefs might 
coherently count as my own.  
We saw this notion of self-consciousness extended from the apparently 
formal conception in Kant to what we thought of as a, perhaps, material 
conception of self-consciousness which required reference to actual 
other subjects—such as the existence of which was taken to be a 
necessary condition of the possibility (a transcendental condition, 
perhaps the ultimate transcendental condition) of rational thought and 
self-conscious, reflective experience.  
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Now, it is in this last “core thesis” taken to be expressive of an insight 
in transcendental idealism which we find trouble; for certainly this 
thesis is not Kantian, and henceforth our references to it as a “core 
thesis” of transcendental idealism are dubious. However, one main 
task of the reconstruction of transcendental proof here has been to 
extend the conception of the transcendental from Kant, to what we 
might think of its fullest expression. In this way, our reading of the 
transcendental as extendable from Kant to Hegel mirrors those recent 
readings of Hegel as “completing” Kant, or bringing Kant’s Copernican 
Revolution to its logical conclusion.1 
This last suggestion is ambitious and we are not able to defend it here. 
It has merely been our aim to show how tension shows itself when 
attempting to account for the Kantian notion of “transcendental”, as in 
attempts of many other kinds which aim to bring into clearer focus 
what the consequences of Kantian ways of thinking are. 
 
What picture do we then have of the transcendental landscape from this 
point? Let us run through the main themes of the argument thus far. We 
began with the question of how we might reconstruct transcendental 
argumentation, by involving transcendental proof. By examining strategies in 
the literature we came to see the need for an approach that reinvigorated the 
strength inherent in the original Kantian project without commitment to the 
totality of Kant’s views. This thought took us through a reconstructive 
attempt at formulating a sound basis for transcendental proof by way of 
considering the notion of “situated thought”. We found there to be numerous 
Strawsonian strategies worth appropriating with an added element of faith in 
a re-interpreted version of transcendental idealism, under the two-aspect 
view. This account, however, appeared under threat from a persistent 
sceptical doubt labelled here as “Stroud’s Challenge”. We then made a 
                                                
1 As we referred to above, works in this vein include Pippin, Hegel’s Idealism: The Satisfactions 
of Self-Consciousness and Redding, Hegel’s Hermeneutics. 
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transition to a Hegelian mode of thinking which involved a consideration of 
how the notion of “situated thought” itself could become philosophically 
viable. This involved an investigation into the genesis of the link between 
perception and action; an investigation into the mutual starting point for 
intentional action and conscious thought; the same place at which we found 
the impetus for linguistic development and thus the formulation of 
conceptual thinking. 
It is now at this point that we need to consider a further elaboration of this 
idea. This will involve engagement with Strawson’s project in Individuals; self-
described as “descriptive metaphysics”. We might tentatively conceive of the 
strengthened reconstruction of Strawson’s version of transcendental 
argumentation so far proposed as leading toward a rewritten basis for 
descriptive metaphysics. This hope for reformulation should carry us forward 
into the next chapter.  
 
4 Rewriting the Basis for a Descriptive Metaphysics 
 
 
In the first part of his book Individuals, Strawson argues that there are 
certain particulars such as persons and material bodies that are necessary and 
fundamental features of our conceptual scheme. These particulars are thought 
of as playing a role in our thought such that we could not make all the 
identifying references we do make without reference to them, and, 
additionally, reference to which is claimed to not rely on reference to other 
particulars of any kind.  Through the arguments I have advanced thus far 
regarding the necessary minimal structure of experience, a picture has 
emerged in which it appears that—in a philosophically interesting and 
important, and not in a merely platitudinous or truistic sense—a structure 
similar to that which Strawson argues for in Individuals is not a mere 
contingent curiosity of our conceptual scheme, but instead is a necessary 
feature of anything that could intelligibly be called experience; not merely in 
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the sense of what fits our definition of experience such that different kinds of 
experience might be conceived of or regarded as possible, but rather in the 
sense that no other shape for thought aiming at knowledge or representation 
of the world or discourse about it is possible.  
We might think of my account here as departing from a delineation of 
merely “formal conditions of the possibility of experience” and setting out to 
also indicate “material conditions of the possibility of experience”. “Formal 
conditions of the possibility of experience” could be thought of as paralleling 
the generally “austere” account given by Strawson in The Bounds of Sense 
which, for its own part, concurs with at least one side of Kant’s transcendental 
enterprise. For despite the unique form of its expression, Strawson’s 
reconstruction of Kant no doubt retains some central Kantian theses, some of 
which Kant himself might have endorsed as long as such theses were 
qualified and bolstered by additional claims. Also, and at least superficially, 
the notion of “formal conditions” would seem to agree with both the Kantian 
idea that the “form” (not the “matter”) of cognition is designed entirely by 
sensibility and the understanding, as well as the Kantian idea that the “I of 
apperception” attaches itself apparently only formally to self-ascribed 
cognition (in terms of the “I think”) and does not figure obviously in any 
more substantial sense vis-à-vis our thought.  
Conversely, the phrase “material conditions of the possibility of 
experience” seems to denote a metaphysical qualification with respect to the 
shape of our thinking. Indeed, it might be supposed that Kant would have 
endorsed certain “material conditions” vis-à-vis our thought, and in fact such 
an interpretation of the significance of the Third Analogy, in particular, has 
been given by Jeffrey Edwards in his book Substance, Force, and the Possibility 
of Knowledge.1 However, we are unable to delve into the detail of such an 
account here so we must say merely that there is perhaps some—unobvious—
way that Kant might be read as attempting to provide such “material 
                                                
1 Jeffrey Edwards (2000) Substance, Force, and the Possibility of Knowledge: On Kant’s Philosophy 
of Material Nature, University of California Press. 
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conditions”. Despite this, the main claim here is that with reference to the 
Transcendental Deduction, it is not manifestly clear this was Kant’s aim—
something which is made at least prima facie evident in Kant’s talk of the bare 
fact of attaching the “I think” to all my representations, where failure to 
satisfy this condition results in failure to be self-conscious in particular cases 
as referred to.  
The superficial force of this point is levelled at Kant’s reluctance to commit 
to a more substantial account of what is required for self-conscious thought 
about a unified, objective world to obtain. The briefly-stated attempted 
corrective voiced in Section 3.4.2 intended to show how a Hegelian 
transcendental proof could be employed to demonstrate the necessity of actual 
intersubjective relations for self-conscious thought about a unified, objective 
world and thus, attempted to show how self-conscious thought was materially 
dependent on the existence of and commerce with other subjects and not 
merely formally dependent on the self-ascription of states of consciousness. In 
fact, the idea is that Kant’s formal requirement is essential, yet is to be 
supplemented by, and recognised as dependent upon, the Hegelian 
corrective. 
In this chapter, we need to explore some of the detail of a few arguments 
presented in the first part of Individuals and attempt to draw a parallel to the 
suggestive references to Hegel already made, and to show what further 
conclusions might be drawn. The general strategy is to spell out in a little 
more detail the distinction between the account here of the proposed 
“material conditions” of a unified, objective experience—understood as a 
fully rational, self-conscious experience of a world, entailing capacities for 
reflection—and the “formal” account proposed by Strawson in both The 
Bounds of Sense and Individuals. Hence, the proposal in the previous chapter 
for a kind of transcendental proof which holds a place for synthetic a priori 
judgment, in virtue of the former’s reliance on situated thought, may be 
extended and strengthened by stating what implications this proposal has for 
understanding the relationship between perception and action; between the 
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epistemic and what we might call the “agency-relative” aspects of a subject or 
person. We observed some general and briefly stated reasons for endorsing a 
claim like this in 3.4.2 and we need to say a little more by here linking our 
reference to the necessary role of other subjects in our thought to Strawson’s 
insistence on the logical primitiveness of the concept of a person as stated in 
Chapter 3 of Individuals. 
The parallel to be drawn with Strawson’s account of “Particulars” in the 
first half of Individuals has two parts: (1) the proposal for the concept of a 
person being logically primitive is paralleled here by derivatives of the 
assertion that a picture of a unified, objective world only falls into place once 
the conditions of intersubjectivity are fulfilled; the term “person” is thus seen 
as the generative concept of any conception of a unified, objective world of 
experience in a material and not merely formal sense.1 In Strawson’s case, the 
argument for the necessary primitiveness of that concept stems from the 
rejection of the idea of a solipsistic consciousness, and indeed, the corollary of 
that motivating idea here is precisely the suggestion for the dependence of the 
individual consciousness on its relations to other individual consciousnesses; 
(2) the argument for the necessity of a certain structure inherent in our 
conceptual scheme can be extended by arguing for the necessity of a certain 
structure necessarily inherent in any form of thought. This can be done by 
firstly changing the terms of the transcendental argument from those only 
aimed at establishing the necessity of a certain structure inherent in our 
conceptual scheme to those aimed at establishing the linkage between thought 
and intersubjectivity and by claiming the reliance of the former (under a 
demanding conception entailing appropriate conceptual or linguistic 
sophistication regarded as rational) on the latter.  
                                                
1 We need to take care in evaluating this assertion since it can quite easily be taken to mean 
more than it does mean. The idea is that having a unified, objective world-view depends on 
having adequate linguistic capacities for identification of items in such a world in addition to 
reflective capacities which themselves both depend on intersubjective relations with other 
subjects with whom one shares such a language that is in turn employed for such 
“identificatory” and reflective purposes. 
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The relevant conjecture is that a case can be made for the existence of a 
primitive structure inherent in any form of thought which generates from the 
same point as thought itself—at the crucial transition from sentience to 
sapience. This primitive structure will show itself to relate to what we might 
call the “dialectical” or “dialogical” form of all thought, yet will insist on its 
status as being firmly ahistorical.1 The appropriate structure will indeed 
retain transcendental form2 even though it is generated through commerce 
with other subjects; the significance of this being the possibility of articulation 
of a logical form for thought which is both non-egological and ahistorical. 
That is, a form of thought that is not “egological”,3 where this term indicates 
the existence of an internal logical structure contained in the mind of 
individual subjects independent of the intersubjective relations they bear to 
other subjects (a paradigm case of which is Kant’s account in the so-called 
Metaphysical Deduction), yet also not “historical”, where this latter term 
seems to relativise all claims to truth and meaning to particular languages to 
the point of obscuring or threatening the idea that we can coherently talk 
about the basis for a shared world view which is “goes beyond” the 
individual culture of language in which we are caught up. 
                                                
1 Thus the common fear felt regarding Hegel’s “historicising” of consciousness need not 
apply to the kernel of the claim that the logical structure of thought depends on 
intersubjectivity. It is possible to claim that consciousness is in an important sense dependent 
on historical factors (i.e., the history of our concepts, practices, etc.) yet still maintain that a 
kernel of logical truth exists in the statement that thought (as we conceive of that term) does 
not arise for subjectively isolated beings. In Chapter 4 of Objectivity and Insight Sacks raises 
this concern regarding the “historicising” of consciousness, as well as the validity of certain 
claims vis-à-vis rationality. He does not seem to have considered the option I explore here by 
interpreting the kernel of Hegel’s theory of subjectivity (and thus intersubjectivity and 
objectivity) as immune, in a peculiar way, from this apparent threat.  
2 Here we can suggest a re-evaluation of what “transcendental” ought to mean. If the shape of 
this argument is still in terms of the “conditions of the possibility” of thought, language, and 
consciousness and so on, why assume that the rejection of an egological model of the mind 
(see footnote directly below) should mean the usage of “transcendental” is void?  
3 I borrow the term “egological” from Sacks, Objectivity and Insight, where it is used 
throughout, although primarily in Chapter 4. 
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The explication of this idea will involve suggestive references to Hegel’s 
arguments in the first four chapters of the Phenomenology of Spirit,1 which 
themselves, I think, can be taken to demonstrate some of the ways such a 
structure may be generated and in what sense that structure serves to shape 
both perception of, and action in2 the world of which one’s thought is about.3  
This is to claim that there is a universal and necessary form to all possible 
languages and forms of thought due to the joint necessary conditions of their 
genesis, despite discrepancies in all other detail; the relevant shared basis 
being what we referred to as a “dialectical” or “dialogical” structure. A 
perhaps widely-held and well-received version of this assertion is that 
something’s being a language means it’s necessarily involving interaction 
between at least two subjects, viz., it’s being necessarily socially mediated.4  
We might be tempted to explain the phenomenon of a shared language 
naturalistically, in biological terms or otherwise, by arguing for the necessity 
of a shared biological basis5 in order for linguistic sophistication or self-
conscious thought to arise, although the point is thoroughly transcendental: it 
is a condition of the possibility of thought and language that intersubjective 
relations exist between any subjects which are to have such thought or 
language. By extrapolation, it should be clear that the existence of thought or 
language is necessary for any conception of a unified, objective world to be in 
                                                
1 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit. The first four chapters (excluding the introduction) are 
entitled thusly: “Sense-Certainty”, “Perception”, “Force and the Understanding”, and “The 
Truth of Self-Certainty”.   
2 It should be taken as implicit here that action does not equate to mere bodily movement.  
3 My reading of Hegel’s arguments in the opening chapters of the Phenomenology thus concur 
with the reading given by Charles Taylor (1976) The Opening Arguments of the Phenomenology, 
in “Hegel: a Collection of Critical Essays”, ed. by Alastair MacIntyre, University of Notre 
Dame Press. My suggestions here go beyond Taylor’s reading of Hegel however, since Taylor 
focuses on the first three chapters of the Phenomenology and does not broach the issue of the 
role of mutual recognition between subjects as a condition of the possibility of rational 
thought. Despite this, I take it that Taylor would not disagree with the spirit of my 
suggestions here. 
4 We can here draw attention to the relevance of this point for thinking of Wittgenstein’s 
“Private Language Argument” as, in some way, a transcendental argument. 
5 For one, it should be obvious that inter-species communication is possible, and the question 
of whether one wants to call primitive stimulus-response interaction a kind of 
communication, or a kind of language, should not trouble this issue. 
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play. Let us leave these reflections for now and embark upon a brief account 
of Strawson’s argument in Part One of Individuals.  
As we noted at the beginning of this chapter, the basic argument of the 
first part of Individuals, entitled “Particulars”, gives persuasive reasons for 
thinking that both material bodies and persons are logically primitive features 
of our thought, or conceptual scheme. “Particulars” is divided into four main 
chapters: “Bodies”, “Sounds”, “Persons”, and “Monads”. The train of thought 
is linear and proceeds from establishing the place of material bodies as the 
basic subject matter of our thought, to exploring the possibility of this 
occurring in a (quasi-) non-spatial paradigm, to establishing persons as a 
logically primitive concept, to exploring a possible variation of this 
conception. Due to the nature of my arguments thus far, it seems prudent to 
focus on Chapter 3 which discusses persons.  
A way of building on the suggestive arguments advanced in Section 3.4.2 
is by exploring the, I think, even more profound implications one can 
ascertain regarding the role of the concept of a person in our thought—or at 
least the conception of mutually recognising rational subjects—than already 
drawn by Strawson. By spelling out in a little more detail how the account we 
gave of situated thought in Section 3.2 is dependent upon intersubjective 
relations that sustain the requisite link between perception and action—
between the epistemic and other “agency-relative” aspects of a subject—we 
can move also to suggest how, in a quite distinctive way, the very structure of 
thought itself, thus any conceptual scheme, unfolds from its recognitive 
genesis in interaction with other subjects.  
 
4.1 The Argument for Persons 
 
A useful way to open up the logical space for assessing the possibility of 
re-writing the basis for a descriptive metaphysics will be to engage with the 
structure of Strawson’s actual arguments in Chapter 3 of Individuals and to 
reflect, at the relevant crucial points, what the arguments stand to gain once 
Transcendental-Phenomenological Proof and Descriptive Metaphysics 
Byron Clugston 
153 
adapted to the model of transcendental subjectivity that I have proposed thus 
far.  
Strawson begins his reflections on this problem by thinking about some of 
the ways in which we “talk of ourselves” and some of the things we “ascribe 
to ourselves”.1 After reflecting on our disposition to ascribe both physical and 
mental predicates to ourselves, Strawson asks two questions. Firstly: 
 
“Why are one’s states of consciousness ascribed to anything at all?”2 
 
And, secondly: 
 
“Why are they ascribed to the very same thing as corporeal characteristics, a certain physical 
situation, &c.?”3 
 
The initial treatment of this issue is dealt with by exploring the “unique role”4 
that one’s body plays in one’s experience; something that leads Strawson to 
some interesting conclusions about the role of particular physical apparati in 
our experience’s constitution. However, Strawson’s conclusion from these 
explorations is that the claim for a “unique role” for one’s body in one’s 
experience does not settle the questions as phrased above. As Strawson notes, 
the peculiar role of my body in my experience does not “explain why I should 
have the concept of myself at all, why I should ascribe my thoughts and 
experiences to anything.”5 That is, the facts regarding, for example, the role of 
one’s eyes, one’s head position, and one’s bodily orientation in one’s (at least 
visual) experience of the world being a certain way does not “explain the use 
that we make of the word ‘I’, or how any word has the use that word has.”6  
Such facts “do not explain the concept we have of a person.”7  
                                                
1 Strawson, Individuals: p. 89.  
2 Op. cit.: p. 90. 
3 Ibid.  
4 Ibid. 
5 Op. cit.: p. 93. 
6 Op. cit.: p. 94. 
7 Ibid. 
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Part of the difficulty Strawson sees in making the extrapolation from the 
obvious role our body appears to play in our experience to the claim that, 
somehow, this body that plays such a “unique role” in our experience and is 
in harmony and intrinsically connected with the “consciousness” for whom 
there seems to be experience, stems from familiar historical dilemmas which 
involved driving a wedge between the “mental” and “physical” aspects of 
persons; viz., the typical view attributed to Descartes. Given this, Strawson’s 
strategy continues by exploring two alternate conceptions of the relationship 
between the purported mental and physical aspect of the subject. The first 
view is called the “Cartesian view”, linked of course to Descartes, whereas the 
second view, entitled the “No-ownership view”, is attributed to Wittgenstein 
and Schlick.1 The point of exploring these two alternate conceptions is to 
develop dialectically a view which evidences the logical primitiveness of the 
concept of a person out of which the notion of a separate “material body” and 
a “pure consciousness” are abstracted. The details of these two views are less 
important than the conclusion they lead Strawson to, so we can move straight 
to Strawson’s considerations about how the logical primitiveness of the 
concept of a person emerges. 
Possibly the most powerful drive toward the notion of the logical 
primitiveness of the concept of a person comes from the fact that ascription of 
states of consciousness to oneself involves the possibility of applying criteria 
which one would apply in third person cases. The necessary role of external 
criteria in ascribing states of consciousness to oneself evidences the 
connection between one’s capacity to refer the possession of states of 
consciousness to oneself and one’s capacity to refer such possession of states 
of consciousness to other subjects. We can note following David Pears that 
Strawson’s argument for the concept of a person is thus an “indirect 
argument”2 since the primitiveness of the concept of a person is to be 
                                                
1 Strawson notes that the “evidence that Wittgenstein at one time held such a view is to be 
found in Moore’s articles in Mind on ‘Wittgenstein’s Lectures in 1930-33’ (Mind, Vol. LXIV, 
pp. 13-14)”. Op. cit.: p. 95.  
2 David Pears (1961) Critical Study Part I: Individuals, Philosophical Quarterly, 43, pp. 173-185. 
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established “indirectly” by way of arguing for the conditions of the self-
ascription of states of consciousness. In Pears’s words, for the indirect 
argument, 
 
“the genesis of my concept of my ownership and the genesis of my concept of 
another’s ownership of states of consciousness must occur at the same point in the 
logical order of my understanding.”1 
 
Namely, one must recognise the existence of persons as logical primitives for 
one can apparently only self-ascribe states of consciousness to oneself if one 
can ascribe them to others, which of course depends on one having a 
conception of other subjects for whom there are states of consciousness. 
This “indirect” argument differs from the “direct” argument of Chapter 
One of Individuals,2 entitled “Bodies”, which insists that the doubt that 
material bodies cannot reliably be thought to exist unperceived demands 
more than the best possible criteria we could have for such identification; the 
Berkeleian sceptic about material bodies is thought to be either claiming that 
when we speak of material bodies existing unperceived we either do not 
mean what we think we mean, or we go beyond the best available criteria. 
The argument for persons thus has a unique structure. We can evidence this 
uniqueness further by quoting Strawson’s answer to his dilemma as phrased 
above, regarding the possibility of attributing both mental and physical 
predicates to particular entities: 
 
“a necessary condition of states of consciousness being ascribed at all is that they 
should be ascribed to the very same things as certain corporeal characteristics, a 
certain physical situation &c. That is to say, states of consciousness could not be 
                                                
1 Op. cit.: p. 180. We might think of this idea as approximate to the notion of mutual 
recognition. Self-consciousness cannot occur for a subject on its own; it is only possible for 
mutually recognising subjects. 
2 As referred to throughout Pears, Critical Study. 
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ascribed at all, unless they were ascribed to persons, in the sense I have claimed for 
this word.”1 
 
And in Strawson’s defence of this idea, which includes insistence on the 
incoherence of conceiving of the concept of a person as a “compound-idea”2 
composed of the both the idea of a “pure consciousness” and that of a 
“material body”, he is led to refer to the historical cases of Hume and Kant 
who both, in their own ways, seem to have inadequately accounted for the 
phenomenon of which Strawson is speaking.3 Strawson sees Hume’s search 
for “the entity corresponding to” the “illusory primary concept of the pure 
consciousness, the ego-substance” as in vain, for it was in this fictitious entity 
that Hume sought a “principle of unity” for consciousness.4 Yet, as Strawson 
notes correctly, “there is no principle of unity where there is no principle of 
differentiation”.5 The idea for Strawson presumably being that for one to 
conceive of a conscious as being unified (and possibly objective, to allude to 
his reading of the Deduction in The Bounds of Sense) requires that one be able 
to distinguish different states of consciousness and be able to self-ascribe 
them, something dependent on external criteria (and thus other-ascription of 
states of consciousness) as we have noted.  
Kant, as seen by Strawson, made a related blunder when he 
 
“accorded a purely formal (‘analytic’) unity: the unity of the ‘I think’ that 
accompanies all my perceptions and therefore might just as well accompany none.”6 
 
And this criticism of Kant corresponds to the objections I already noted in 
relation to a merely formal account of self-consciousness in Section 3.4.2 where 
I suggested that it might be possible to delineate material conditions of self-
consciousness. These material conditions of the possibility of self-
                                                
1 Strawson, Individuals: p. 102. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Op. cit.: p. 103. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
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consciousness were discussed there in relation to some Hegelian theses and it 
is at this point that we can begin to illuminate the connection to Strawson. 
Following on from his assertion that states of consciousness can only be 
ascribed to the same things to which “certain corporeal characteristics” and a 
“certain physical situation” can be ascribed,1 Strawson says: 
 
“There would be no question of ascribing one’s own states of consciousness, or 
experiences, to anything, unless one also ascribed, or were ready to ascribe, states of 
consciousness, or experiences, to other individual entities of the same logical type as 
that thing to which one ascribes one’s own states of consciousness.”2 
 
This conception, articulated by Pears above as the idea that self-ascription and 
other-ascription of states of consciousness “must occur at the same point in 
the logical order of my understanding”3 depends on the idea, which we have 
already noted, that we require (at least) external criteria which can be 
employed for the ascription of both kinds. We can further explain this idea by 
noting that for Strawson 
 
“There is no sense in the idea of ascribing states of consciousness to oneself, or at all, 
unless the ascriber already knows how to ascribe at least some states of 
consciousness to others. So he cannot argue in general ‘from his own case’ to 
conclusions about how to do this; for unless he already knows how to do this, he has 
no conception of his own case, or any case, i.e. any subject of experiences. Instead he 
just has evidence that pain &c. may be expected when a certain body is affected in 
certain ways and not when others are.”4 
 
To illuminate this idea, Strawson employs the terminology of M-predicates 
and P-predicates. M-predicates stand for the ordinary predicates we apply to 
material bodies such as “weights 10 stone” and “is in the drawing room”, 
                                                
1 Op. cit.: p. 102. 
2 Op. cit.: p. 104. 
3 Pears, Critical Study: p. 180. 
4 Strawson, Individuals: p. 106. 
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whereas P-predicates stand for all other relevant kinds of predicates typically 
applied to persons such as “is smiling”, “is going for a walk”, in addition to 
predicates like “is in pain”, “is thinking hard”, “believes in God” etc.1 
Strawson then claims that being able to appropriately apply P-predicates, the 
kind distinctively applied to persons, requires recognition of the double-
aspect of their criterial requirements. This double-aspect is as follows.  
Firstly, as ought to be evident by now, reliable self-ascription of P-
predicates of the kind “is a bad driver” require external criteria which is 
publicly mediated in the sense that appeal to ascriptions of this kind refer to 
publicly assessable standards about the kind of behaviour driving is, and 
what variations of this kind of behaviour suggest it be deemed “bad”. 
However, P-predicates of the form “has a pain in one’s leg” do not rely 
simply on the kind of external criteria which it is obvious “is a bad driver” 
does. For although there is a swathe of pain-behaviour which may reliably 
(and sometimes unreliably) lead to ascriptions of the kind “has a pain in one’s 
leg”, it is obvious that, at least in some cases, truthful self-ascription of leg 
pain may rely on a different set of criteria.  
The existence of cases such as this appears to cause a problem if it suggests 
that different criteria exist for self-ascription as opposed to other-ascription of 
particular P-predicates—for it was this disparity which was to be dispensed 
with. Specifically, if it appears that one can rely on merely “internal” criteria 
for the self-ascription of leg pain, then one’s other-ascription of leg pain 
begins to look dubious (as does others’ ascription of leg pain to oneself). 
However, it ought to be clear that such “internal” criteria as there might be for 
self-ascription of leg pain are not therefore necessary criteria for such 
ascription, but merely sufficient, in the appropriate cases.2 Likewise, for certain 
                                                
1 Ibid. 
2 Wittgenstein’s argument against the idea of a “private language” for our sensations does 
not, on its own, threaten the idea that we actually have sensations at all, so the idea that I can 
be in a unique position to confirm the existence of a pain in my leg should not be 
controversial claim. It is the re-identification of particular kinds of sensations that is 
problematic, not the identification of sensations in general (or the awareness that we have 
them). For surely it is part of the structure of our language involving the concept “sensation” 
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cases of other-ascription of leg pain it seems that there are, equally, a range of 
sufficient criteria, none of which should be seen as necessary. This range of 
sufficient criteria may range from the more or less dubious (hobbling) to the 
more or less reliable sets of criteria (reporting pain, sitting down whilst 
desperately clutching one’s knee, howling, signs of blood from leg).  
The whole point of noting this range of criteria is to show how no 
straightforward answer can be given which insists on one set of external 
criteria for identifying such a thing as leg pain. And noting this complication 
brings us closer to appreciating the virtue of viewing the concept of a person 
as “logically primitive” since the temptation to rely on merely external 
criteria, in cases of P-predication in which it is apparent other criterial 
requirements might be served, leads to a perversion which places priority on 
what we might call the “visible” (or external) aspect of personhood.1 This 
perversion attempts to drive a logical wedge between self-ascription and 
other-ascription of P-predicates of the logical form “has a pain in one’s leg” 
whereby it is assumed that these two kinds of ascription are independent. Yet, 
as Strawson says, 
 
“it is essential to the character of these predicates that they have both first- and third-
person ascriptive uses, that they are both self-ascribable otherwise than on the basis 
of observation of the behaviour of the subject of them, and other-ascribable on the 
basis of behaviour criteria. To learn their use is to learn both aspects of their use. In 
order to have this type of concept, one must be both a self-ascriber and an other-
ascriber of such predicates, and must see every other as a self-ascriber.”2 
 
At this point we can see a link emerge to the conception of the role of 
intersubjectivity in the formation of self-consciousness, although at this stage 
the link exists only at the surface level of ordinary discourse, not the deep 
                                                                                                                                       
that such things are private, in a certain sense. It is the nature of their identity that appears to 
cause trouble.  
1 We will not call the converse aspect of purportedly “internal” criteria “invisible” since this 
might appear to commit us to more than be intended here.  
2 Op. cit.: p. 108. 
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logical structure of our thought. The link comes via talk of how the concept of 
P-predicates requiring a double-aspect relies on the concept of a person being 
thought of as logically primitive. For Strawson, the concept of a person 
functions as a logically primitive notion insofar as it is presupposed by our 
satisfactory grasp of the employment conditions of such P-predicates as “has 
a pain in one’s leg” where complete grasp of the logical structure of such 
predicates requires that one be able to both self-ascribe and other-ascribe 
these predicates. Strawson says further: 
 
“In order to understand this type of concept, one must acknowledge that there is a 
kind of predicate which is unambiguously and adequately ascribable both on the 
basis of observation of the subject of the predicate and not on this basis, i.e. 
independently of observation of the subject: the second case is where the ascriber is 
also the subject.”1 
 
The point being that, for concepts like “pain” and “depression”, we must 
appreciate both the external, behavioural criteria we have for their 
identification, as well as the “internal” criteria. Failure to appreciate this idea 
is “to refuse to accept the structure of the language in which we talk” about 
phenomena like this.2  
Since Strawson says, regarding the logical structure of concepts like “pain” 
and “depression”, that this logical structure pertains merely to “the language 
in which we talk” he allows himself the qualification that “[O]ne might give 
up talking or devise, perhaps, a different structure in terms of which to 
soliloquize.”3 However, it seems that the logical structure of the language 
involved here actually demonstrates an additional fact about the conditions of 
a shared language.4 For although one might speak differently, a manner of 
speaking that avoided the logical structure inherent in our ordinary ways of 
speaking about concepts such as “pain” and “depression” would not 
                                                
1 Ibid. 
2 Op. cit.: p. 109. 
3 Ibid. 
4 We will here ignore the tautologous nature of this phrase. 
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constitute a language which recognised the existence of other subjects—or the 
dependence of the meaning of one’s own states of consciousness on 
interaction with such other subjects—since it would exclude a conception of 
not simply other subjects’ states of consciousness, but also the possibility of 
third-person cases of ascription of states of consciousness to oneself. In such a 
case, the logical structure of one’s language would—in a self-deluded 
fashion—appear to lead to an (at least implicit) endorsement of solipsism. It is 
difficult to see how such a language could in principle come to be 
employed—unless as a joke, or as a temporary experiment which thus 
depended on our regular ways of talking and applying P-predicates 
dependent upon both first-person and third-person ascription. 
After considering the indispensable role the concept of a person plays in 
the actual structure of our language, Strawson rephrases the guiding question 
regarding the possibility of ascribing states of consciousness. He does so in 
the following way: 
 
“Now our perplexities may take a different form, the form of the question: ‘But how 
can one ascribe to oneself, not on the basis of observation, the very same thing that 
others may have, on the basis of observation, reasons of a logically adequate kind 
ford ascribing to one?’ This question may be absorbed into a wider one, which might 
be phrased: ‘How are P-predicates possible?’ or: ‘How is the concept of a person 
possible?’”1 
 
Strawson does “not pretend to be able to satisfy this demand at all fully” yet 
he mentions “two very different things which might count as beginnings or 
fragments of an answer.”2 A discussion of these continues below. 
Strawson’s first suggestion consists in “moving a certain class of P-
predicates to a central position in the picture”.3 These P-predicates are those 
pertaining to familiar kinds of actions such as “going for a walk”, “coiling a 
                                                
1 Op. cit.: p. 111. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
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rope”, “playing ball”, “writing a letter”.1 Now although these P-predicates 
involve observation in cases of other-ascription of them, no observation is 
required in cases of self-ascription of them. This is common enough. The 
distinctive character of them however, is that this fact does not appear to 
cause a problem in understanding them, or in understanding what exactly 
this fact means in such cases.2 Strawson describes this relative comfort as 
dependent upon “the marked dominance of a fairly definite pattern of bodily 
movement in what they ascribe, and the marked absence of any distinctive 
experience.”3 For the idea is that such predicates involving actions of these 
kinds “release us from the idea that the only things we can know without 
observation or inference, or both, are private experiences; we can know, 
without telling by either of these means, about the present and future 
movements of a body.”4 However, “bodily movements are certainly also 
things we can know by observation and inference.”5 For, “[A]mong the things 
we observe, as opposed to the things we know about without observation, are 
the movements of bodies similar to that about which we have knowledge not 
based on observation.”6  
Strawson’s general point seems to be that our tendency to be happy with 
thinking about such bodily movements as the same phenomenon in both self-
ascribed and other-ascribed cases, despite the disparity inherent in the fact 
that the former cases do not rely on observation whereas the latter cases do, 
shows the unique role bodily movement (discussed in terms of these P-
predicates) can have for explaining the conceptual scheme we have. Strawson 
says that: 
 
                                                
1 Ibid.  
2 As in contrast to the case of the concepts “pain” and “depression” which we examined 
above, for example. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Op. cit.: p. 111-112. 
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“What I am suggesting is that it is easier to understand how we can see eachother, 
and ourselves, as persons, if we think first of the fact that we act, and act on each 
other, and act in accordance with a common human nature.”1 
 
Now, before we move on to consider Strawson’s second suggestion with 
respect to how we come to have the concept of a person, we can relate the 
quotation immediately above to a thought expressed by Taylor where he 
gives voice to an idea alluded to in our account of situated thought. Taylor 
says that: 
 
“Perception of objects is available only to a subject who is an embodied agent 
interacting with the world he experiences.”2 
 
And although Taylor’s remark is related to his reading of Chapter 2 of the 
Phenomenology of Spirit, we can see how it is relevant for our understanding of 
Strawson’s investigations into the concept of a person as pointing to a truistic 
conception of persons as embodied, active, rational agents in the world. 
Additionally, drawing the link this way makes the appropriate connection 
between our actions within the world as embodied agents and our perceptions 
of the world, the structure of which is tied to the same. 
As for Strawson’s second suggestion vis-à-vis the derivation of the concept 
we have of a person, by way of it we can make reference to some explicitly 
Hegelian theses. Let us examine his suggestion.  
By way of reference to the idea of a “group mind” Strawson entertains the 
possibility of “whether we might not construct the idea of a special kind of 
social world in which the concept of the individual person is replaced by that 
of a group.”3 This possibility is explored by conjuring the imagery of groups 
of individuals engaged in such group pursuits as battle and wherein such 
individuals refer not to themselves, but rather to the group of which they are 
                                                
1 Op. cit.: p. 112.  
2 Taylor, The Opening Arguments of the Phenomenology: p. 182.  
3 Strawson, Individuals: p. 113. 
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a part by employing the terms “we” and “they”. However, as Strawson notes, 
these apparent “plural forms” do not have their usual meaning for there is no 
corresponding singular usage.1 Strawson’s examples of this kind of usage are: 
“We have taken the citadel” and “We have lost the game”.2  Indeed, the usage 
of “we” in these contexts, as employed by a member of a group, refers not to 
something, the logical order of which can be adequately contrasted with “I”. 
Since although it is essential that an individual who might make such a claim 
be thought of as a part of that to which “we” refers, that status as a “part” of 
“we” cannot be captured by claiming that “I have (in part) taken the citadel” 
for the point of a claim like “We have taken the citadel” is to establish that a 
particular entity, say “the army of Goths” has “taken the citadel”. The 
personal pronoun “I” cannot be adequately accommodated in this claim in the 
same way that “I” can be said to be a member of a group, for the action of 
“taking the citadel” is only intelligible as a group action, not a series of 
atomistically conceived actions by individual soldiers, for example (although 
we can of course describe the course of events at that level). Moreover, the 
role conceived for individuals within the group, as in a cricket team for 
example, is to be in terms of the group as a whole; viz., Strawson’s examples 
of “stroke” and “square leg” represent these kinds of roles.3  The general 
conclusion from this second consideration is as follows: 
 
“When we think of such cases, we see that we ourselves, over a part of our social 
lives—not, happily, a very large part—do work with a set of ideas from which that of 
the individual person is excluded, in which its place is taken by that of the group. But 
might we not think of communities or groups such that this part of the lives of their 
members was the dominant part—or was not merely a part, but the whole? It 
happens sometimes, with groups of human beings, that, as we say, their members 
think, feel and act ‘as one’. I suggest it is a condition for the existence of the concept 
of an individual person, that this happen only sometimes.”4 
                                                
1 Ibid. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Op. cit.: p. 114. 
4 Ibid. 
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Undoubtedly, and as Strawson’s characterisation of the two foregoing points 
as “beginnings or fragments of an answer”1 to the question of how we come 
to have a logically primitive role reserved in our discourse for the concept of a 
person suggests, much more would need to be said to make explicit the 
precise consequences of this remark.  
It appears that the first suggestion can be loosely related to the account we 
gave of situated thought wherein we suggested that a link between 
perception of and action in a world was necessarily to be established in order 
to construct adequate transcendental proof. We saw this suggestion take 
shape in our talk of the case of moving from point A to point B vis-à-vis the 
apple tree in the garden, guided by both empirically informed expectation 
and synthetic a priori knowledge about spatial relations.  
The second suggestion, regarding the role of our sense of, occasionally, not 
merely belonging to group, but temporarily having our usual sense of identity 
absorbed by such a group, can be related to a “linguistic case” which has been 
mostly implicit thus far. The “linguistic case” can phrased simply in terms of 
the familiar idea that the meanings of words derive from and rely upon their 
role in linguistic structures which are embedded within particular ways of 
speaking and acting in the world. The idea is that just as we occasionally lose 
our sense of our separate identity from other subjects by absorption in a 
group, what we might call the “meaning” of our actions and utterances, and 
our more fundamental sense of ourselves as self-conscious beings (beings for 
whom there are meanings), is permanently caught up in a similar fashion. It is 
to this “linguistic case” that we can relate Hegel’s famous dialectical result in 
Chapter 4 of The Phenomenology of Spirit where he discusses “The Truth of 
Self-Certainty”:  
 
“A self-consciousness exists for a self-consciousness. Only so is it in fact a self-
consciousness; for only in this way does the unity of itself in its otherness become 
                                                
1 Op. cit.: p. 111. 
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explicit for it...A self-consciousness, in being an object, is just as much ‘I’ as ‘object’. 
With this we already have before us the Notion of Spirit...this absolute substance 
which is the unity of the different independent self-consciousnesses which, in their 
opposition, enjoy perfect freedom and independence: ‘I’ that is ‘We’ and ‘We’ that is 
‘I’. It is in self-consciousness, in the Notion of Spirit, that consciousness first finds its 
turning point, where it leaves behind it the colourful show of the sensuous here-and-
now and the nightlike void of the supersensible beyond, and steps out into the 
spiritual daylight of the present.”1 
 
Ignoring the bewildering mode of expression and grandiose tenor of 
statement, we can certainly appreciate that Hegel’s words here are relevant to 
the suggestions we made in both Section 3.4.2 and the foregoing discussion of 
Strawson’s argument for the logical primitiveness of the concept a person. 
The general idea is that self-consciousness cannot be adequately construed in 
terms of the merely formal conditions proposed by Kant, in particular, by 
being able to append “I think” to all the contents of my consciousness, but 
rather can only generate out of intersubjective relations.  
In the proposal for a form of transcendental proof which depended on the 
notion of “situated thought” we saw that Kant’s Transcendental Deduction 
could be extended beyond the mere formal condition of being able to think of 
all one’s states of consciousness as one’s own, by claiming that being able to 
ascribe states of consciousness to oneself was dependent upon linguistic 
capacities which themselves required that the conditions of intersubjectivity 
be satisfied. The conception of intersubjectivity alluded to can also be related 
to the insistence in Strawson’s reading of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction on 
the necessity of a “unified, objective world of experience”; undoubtedly, the 
conception of a unified, objective world independent of our subjective 
apprehension of it arises from the conception we get, through 
intersubjectivity, of other subjects’ points of view on the same world of which 
both their and our experience is of.  
                                                
1 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit: section 177.  
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Moreover, in our account of Strawson’s argument for the logical 
primitiveness of the concept of a person we have seen some similar ideas be 
developed, although it appears that to complete the train of thought 
suggested by such arguments we need to recognise the full flavour of Hegel’s 
position as phrased above. And although it may be controversial to call 
Hegel’s general philosophical position “transcendental”,1 the point just made 
with reference to Hegel’s conception of the condition of the possibility of self-
consciousness certainly looks like it could be interpreted as “transcendental” 
in the sense we have given that term in this essay. 
 
4.2 Consequences of this reading of Transcendental Philosophy 
 
It should help to briefly consider a numbered list of general outcomes that 
result, given the version of transcendental philosophy I have proposed. These 
general outcomes are a condensed version of the foregoing claims. Let us 
examine them. 
 
(1) Transcendental philosophy retains the province of synthetic a priori 
judgment, yet with the qualifier that such judgment is not generated 
out of internal “egological” metaphysical laws contained in the 
individual subject which impart a necessary structure to anything 
which can be considered as thinking or experience (as, roughly, in 
Kant). The deepest transcendental condition—of experience and 
thought—is seen to be socially mediated, recognitive relations with 
like-minded subjects. 
(2) Typical interpretations notwithstanding, the structure of experience 
and thought’s reliance on intersubjective relations does not lead 
                                                
1 Important work contributing to this debate can be found in Robert R. Williams (1985) Hegel 
and Transcendental Philosophy, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 82, No.12, pp. 595-606; Klaus 
Hartmann (1966) On Taking the Transcendental Turn, The Review of Metaphysics, 78, pp. 223-
249; Taylor, The Opening Arguments of the Phenomenology.  
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ultimately to a weakening of the transcendental position to one which 
collapses under the threat of all-embracing relativism. Although the 
social and linguistic dimension of selfhood is easily seen as having a 
socially mediated structure, the primitive logical structure of self-
consciousness and language is regarded as having an ahistorical 
structure; one which is generated by that which the existence of 
language, thought, and experience (admitting of rational, reflective 
capacities) necessitates.  
(3) The possibility is entertained that transcendental philosophy might 
provide not merely formal, but material conditions of the possibility of 
language, thought, and experience. These material conditions are seen 
to include the actual inter-relations between epistemic agents and say 
nothing in the naturalistic tone whatsoever about physical constitution 
or empirical existence, but instead dictate the logical requirements 
standing in need of fulfilment such that intersubjectivity (and thus, 
subjectivity and objectivity) may exist, appropriately conceived. As we 
have noted, the consequence of this is that language, thought, and 
experience is seen as having, at bottom, a dialectical structure. 
(4) Under this interpretation, an alternative to Kant’s Metaphysical 
Deduction appears to suggest itself. Although no explicit commitment 
to a form of Metaphysical Deduction has been made, it now seems as if 
a valid appeal to a related idea can be made, given acceptance of what 
has been argued for thus far. Such a new Metaphysical Deduction (if 
one wishes to call it that) will dictate merely what dialectical form must 
structure concept employment. Such a Deduction would logically 
precede anything having an analogous role to Kant’s actual 
Metaphysical Deduction since it would dictate the possibility of such a 
Deduction; it would not prescribe a Table of Categories yet would 
instead dictate the conditions of the possibility of having something like 
such a Table of Categories (and the Table of Judgments for that matter, 
since the former are taken by Kant to derive from the latter)—where 
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this is simply taken to mean the basic structure of any given language, 
not the metaphysical basis of empirical thought. Such a structure is 
itself mutable whereas the latter metaphysical idea is not; again, we are 
moving the commitment to something immutable a step further back 
than Kant. Thus, in harmony with what I have said so far, no claim will 
be made here for a list of concepts which themselves serve to structure 
our thought, rather the claim will be limited to circumscribing the 
conditions of the possibility—the transcendental conditions—of having 
any such form of thought about the world. Under such a rubric we are 
not committed to the untenable claim that there is a universal form for 
all thought or language; instead, we are committed to the more 
primitive and less ambitious claim that all thought and language is 
generated by a universal, dialectical structure; in the commonsense 
image, of two or more persons engaged in articulate, mediated, logical1 
interaction. 
As an additional disclaimer, the advocation of transcendental 
conditions of this form not only eschews the particular form of Kant’s 
Metaphysical Deduction yet also eschews commitment to the particular 
expression of transcendental idealism which links Kant’s Metaphysical 
Deduction with such theses as the concept/intuition divide and the 
notion of unschematised categories. However, due to limitations of 
space and focus we must leave these complex issues untreated.  
 
4.3 Objections to the Proposed Account  
 
The first objection that comes to mind when entertaining the thought of an 
interpretation of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction that holds a place for 
                                                
1 We can skirt the question of whether defining our commonsense version of the notion here 
as involving logic amounts to damaging circularity, since we have not bothered to go into too 
much detail what “logical” means here beyond the everyday conception by referring to 
“recognitive logical structure”. The idea is that revisions at the base level need not be thought 
of as percolating up such as to disturb our argument.  
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material and not merely formal identity is that such an interpretation gets Kant 
wrong. This seems to be a fair objection and the task here, as reconstructive, 
has been to fulfil the seeming requirements of the project Kant initiated rather 
than concur with him on all fronts. Hence, with our general operative notion 
that Hegel’s understanding of the demands of self-consciousness are in 
principle correct, we have insisted on a richer understanding of self-
consciousness and the related idea of a unified objective world. Given the 
strategy inherent in this attempt on extending the project taken to be 
contained in Kant’s Transcendental Deduction, it is clear that the reading of 
transcendental idealism advocated thus far can be distinguished in an 
important way from Kant’s. For if the basic outcome of the project of the 
Deduction is seen as extending beyond Kantian theses into Hegelian territory, 
the basic philosophical doctrine which guides Kant’s thought cannot be seen 
as adhered to. Thus, under the reading of transcendental proof given here, the 
term transcendental is given a modified meaning. This modified meaning 
however, adheres to the basic notion of “necessary conditions of the 
possibility of experience or thought”, yet extends this basic notion beyond 
Kant’s by co-opting the Hegelian insight that self-consciousness is dependent 
upon intersubjectivity. 
Now it is true that Kant, perhaps correctly, conceived of self-consciousness 
as “the supreme principle to which...all forms of rationality (‘employment of 
the understanding’) can be traced back”,1 yet it is perhaps not true that this 
“supreme principle” could quite be derived in the way Kant suggested, or 
that as a mere principle it could support the actual generation of self-
consciousness, conceived of in the richer sense discussed here.  
To illustrate the parallel between Kant’s argument and the one here, we 
can consider how, for Kant, “in relation to the possibility of self-consciousness 
the categories can be regarded as conditions of the possibility of experience.”2 
                                                
1 Dieter Henrich (1989) The Identity of the Subject in the Transcendental Deduction, in “Reading 
Kant: New Perspectives on Transcendental Arguments and Critical Philosophy”, ed. by Eva 
Schaper and Wilhelm Vossenkuhl, Basil Blackwell: p. 251.  
2 Op. cit.: p. 252.  
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Namely, for Kant at least, there is an indispensable connection between the 
Categories and the possibility of self-conscious experience of a unified, 
objective world. We can draw a parallel with this thought by conceiving that, 
indeed, an indispensable connection exists between the conditions of self-
consciousness, experience of a unified, objective world, and a certain logical 
structure, yet this “certain logical structure” might be more indeterminate 
than Kant assumed. Consider Strawson’s later willingness to entertain the 
idea that we can explain how it is that “we have just the functions of 
judgement (the logical forms) and just the spatio-temporal forms of intuition 
that we do have”.1 His attempt at explanation involves three assumptions, 
two of which, he says, were made by Kant himself. For our purposes here, we 
need mention only the first of them: 
 
(1) The necessity of a certain form for general logic; one which pervades 
our capacity to think about the world. This general form includes the 
“fundamental logical operations”, which are: “predication (subject and 
predicate); generalization (particular and universal forms); sentence 
composition (including negation, disjunction and conditionality, etc.)”.2 
This idea of the existence of certain fundamental logical operations is 
expressed also by Wittgenstein in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 
where he says: 
 
“One could say that the sole logical constant was what all propositions, by their very 
nature, had in common with one another. But that is the general propositional 
form.”3 
 
We might think of this remark of Wittgenstein’s as an expression of the 
same thought; that of the ineradicable logical form inherent in 
thinking, insofar as thinking is taken to be propositional. However, as 
                                                
1 Strawson, Kant’s New Foundations of Metaphysics: p. 238. 
2 Ibid.  
3 Ludwig Wittgenstein (1974) Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. by David Pears and Brian 
McGuinness with an introduction by Bertrand Russell, Routledge: Paragraph 5.47. 
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Strawson notes, it is a relevant yet unresolved problem as to why Kant 
supposed that the truths of logic and principles of formal inference 
were analytic, yet did not suppose that “the forms of logic, the 
fundamental logical operations” were “themselves analytically implicit 
in the very notion of judgement”.1 As Strawson says, correctly, this 
further conclusion would have left Kant unsurprised by the fact of our 
possession of particular, unique functions of judgement. 
 
Now the reason for recognising this point made by Strawson is to make it 
clear that we are here leaving open the issue of how a priori concepts might 
be conceived of. We have avoided commitment to Kant’s actual account of a 
priori concepts in the Metaphysical Deduction, although this does not 
disqualify us from considering how else one might account for such a 
purportedly possible notion. We will have to be contented with these brief 
reflections as it is beyond our concerns here to give a satisfactory answer. 
 
5 Conclusion 
 
The landscape we have traversed is a peculiar one which admits of chaos 
in attempts to fix a compass point. We must revisit our reflections in Chapter 
1 since they gave shape to what followed; this ought to help us in obtaining a 
synoptical view.  
We began by reflecting on the notion of limitation and on both the 
philosophical and non-philosophical senses which this notion lent itself to. 
We made thematic the idea that a certain philosophical sense of limitation 
was to be regarded as salient for us in a unique way, which meant that focus 
on a non-philosophical sense of limitation—as exemplified by a scientific or 
naturalistic account of the “limiting factors” in perceptual experience—was to 
be regarded as inadequate for certain epistemic purposes.  
                                                
1 Strawson, Kant’s New Foundations of Metaphysics: p. 239. 
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Following from this distinction, we characterised the philosophical sense 
of limitation under focus in terms of the word “transcendental”; thus making 
clear that the general project here belonged to the topic of transcendental 
arguments. We then employed a further way of characterising the distinction 
between philosophical and non-philosophical senses of limitation by placing 
in opposition the two phrases “epistemic conditions” and “cognitive 
faculties”. The former phrase, we declared, was to be the focus of our defence 
of transcendental argumentation, proof and, generally, transcendental 
philosophy. The reason for this was that the notion of “epistemic conditions” 
formed the cornerstone of the interpretation of transcendental idealism which 
we set out to defend (although only in a partial, peripheral—and thus 
inadequate—manner). We noted that this interpretation found its fullest 
expression in the work of Henry Allison and was known generally as the 
“two-aspect” view (such a position was distinguished from the traditional 
ontological reading of transcendental idealism now known generally as the 
“two-world” (or “two-object”) view. This latter reading of transcendental 
idealism we saw to be connected up with Strawson’s influential 
reconstruction of transcendental arguments and thereby, to have played a role 
in the generally negative dismissal of transcendental argumentation. We 
observed that the connection between the negative attitude toward 
transcendental idealism and the dismissal of transcendental arguments was 
due to the fact that reading transcendental idealism as, primarily, an 
ontological thesis, meant that it was seen as untenable. Due to this apparent 
untenability, attempts at reconstructing transcendental argumentation 
avoided implicating transcendental idealism and instead proceeded by way of 
explicating the necessary conceptual connections which were required for a 
coherent, unified, objective world of experience to exist. 
By advocating an alternate reading of transcendental idealism and 
reconnecting transcendental argumentation with that doctrine (and 
reconceiving the core of such arguments as involving transcendental proof), 
we saw that a stronger construal of such a philosophical method was made 
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available. This stronger construal was taken to involve the explication of the 
kind of epistemic conditions taken to shape our knowledge, under the two-
aspect view of transcendental idealism. Our innovative strategy here was to 
further develop the notion of “epistemic conditions” which allowed for such 
conditions to be made manifest in cases of actual experience. We employed 
the notion of “situated thought” to this end; a notion we found in the work of 
Mark Sacks. In our investigations of the notion of “situated thought” we made 
appeals to an intuitive conception of what is involved in having certain kinds of 
experiences and the making of certain perceptual judgments. In doing this we 
connected up with a host of issues in contemporary philosophy (such as the 
issue of non-conceptual content, the notion of material inference, the 
possibility of a role for phenomenal quality as the “what it is like” of an 
experience, etc.) which showed their relevance in considering the 
philosophical import of the notion of “situated thought”. In doing this, we 
noted how much more work was needed to adequately account for this 
philosophical device, yet exhibited a generally positive disposition toward it; 
a disposition which reflect our generally positive attitude toward the 
philosophical method of transcendental argumentation and transcendental 
proof. 
Through the consideration of a variety of problems in giving an account of 
transcendental proof we came to the conclusion that an approach toward 
doing transcendental philosophy that stopped at Kant was inadequate. We 
made the cursory suggestion that alternate philosophical insights could be 
legitimately borrowed from Hegel which, as it were, extended the 
transcendental project. We saw the impetus for this extension of Kant as 
stemming from a feeling of inadequacy toward the notion of a merely formal 
account of subjectivity and self-consciousness. We noted with respect to 
Hegel that the a fully coherent reading of subjectivity and self-consciousness 
required a connection to, what we took to be, the ultimate conditions of the 
possibility of a unified, objective view of the world. We saw this construal of 
the “ultimate” conditions of the possibility—the “ultimate” transcendental 
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conditions”—as involving an appeal to Hegel’s dialectical result in Chapter 4 
of the Phenomenology of Spirit which essentially claims that self-consciousness 
of dependent upon relations with like-minded subjects. This appeal was more 
suggestive than explanatory although justified our general sympathy with a 
Hegelian extension of Kant with respect to the project taken to be contained in 
Kant’s original Transcendental Deduction.  
The advocation of this possible “extension” of the Kantian project was not 
meant to negate the totality of Kantian theses but meant instead to 
supplement them. Thus we found in our appeal to something like the two-
aspect version of transcendental idealism an extension of that conception. We 
phrased this extension mainly in terms of what we took to be the precursor to 
the Strawsonian reading of the Transcendental Deduction as giving an 
account of the relationship between self-consciousness and a unified, objective 
experience. What we took to be the precursor to both these notions was 
precisely the intersubjectivity which Hegel, apparently rightly, claimed was 
necessary for the existence of self-consciousness.  
Chapters 2 and 3 could then be taken to represent, respectively, the 
reasons for advocating this reconstructed version of transcendental 
argumentation (as involving transcendental proof) and the necessary 
extensions of the transcendental project required to make it consistent.  
At the end of Chapter 3 we made the additional appeal that the more full-
blooded version of transcendental argumentation offered, via the notion of 
“situated thought”, could be extended from a criticism of Strawson’s project 
in The Bounds of Sense to the beginning of an attempt to rewrite the basis for 
his “descriptive metaphysics” as accounted for in Individuals. We gave a brief 
outline of how we might reconceive Strawson’s project in Individuals by way 
of the heavy emphasis we placed on the Hegelian conception of self-
consciousness as playing a role in our account of transcendental proof. This 
suggestion for reconceiving Strawson’s project of a “descriptive metaphysics” 
was also phrased in terms of shifting the emphasis from merely formal 
conditions (necessary conceptual connection) to material conditions of the 
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possibility of concept employment, thought, language, and experience. Again, 
we took the relevant point to be the material dependence of self-consciousness 
on intersubjectivity—insofar as the actual existence of other subjects was taken 
to be the ultimate transcendental condition of language, thought, and a self-
conscious, unified and objective experience. 
Now, there are numerous possible objections to the account given here and 
it will be helpful to consider them momentarily to give us a sense of how 
further to argue in this vein. 
The exact form of transcendental idealism argued for here is defined in 
terms of a “core set of theses” which we have argued can be read off the 
structure of the notion of “situated thought”. Admittedly this reading of 
transcendental idealism given in terms of this “core set of theses” is highly 
controversial and extremely limited. The idea is that the proposal given for a 
reconstruction of transcendental proof via the notion of “situated thought” 
stands to explain how one might read transcendental idealism differently. No 
doubt the defence of that idea would require deep, lengthy reflections in 
another place. 
 The general idea, however, is that such a transcendental idealism as one 
might argue for need not be identical to the historical position found in Kant. 
The support of the two-aspect view of such a doctrine as recommended here 
by reference to the work of Henry Allison serves to fulfil our commitment to 
some form of that interpretation, yet again, no commitment is made to any 
further illuminating particulars since restrictions of space and focus are 
indeed pertinent. The support does its work of giving us a sense of how 
transcendental idealism might be thought of, given the arguments put forth to 
reconstruct an account of transcendental arguments and proof. 
It is inappropriate to rehearse all points of attack on, and defence of, the 
two-aspect reading. However, there are a number of points worth being made 
out for purposes of clarification. As should be fairly clear, the worry with 
attempting a rehabilitation of transcendental proof that retains transcendental 
idealism as a philosophical partner (which indeed, given that it is 
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transcendental proof, should be seen as virtually necessary) is that the reading 
required of such a doctrine to make it palatable can be seen as an inelegant 
attempt at letting go of that doctrine. The threat then might seem that 
“Strategy B”, as I have characterised my reading, is an illegitimate strategy. 
“Strategy A”, as I have characterised Sacks’s reading of transcendental 
idealism in, especially, Objectivity and Insight, might seem to be a more sober, 
sensible strategy insofar as it apparently appreciates (what is taken to be) the 
full force of transcendental idealism and deems such a philosophical doctrine 
indefensible in general, although in possession of particular, extractable 
virtues.  
I have defended “Strategy B”, however, on the grounds that the “core set 
of theses” claimed to be contained in transcendental idealism are most 
powerful and coherent when left as partnered with what seem to be their 
metaphysically flamboyant neighbours. Claiming that “Strategy B” gives a 
more coherent reading of transcendental idealism in these terms is risky 
however, since it has been noted explicitly that the reading given here of the 
“core set of theses” claimed to be contained in transcendental idealism goes 
beyond Kant into Hegelian territory. Again, the defence against this 
interpretive strategy is that certain tensions exist in Kant’s philosophy that 
appear irresolvable in the terms in which Kant states them. The general idea 
advanced here is that talk of self-consciousness in the Transcendental 
Deduction must be supplemented by the Hegelian corrective as referred to.   
Given this appeal to Hegelian theses we might wonder why the label 
“transcendental idealism” is appealed to, instead of the Hegelian doctrine of 
“absolute idealism”. We can say merely that the point of retaining the Kantian 
label has two aspects: (1) most of what we say here is in a generally Kantian 
spirit and we have endeavoured to show—in a primarily suggestive 
manner—that the revised conception of “transcendental” is not a usurpation 
of Kant, but a supplementation; (2) since our concern here has been with 
transcendental philosophy, insofar as such philosophy is concerned with 
articulating “conditions of possibility”, we prefer to retain the phrasing of the 
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doctrine appealed to here as “transcendental idealism” instead of “absolute 
idealism” (as is Hegel’s label for his own philosophical orientation). 
  Now, to show why such revision of transcendental idealism is not an 
inelegant attempt at letting it go, we need make note of a few points. It 
becomes evident that it is a peculiar philosophical quibble that emerges: the 
matter comes down to either re-interpreting what transcendental idealism 
means—including a more charitable reading of its tendentious aspects—or, 
extracting the appealing parts and discarding the rest. This distinction 
corresponds to what I earlier referred to as “Strategy B” and “Strategy A” 
respectively. Obvious arguments against the former strategy might claim that 
it obscures or downplays certain essential features of the position; arguments 
for this strategy might claim that it is a more accurate and sensible (albeit 
charitable) way to think of such a doctrine, and since the tendency to 
misconstrue it is a more general symptom of the reception of revolutionary 
philosophical ideas, we ought not simply extract the parts which are easy to 
accommodate since this undermines the revolutionary character of the 
original thought.  
A brief comment on the references to phenomenology and 
phenomenological method—and nothing more than this—is needed. 
Although Husserl is scarcely mentioned in this essay, he looms as a spectre in 
the background and should even be visibly present to the keen observer in the 
discussion of the work of Mark Sacks. In the account given of the notion of 
“situated thought” we ought to have discerned such a philosophical notion to 
represent an affinity with Husserl’s phenomenology, and such affinities as 
there might be should then suggest to us what further explorations of the 
transcendental terrain might be possible given this connection. Further 
comparisons between the transcendental in Kant and Husserl suggests 
themselves as well as a more complete account of how the conception of the 
“transcendental” in Husserl might be extended and argued for more clearly, 
given Sacks’s articulation of the idea of situated thought, which itself is 
arguably quite Husserlian. Clearly, the suggestion from Sacks is that the 
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notion of “situated thought” ought to be the touchstone for further work on 
transcendental proof and that any attempt at reconstructing transcendental 
arguments ought ultimately to refer to such proof insofar as this serves to 
make the connection to “lived experience”1 (discounting for now the prima 
facie vagueness of this appellation). Support of this estimation of 
phenomenological method can be found in J.N. Mohanty’s words, such that a 
remark made by him in his review of Rorty’s Philosophy and the Mirror of 
Nature is worth quoting in full: 
 
“although in some of the writings of Husserl, especially in the early Idea of 
Phenomenology of 1907, there is a concern with epistemology, namely, with how 
knowledge is possible, this epistemological concern is not the predominant theme of 
phenomenology, even of the Husserlian sort. The concern is rather about what is 
involved in knowledge (as well as other sorts of experience, moral, aesthetic) than in 
justifying any cognitive (or other non-cognitive) claims. The motive of “blocking 
scepticism” – that typical Anglo-Saxon concern – is conspicuous by its absence.”2  
 
The close of this remark need not be our focus since by now it ought to be 
clear that the general theme of this essay also dodges commitment to 
justification of knowledge claims against the sceptic, at least in that sense in 
which much contemporary epistemology, especially that concerning the topic 
of transcendental arguments, has committed itself. Rather, the general 
comment about phenomenology as being concerned with “what is involved in 
knowledge” is precisely our concern. This was the central point which the 
focus on situated thought intended to show by attempting to make as 
transparent as possible what transcendental proof ought to be concerned with 
in making claims about the possibility of synthetic a priori judgment and its 
relationship to “what is involved in knowledge”. So it is an attempt at 
elucidating this “involvedness” that has occupied us, and perhaps such an 
                                                
1 Not the exact term used by Sacks, although one which ought not to seem at odds with his 
understanding of what is at issue here.  
2 J. N. Mohanty (1985) Rorty, Phenomenology and Transcendental Philosophy, in “The Possibility 
of Transcendental Philosophy”, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: p. 61.  
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orientation might point specifically to what Mohanty seems to regard as an 
anti-epistemological1 orientation of phenomenological method, and might 
show also how we might overcome this drive to a certain species of 
epistemology (one concerned with rebutting scepticism). 
Putting matters in these terms seems to put us in a familiar position, one 
which we can, however, easily resist; viz., making a choice between those 
varieties of philosophy which profess to have simply stepped over the sceptic. 
Such luminaries as Rorty, Davidson, and McDowell come immediately to 
mind. And the pertinent disposition can be displayed by repeating the 
expression of Rorty’s attitude as evidenced in his quip of “telling the sceptic 
to ‘get lost’”.2 Perhaps McDowell’s strategy, especially in Mind and World, can 
be described as somewhat more elaborate than a “stepping over”, although 
his general quietist approach to philosophy means that the exact way we 
ought to take his extensive theorising, in the face of claims for such theorising 
as unnecessary, is unclear. As a general comment, it can be said that the 
account of transcendental proof given here differs in philosophical orientation 
to the three luminaries mentioned above in at least its attempt to provide a 
substantial, positive philosophical account of “what is involved in 
knowledge”. 
                                                
1 We can relate Mohanty’s comment to a quote from Sacks which we employed on p. 110. The 
quote runs: “Specifically, the form of identified, in asking after the preconditions of what I 
have been calling situated thought, approximates to what may deservedly be referred to as 
transcendental or pure phenomenology. If what has been said here is right, then we have an 
insight into how such a pure phenomenology is of epistemic – and not merely descriptive – 
import; and how it helps to capture both the nature of Kant’s transcendental proofs and the 
confinement of their validity to empirical reality, to the level of possible experience.”(Sacks, 
The Nature of Transcendental Arguments: p. 455). Of course it would appear that Sacks’s 
construal of a “pure phenomenology” as of “epistemic – and not merely descriptive – import” 
(ibid.) is in direct conflict with Mohanty’s claim that a concern with epistemology "is not the 
predominant theme of phenomenology, even of the Husserlian sort. The concern is rather 
about what is involved in knowledge” (Mohanty, Rorty, Phenomenology and Transcendental 
Philosophy: p. 61). However, it would appear that the conflict is only superficial. For by 
claiming that phenomenology is not primarily concerned with epistemology it would appear 
that Mohanty is referring to justificatory epistemology of the kind concerned with rebutting 
scepticism. The “epistemic” concern to which Sacks refers would seem to be precisely the 
variety of philosophical thinking referred to by Mohanty in his idea of “what is involved in 
knowledge”.  
2 See Davidson, A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge: p. 156. 
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